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[Tihe status of the collective bargaining agreement when an employer goes into an
insolvency court ... is a problem, not heretofore acute, which may be of considerable
importance the next time a wave of business failures hits the country.
T. Richard Witmer, 1938'
I. INTRODUCTION
Several political and economic factors have converged recently to create a crisis
for both bankruptcy and labor lawyers in dealing with the problems that arise when
a unionized employer files for relief under the Bankruptcy Code. The recession of the
early 1980s has been the most severe recession since World War II, dramatically
increasing the number of business bankruptcy filings during the last five years. 2
Approximately twenty percent of the labor force are union members, making the
status of a collective bargaining agreement a potential issue in over 14,000 business
bankruptcies filed each year.3
The recent recession has coincided with and encouraged a resurgence of the
anti-union movement in the United States. The efforts of the corporate community
1. T. Richard Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts, 48 YAUt L.J. 195, 222 (1938).
2. From July 1, 1979, through June 30, 1984, 369,542 business bankruptcies were filed, more than double the
number filed during the previous five years. 1 BROKEN BEscH RaV. 7 (Jan. 1982); 1 BROKEN BEncH REy. 6 (Dec. 1982); 2
BROKEN BEcai Rav. 83 (Dec. 1983); 3 BRoKEN BE~cH Rav. 83 (Dec. 1984). The business bankruptcy filings during the
previous five years, 1974-1979, totalled only 157,548. JuOZaAL CONFENCE OF Thm UNrrm STAts, U.S. Coutrs Arm.
OmcE, ANN. REP. Di. 136-37 (1980).
3. The percentage of the nonagricultural labor force that is unionized has declined steadily from a high of almost
35% in 1954, to 27% in 1970, and to 23.6% in 1978. BuR.Au OF LAsoR. STATisriCS, 1980 HmhsooK OF LABOR STAm cs 412.
In 1980, only 20.9% of the total labor force was unionized, whereas by 1984, union membership had declined to
approximately 19% of the work force. BuREAu OF NAT'L AFFAip.s, DrucroRv OF UIErm STATEs LABOR OGAozAsro\s 1 (1983).
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, quoted in Reneved Optimism at AFL-CIO Council Meeting, 118 LAB. RE. Rn,. (BNA)
175 (March 4, 1985).
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and conservative political forces to undermine union organization of workers received
significant support from the defeat of the Labor Law Reform Act of 1978 in
Congress, 4 the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, and the President's quick and
successful decertification of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers' Organization
(PATCO) in 1981.5 Widespread unemployment and layoffs have decimated the
membership of many large unions, such as the United Auto Workers, 6 and
deregulation of the trucking and airline industries has added further to the woes of
certain unions and employees. 7 The incidence of labor strikes has declined to the
lowest number since the Bureau of Labor Statistics began keeping records in 1947.8
All of these factors have provided the backdrop for employers' use of bankruptcy law
against labor unions, organized employees, and collective bargaining agreements. 9
Bankruptcy law has an impact on labor relations because provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code") allow an employer to take certain actions which are prohibited by
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)." To illustrate the way in which the
conflict between bankruptcy law and labor law arises, consider this scenario: An
employer has a collective bargaining agreement with a labor union representing its
4. H.R. 77, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Coxa. REc. 128 (1977). See also AFL-CIO Executive Council Summer
Meeting and AFL-CIO Building Trades Legislative Conference, 1978 LABoR LaTAONS YEaUooK (BNA) 252, 253, 254
(1979); Mills, Flawed Victory in Labor Lans Reform, HAsv. Bus. Ray. May-June 1979, at 92.
5. Professional AirTraffic Controllers' Org., 7 F.L.R.A. No. 10 (Oct. 22, 1981), aff'd, 685 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
6. The UAW lost over 26% of its membership from 1978 to 1983, shrinking from 1.5 million in 1978 to 1.1
million in 1983. Detroit's Jobs That Will Never Come Back, Bus. WK., May 23, 1983, at 168.
7. Both the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705, codified at 49 U.S.C. § 334
(1982), and the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793, codified at 1S U.S.C. § 1114 (1982), 49
U.S.C. §§ 10101-1 1902a (1982) resulted in the formation of nonunion carriers and a consequent loss of jobs among the
unionized employees of older carriers. Daniels, The Origins and Impact of Deregulation, 1 HorsA LAB. L. F. 63, 65-66
(1983). By 1983, the Teamsters Union had reportedly lost 500,000 members. Zifchak, Collective Bargaining in the
Reagan Era: A Management Perspective, I HoramA LAB. L. F. 1, 5 n.13 (1983).
8. The number of work stoppages involving 1,000 or more workers fell from 235 in 1979 to 187 in 1980, and then
declined to 62 in 1984. In comparison, the number fell below 200 only twice between 1947 and 1979. 108 Mo.mmy LAB.
Ryv., June 1985, at 95.
9. This is not the first period in our legal history in which bankruptcy law has been used to control or defeat the
unionization of employees. The development and use of the injunction remedy against labor strikes had its origins in the
equity jurisdiction of the federal courts involved in the administration of railroad receiverships beginning in the 1870s.
See Nelles, A Strike and Its Legal Consequences-An Examination of the Receviership Precedentfor the Labor Injunction,
40 YAt.E L.J. 507 (1931); F. FpsxromxR & N. GRsEEat, Tim LABoR IMtUenoN 23 (1930). The federal courts' widespread
use of labor injunctions to combat the unionization of the railroads resulted in the first major labor legislation in the U.S.:
the Railway Labor Act, passed in 1926, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88. It is this history of the use of receiverships and bankruptcy
law to suppress unionization of the railroads that caused Congress to protect the collective bargaining agreements of
railroad employees in § 77(n) of the Bankruptcy Act. This exception for railroad employees' collective bargaining
agreements is carried forward in § 1167 of the Bankruptcy Code. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
10. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982). The Bankruptcy Code, enacted as the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, went into effect Nov. 6, 1979. Pub. L. No. 95-598 § 402, 92 Stat. 2682. Although the
Code completely reorganized bankruptcy law, the substance of the law on the rejection of executory contracts remained
essentially the same until 1984. Compare §§ 70(b) and 313 of the Bankruptcy Act, former 11 U.S.C. §§ l10(b) and
713(1), with § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 365. Compare § 77(n) of the Bankruptcy Act, former 11 U.S.C.
§ 205(n), with § 1167 of the Bankruptcy Code, I1 U.S.C. § 1167.
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982). The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was first passed in 1935 and was
known as the Wagner Act. 49 Stat. 449 (1935). It was substantially revised in 1947 by the Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No.
80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). The Taft-Hartley Act is officially known as the Labor Management Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 141 (1982). Although the NLRA as revised is technically a part of the Labor Managment Relations Act, it will
be referred to throughout this article by its original name, the NLRA. When other sections of the Taft-Harley Act are
discussed, specifically § 301, they will be referred to as part of the Labor Management Relations Act.
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employees.12 The collective bargaining agreement is a three-year agreement, and will
not expire for another year and a half. The employer's business is experiencing severe
financial difficulties, so the employer decides to seek relief by filing a reorganization
petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.13 The employer would like to
reduce the wages it pays its employees, but to do so would violate the collective
bargaining agreement. Furthermore, the NLRA prohibits an employer from unilat-
erally modifying a collective bargaining agreement during the term of the contract.14
Once the employer files a bankruptcy petition, however, the Bankruptcy Code allows
a debtor-in-possession to reject an executory contract.I5 Consequently, at the same
time the employer files its bankruptcy petition, it files an application to reject its
collective bargaining agreement. The bankruptcy court approves the employer's
request for rejection, and the collective bargaining agreement is terminated. Now that
the employer has no contract with the union, it immediately reduces the wages it pays
its employees. At this point, not only has the employer violated the NLRA by
terminating the contract during its term, but it has also violated the NLRA by
reducing wages without first bargaining in good faith with the union for a new
contract.
This scenario introduces two separate areas of conflict: (1) the conflict over the
status of the collective bargaining agreement itself, and (2) the conflict over the
employer's duty to bargain for a new collective bargaining agreement. These areas of
conflict will be analyzed in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildiscot6 and Congress' subsequent enactment of section 1113
of the Bankruptcy Code. 17
The conflict between what actions an employer may take under bankruptcy law
and what it may do under labor law has been difficult to resolve for several reasons.
First, bankruptcy and labor law are both areas of federal law. There is no supremacy
clause to tell the courts which law should prevail.' 8 Furthermore, a collective
12. A typical collective bargaining agreement, signed by the employer and the union which represents the
employees, contains provisions on wages, fringe benefits, leave policies, hours, work assignments, job-bidding
procedures, layoff and recall of employees, and a variety of other terms and conditions of employment. Perhaps the most
important provisions are its grievance and arbitrations clauses, providing for binding arbitration of disputes which arise
under the contract, and the promise by the union to not call a strike during the term of the contract. Most collective
bargaining agreements are for a three-year term because of the "contract bar" doctrine developed by the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB), under which a contract will only bar a union representation election for up to three years.
13. I1 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (1982). Under Chapter 11, a debtor receives protection from lawsuits by creditors and
remains in control of the business, subject to court supervision, while either liquidating the business or working out a
reorganization plan to pay whatever percentage of its debts it can afford and whatever percentage its creditors will accept
in order to allow the business to continue operating. Ayer, The New Chapter 11, NoRToN BAsm. L. Anvrsos, June, 1985,
at 1.
14. NLRA § 8(d), 29 u.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
15. When an employer files a reorganization petition under Chapter 11, the employer becomes a "debtor-in-
possession." 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (1982). As debtor-in-possession, the employer has many of the rights and powers of
a bankruptcy trustee, including the right to reject executory contracts under § 365(a) subject to court approval. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 1107(a), 365(a) (1982). If the bankruptcy court approves this rejection, the contract is treated as if it had been
breached by the debtor on the day before bankruptcy was filed.
16. 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
17. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113 (West Supp. 1985), providing for the rejection of collective bargaining agreements, was
enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 541(c), 98
Stat. 333, 391.
18. The great bulk of the legal relationships affected by bankruptcy are based on state-created rights of property
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bargaining agreement is a special kind of contract, growing out of a continuing
bargaining relationship between an employer and a union, and cannot be dealt with
as an ordinary commercial contract. Collective bargaining agreements have been
accorded their own special status under federal law. Finally, the duty to bargain
between the employer and the union survives the termination of collective bargaining
agreements and limits an employer's ability to make subsequent changes in working
conditions. Because of the impossibility of breaking off the bargaining relationship,
it is difficult to apply the bankruptcy law of rejection to an organized employer.
II. THE DUTY TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FArrH
A collective bargaining agreement is a unique document because it is the product
of a relationship imposed on the employer by law, not a document produced by a
voluntary relationship. Once a union has been chosen by a majority of employees,
section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA imposes on the employer the obligation to bargain in
good faith with the union on wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. 19
The duty to bargain imposed by section 8(a)(5) is defined in section 8(d) as
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement,
or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any
agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession ....20
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the federal courts will find that
a party is bargaining in good faith if the party has an "open mind and a sincere desire
to reach an agreement.''21 Whether each party has the requisite state of mind must be
discerned from the totality of the conduct of each party.22 No one factor is conclusive;
and contract derived from each state's statutes and common law. See Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy
Cases (P.1.), 47 N.Y.U. L. REy. 407, 412 (1972). Consequently, the majority of legal conflicts that arise in bankruptcy
practice are conflicts between state laws controlling property rights and the debtor-creditor relationship on the one hand,
and the substantive provisions of the Bankruptcy Code on the other, such as those on lien avoidance, priority of debts,
and discharge. When such conflicts arise, the Bankruptcy Code, enacted under the explicit authority of Article I of the
United States Constitution, takes precedence over state law by virtue of the supremacy clause. Article I of the Constitution
provides that Congress may "establish... Uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.,
U.S. Coi r. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The supremacy clause provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. Co.sr. art. VI, cl. 2. See, e.g., National Collection Agency
v. Trahan, 624 F.2d 906, 907 (9th Cir. 1980); In re U.S. Financial, Inc., 594 F.2d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1979).
19. § 8(a)(5) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a).
§ 9(a) provides in relevant part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by a majority of the employees
in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit
for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours or employment, or other
conditions of employment.
National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a)(5), 9(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 159(a) (1982).
20. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) (emphasis added).
21. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1943) (quoting from NLRB v. Reed & Prince
Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 874, 885 (1st cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941)).
22. NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941).
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a determination of good or bad faith is based on many factors, such as frequency and
duration of meetings, exchange or lack of exchange of counteroffers, willingness to
consider counteroffers, repetitious offering of clearly unacceptable proposals, and
inability to reach agreement on any significant issue.2 3 If negotiations between the
parties are successful, a collective bargaining agreement is drafted and signed.
If negotiations are not successful, the parties must continue to bargain until they
reach impasse. Impasse is reached when the parties have discussed each issue for a
reasonable period of time, have failed to agree, and neither side is willing to change
its position. 24 An impasse suspends the duty to bargain, but only temporarily until
circumstances change or one of the parties changes its position.25
The duty to bargain under section 8(a)(5) includes a further obligation on the
employer that becomes crucial in the bankruptcy context. Once employees are
represented by a union, the employer may not make any changes in wages, hours, or
other "mandatory" bargaining subjects without first bargaining to impasse. 26 When
a union is first elected and is bargaining with the employer for an initial contract, the
employer must continue to abide by the same terms and conditions of employment
then in effect until impasse is reached or a contract signed. The same rule applies
when a contract expires and the parties are negotiating a new contract. If an employer
wants to make a change in the status quo under an expiring collective bargaining
agreement, the employer must first present the proposed change to the union and
bargain to impasse on it. Once impasse is reached, the employer may then unilaterally
implement any changes in the status quo consistent with its last offer to the union.27
23. Because the concept of good faith is so elusive and fact-sensitive, the possible fact patterns and cases discussing
good faith bargaining are endless. For a summary of good faith bargaining determinations, see C. MoRsMs, TiE DEV,-oma
LABoR LAW 570-606 (2d ed. 1983).
24. An impasse is "a state of facts in which the parties, despite the best of faith, are simply deadlocked." NLRB
v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F.2d 472,482 (5th Cir. 1963). Factors in deciding whether impasse has been reached include length
of negotiations, good faith efforts to reach agreement, and the importance of the subjects on which agreement cannot be
reached. Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967).
25. In Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404 (1982), the Court described impasse thus: "As
a recurring feature in the bargaining process, impasse is only a temporary deadlock or hiatus in negotiations 'which in
almost all eases is eventually broken, through either a change of mind or the application of economic force."' Id. at 412
(citation omitted).
26. The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958), divided bargaining subjects into
two categories: mandatory and permissive. Mandatory subjects are "'wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment." National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). For example, under court interpretations,
an employer's decision to subcontract work is a mandatory subject of bargaining. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). An employer's decision to partially close a plant, however, is not a mandatory subject, but
a permissive one. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). Permissive subjects are essentially all
those that are neither mandatory nor illegal subjects.
If an issue is a mandatory subject of bargaining, it is a violation of § 8(d) to refuse to bargain over it. NLRB v.
Borg-Varner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958). On the other hand, to insist to impasse on an issue that is merely a
permissive subject is also a violation of the duty to bargain, since it is in effect a refusal to bargain over the mandatory
subjects. Id.
In NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962), the Supreme Court held that "an employer's unilateral change in conditions
of employment under negotiation is ... a violation of § 8(a)(5), for it is a circumvention of the duty to negotiate ....-
Id. at 743. Consequently, if the employer wishes to make a change in operations which involves a mandatory subject of
bargaining, the employer must bargain to impasse before making the change.
27. For example, in the 1983 national Greyhound negotiations for a new contract, Greyhound wanted to reduce
wages and requested that the bus drivers accept a 9.5% decrease in the expiring wage rate. The union refused to agree
to the company's offer and, after the contract expired, went out on strike. The company then implemented the 9.5%
decrease after reaching impasse in negotiations. N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1983, Part I at 26, col. I. Once impasse was
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Under the NLRA, the employer's obligation to bargain in good faith continues
throughout the relationship between the employer and the union. It is not suspended
by the signing of a collective bargaining agreement. Both parties are obligated to
bargain at any time over any term or condition of employment not addressed by the
collective bargaining agreement itself.28 Incorporating specific items into a collective
bargaining agreement, however, waives the duty of either party to bargain again on
those items during the term of the contract. 29
m. COLLECTIVE BARGAINNG AGREEMENTS UNDER FEDERAL LAW
A. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
A collective bargaining agreement is created and enforced under federal law, not
state law. State-created common law principles of contract formation, interpretation,
and breach do not apply to collective bargaining agreements. The federal law which
controls the interpretation and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements has
been developed by the federal courts under section 301 of the Labor Management
reached, the company was free to adopt its last wage offer as its new term of employment. This unilateral change made
by the employer was consistent with the employer's bargaining position at the time impasse was reached.
28. "Collective bargaining is a continuing process . . . [that] involves . . . resolution of new problems not
covered by existing agreements." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46 (1957). The employer has a duty to bargain "as
to subjects which were neither discussed nor embodied in any of the terms and conditions of the contract." NLRB v.
Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 680, 684 (2d Cir. 1952). A union, however, may explicitly waive its right to bargain during
the contract term about mandatory subjects of bargaining not covered by the contract by agreeing to a zipper clause in the
contract. A zipper clause specifies that the written collective bargaining agreement contains all agreements between the
parties, and the union waives its right to bargain during the contract's term about any matters not contained in the contract.
For a zipper clause to constitute a waiver, however, there must be clear and unmistakable evidence from the bargaining
history, completeness of the contract, or the actual contract language that the union intended to give up its right to bargain
over a particular subject. Columbus & S. Ohio Ele. Co., 270 N.L.R.B. 686 (1984); Bancroft-Whitney Co., 214
N.L.R.B. 57 (1974); Radioear Corp., 214 N.L.R.B. 362 (1974). The courts have held that waiver of the right to bargain
over a specific subject will not be extended to cover a more general subject. See, e.g., NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp.,
385 U.S. 421 (1967). See generally Mossas, supra note 23, at 641-63, 672-74.
when issues arise during the life of a contract which are not controlled by the collective bargaining agreement or
upon which the parties have not waived their bargaining rights, the employer is under a continuing obligation to bargain
with the union prior to taking unilateral action. For example, if an employer wants to subcontract work, but (1) the
employer has never subcontracted such work before, and (2) the collective bargaining agreement is silent on the issue of
subcontracting, the employer must bargain to impasse with the union before it may subcontract the work. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). If the employer makes this change without bargaining, the employer
has violated § 8(a)(5). The provisions of the collective bargaining agreement may or may not be relevant to the NLRB's
unfair labor practice determination. Although there may be instances when such a unilateral change is both a violation of
§ 8(a)(5) and a violation of the collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain does not arise from the contract, but
from the statutory obligation contained in the NLRA. "The fact that the unfair labor practice is also a breach of contract
for which the injured party might have another remedy . . . does not displace the authority of the Board to deal with and
remedy the unfair labor practice." Nassau County Health Facilities Ass'n, 227 N.L.R.B. 1680, 1684 (1977). See also
NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967) (Board had jurisdiction to interpret contract clause to determine
if employer had unilaterally changed a term of employment in violation of § 8(a)(5)).
29. The duty to bargain during the term of the contract is defined, in part, in § 8(d) as follows:
Mhe duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either party to discuss or agree to any modifications
of the terms and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to become effective
before such terms and conditions can be reopened under the provisions of the contract.
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). In interpreting § 8(d), the National Labor Relations Board has stated that, "[as to the written
terms of the contract, either party may refuse to bargain further about them" during the term of the collective bargaining
agreement. Allied Mills, 82 N.L.R.B. 854, 862 (1949).
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Relations Act, passed in 1947.30 In 1957, in its first interpretation of section 301, the
Supreme Court held that section 301 "authorize[d] federal courts to fashion a body
of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements." 31
Since 1957, the Court has developed a federal common law of collective bargaining
agreements, using as its basis the NLRA, the Labor Management Relations Act
(Taft-Hartley), the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 32 the Landrum-Griffin Act,33 and the
"penumbra" of these statutes and the Congressional policies they exemplify, as
divined by the Court.34 Consequently, today's disputes over breach of collective
bargaining agreements are normally litigated in federal district court and are
controlled by federal labor law principles under section 301, not the common law of
ordinary contracts. When a collective bargaining agreement becomes embroiled in a
bankruptcy proceeding, the bankruptcy court must look to the body of federal law
under section 301 to interpret and determine the nonbankruptcy status of the
agreement and any claims arising under it.
Because collective bargaining agreements have been enforced under federal law
for only twenty-nine years, a relatively short time in the development of a common
law, the exact legal nature of a collective bargaining agreement has never been clearly
defined. 35 The Supreme Court has described a collective bargaining agreement in
30. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1982). § 301 is codified as 29 U.S.C. § 185.
The Labor Management Relations Act is better known as the Taft-Hartley Act. See supra note 11. § 301(a) reads:
Suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an
industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982). Many argued that § 301 was unconstitutional because it attempted to give jurisdiction to the
federal courts without creating any substantive federal law under which such suits would arise. See Westinghouse Salaried
Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,
460 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Any doubts were resolved, however, when the Supreme Court upheld the statute
as constitutional in Lincoln Mills. Id. at 457.
31. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957).
32. Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1982). This statute withdraws jurisdiction from
the federal courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes except in very narrow circumstances and under strict procedural
limitations.
33. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982). This statute regulates the internal
affairs of unions and guarantees certain rights of union members to participate in union affairs.
34. The Court has held that, although state courts have concurrent jurisdiction under § 301 to enforce collective
bargaining agreements, state courts must apply federal substantive labor law in interpreting and enforcing these contracts.
Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
35. See Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MICH. L. Ray. 1 (1958); Shulman,
Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. Rav. 999 (1955); Summers, Collective Agreements and the
Law of Contracts, 78 Ymts L.J. 525 (1969); and Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61
CAIF. L. REv. 663 (1973).
Three theories of the contractual nature of a collective bargaining agreement are discussed in R. Strm, L. M1r-mun,
T. ST. ANTgow, & C. CRAvER, LABOR RE Aioxs LAw 703-04 (7th ed. 1984). Two of the theories, the agency theory and
the third-party beneficiary theory, use traditional common law contract concepts. The agency theory is that the union, as
agent, negotiates and signs the agreement for the employees, the principals. The third-party beneficiary theory is that the
employer and union make mutual promises for the benefit of the third-party employees. The third theory treats the
collective bargaining agreement as a kind of governmental code regulating a system of industrial self-government in each
factory or work place. See John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-80 (1960).
Professor Corbin describes a collective bargaining agreement as follows:
A "collective bargain" is itself a "contract," but it is a contract of a very special kind .... The collective
bargain has many features of a fundamental organizing statute... .The rights conferred by existing (and
changing) legislation are not contract rights. . . . The collective bargain is certainly enforceable as a
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varying terms over the years, emphasizing its nature either as an industrial code of
self-government or as a third-party beneficiary contract. In one of the Court's earliest
discussions of a collective bargaining agreement in 1944, Mr. Justice Jackson used
both elements:
Contract in labor law is a term the implications of which must be determined from
the connection in which it appears.... The negotiations between union and management
result in what often has been called a trade agreement, rather than in a contract of
employment....
After the collective trade agreement is made, the individuals who shall benefit by it
are identified by individual hirings ....
But, however engaged, an employee becomes entitled by virtue of the Labor
Relations Act somewhat as a third party beneficiary to all benefits of the collective trade
agreement, even if on his own he would yield to less favorable terms. The individual
hiring contract is subsidiary to the terms of the trade agreement and may not waive any
of its benefits .... 36
In the Steelworkers Trilogy,37 the Court's most significant set of labor decisions
after adopting a federal common law of labor agreements in 1957, the Court reiterated
the theme of the collective bargaining agreement as a kind of governmental code of
labor relations:
The collective bargaining agreement states the rights and duties of the parties. It is more
than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen
cannot wholly anticipate .... The collective agreement covers the whole employment
relationship. It calls into being a new common law-the common law of a particular
industry or of a particular plant ....
A collective bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a system of industrial
self-government. When most parties enter into contractual relationship they do so
voluntarily, in the sense that there is no real compulsion to deal with one another, as
opposed to dealing with other parties. This is not true of the labor agreement. The choice
is generally not between entering or refusing to enter into a relationship, for that in all
probability pre-exists the negotiations. Rather it is between having that relationship
governed by an agreed upon rule of law or leaving each and every matter subject to a
temporary resolution dependent solely upon the relative strength, at any given moment,
of the contending forces. 38
The compulsory nature of the collective bargaining agreement is derived from the
employer's duty to bargain in good faith. What emerges from this description is a
realization that what is most significant about a collective bargaining agreement is
"contract" against the parties thereto, not only by the sanctions that newly adopted law may prescribe, but by
the ordinary remedies of law and equity in contract cases. . . . The employees may or may not be regarded as
parties to the bargain; but they are certainly beneficiaries of the bargain with legally enforceable rights ...
[U]nion representatives act on behalf of all the employees . . . [but) are not ordinary "agents" of the
employees.
6A A. CoRBLN, Come: o. Co-nvrcrs § 1420 (1982). Corbin thus touches on the beneficiary, agency, and industrial
self-government theories, showing the uncertain nature of the relationship between contract law and collective bargaining
agreements.
36. J.1 Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 334-36 (1944).
37. Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
38. Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-80 (1960).
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not its specific terms, but its existence as an embodiment of the continuous
relationship between the employer and the union representing its employees.
Because of this need to protect and foster the bargaining relationship behind the
contract, the Court has felt free to depart from traditional common law principles of
contract law in construing specific provisions of collective bargaining agreements.
For example, in John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston39 the Court held that the duty to
arbitrate grievances arising under a collective bargaining agreement survived a
corporate merger, binding the successor corporation even though it had not assumed
the contract. In so holding, the Court commented:
While the principles of law governing ordinary contracts would not bind to a contract an
unconsenting successor to a contracting party, a collective bargaining agreement is not an
ordinary contract .... Central to the peculiar status and function of a collective
bargaining agreement is the fact, dictated both by circumstance ... and by the
requirements of the National Labor Relations Act, that it is not in any real sense the simple
product of a consensual relationship.-
The Court has continued to construe collective bargaining agreements as unique
and special contracts in a variety of ways.41 The John Wiley opinion, however, is
39. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
40. Id. at 550.
41. For example, the Court has rejected some of the normal legal incidents of third-party beneficiary contracts. In
Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459 (1960), the trustees of an employee retirement and welfare fund set up by
the national collective bargaining agreement in the coal industry sued a coal company for failure to pay the full premiums
required by the collective bargaining agreement. The coal company defended on the grounds that performance of its duty
to pay the royalties to the fund was excused when the union violated the collective bargaining agreement with strikes and
work stoppages. The Court acknowledged that the normal rule governing third-party beneficiary contracts would allow
the company to set off, as a defense to the third-party's suit for recovery under the contract, the company's damage claim
against the union. In rejecting this third-party principle, the Court stated:
This collective bargaining agreement, however, is not a typical third-party beneficiary contract. The [coal
company] promisor's interest in the third party here goes far beyond the mere performance of its promise to that
third party, Le., beyond the payment of royalty. . . . Not only has Benedict entered into a long-term
relationship with the union in this regard, but in compliance with [federal law] it has assumed equal
responsibility with the union for the management of the fund ....
Furthermore, Benedict promised in the collective bargaining agreement to pay a specified scale of wages
to the employees. It would not be contended that Benedict might recoup its damages by decreasing these
wages . . . .
Finally, a consideration which is not present in the case of other third-party beneficiary contracts is the
impact of the national labor policy.
Id. at 468-70. Justice Frankfurter dissented from the holding, as he had in Lincoln Mills, arguing that the Court should
be wary of creating any specialized law of collective bargaining agreements separate and apart from traditional notions
governing the operation and interpretation of contracts. Id. at 471 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter was
obviously reluctant to give courts a free hand in interpreting collective bargaining agreements under some still-to-be-
discovered federal common law of labor relations and preferred that judges begin with well-established contract doctrines.
In a recent case involving a welfare fund trustee suit against an employer, Schneider Moving & Storage Co. v.
Robbins, 466 U.S. 364 (1984), the Court relied in part on Lewis v. Benedict Coal for the proposition that the company
could not assert the same defense against the welfare fund trustee that it could assert against the union. The Court decided
the case, however, under traditional contract notions, examining the language of the collective bargaining agreement to
determine the intent of the parties.
Another example of the continuing tension between the Court's view of a collective bargaining agreement as a
commercial contract and its view of it as a peculiar creation of federal common law is a series of opinions addressing the
question of which statute of limitations to apply to a suit to enforce a collective bargaining agreement. Initially, the Court
held that a suit to enforce a collective bargaining agreement under § 301, filed by a union against an employer to collect
vacation pay, "closely resemble[d] an action for breach of contract cognizable at common law." Auto workers v.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 705 n.7 (1966). In deciding which was the most analogous state statute of
limitations to apply, the Court reasoned that a suit to enforce a collective bargaining agreement is based in part upon the
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perhaps the high-water mark of the Court's protection of a collective bargaining
agreement, extending its reach beyond its own terms. Beginning in the 1970s, the
Court began to restrict the "successor employer" doctrine as set forth in John Wiley.
The Court protected a collective bargaining agreement once it had been formed, but
refused to bind a subsequent employer of the same workers to the preceding
employer's contract, unless the successor had voluntarily assumed it.42 The Court
based this refusal to bind a successor employer on its holding in H.K. Porter43 that
written collective bargaining agreement, but is also based upon the oral contracts of hire between the employer and each
employee. Because this resulting "contract" was partly written and partly oral, the Court chose the six-year state statute
of limitations on contracts "not in writing." Id. at 707.
In two cases decided in 1981 and 1983, however, the Court rejected state statutes of limitation governing contract
actions, ultimately choosing the six-month statute of limitations contained in the NLRA for filing unfair labor practice
charges. These cases involved not only a § 301 claim for an alleged breach of contract by an employer, but also a claim
for breach by the union of the duty of fair representation which it owes to every employee it represents. See United Parcel
Serv. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981); Del Costello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983). In
justifying its departure from state contract statutes of limitation, the Court quoted from Justice Goldberg's concurring
opinion in Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964):
Illn this Court's fashioning of a federal law of collective bargaining, it is of the utmost importance that the law
reflect the realities of industrial life and the nature of the collective bargaining process. We should not assume
that doctrines evolved in other contexts will be equally well adapted to the collective bargaining process.
Del Costello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172 (1983) (quoting Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335,
358 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring)). Again, it is the nature of the collective bargaining process that is important, not
the status of the agreement as a discrete contractual document.
Finally, in Bowen v. U.S. Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212 (1983), a third suit involving an employee's claim against the
union for breach of the duty of fair representation and his claim against the employer for breach of the collective bargaining
agreement, the Court rejected the union's argument that only an employer can be held liable for damages for discharging
an employee in breach of the contract. The Court explained:
The difficulty with this argument is that it treats the relationship between the employer and employee, created
by the collective-bargaining agreement, as if it were a simple contract of hire governed by traditional
common-law principles. This reading . . . fails to recognize that a collective-bargaining agreement is much
more than traditional common-law employment teninable at will. Rather, it is an agreement creating
relationships and interests under the federal common law of labor policy.
Id. at 220. Relying on the nature of the relationship between the employer, the union, and the employees, the Court
departed from general contract law and held that the union, as well as the employer, was liable for a portion of the
damages arising from the employer's breach of the collective bargaining agreement. The breach of contract claim and the
duty of fair representation claim are closely related in that the employee cannot prevail against the company on the breach
of contract claim unless the employee first shows that the union breached its duty of fair representation in representing
the employee during the grievance and arbitration process. See infra note 47. Consequently, in Bowen the Court held:
Mhe employer discharged the employee wrongfully and remains liable for the employees' backpay. . . . The
union's breach of its duty of fair representation, however, caused the grievance procedure to malfunction
resulting in an increase in the employee's damages. . . . mhe union is responsible for the increase in damages
and . . . should bear its portion of the damages.
Id. at 223. The Court approved the result reached at the trial court level where the apportionment of damages between
the defendants had been left to the jury's discretion, with the jury accepting the district court's suggestion that
apportionment be based on the date of a hypothetical arbitration decision representing the earliest date the employer would
have reinstated the plaintiff if the union had fulfilled its duty of fair representation. Id. at 215.
42. See NLRB v. Bums Sec. Serv., 406 U.S. 272 (1972) (successor employer who had maintained substantial
continuity of the business and identity of workforce but had not assumed the existing collective bargaining agreement was
not bound by its terms; however, because it hired a majority of its employees from the employees of the former employer,
it was obligated to bargain with the union which continues to represent a majority of the successor's workforce); Howard
Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., Hotel & Retaurant Employees, 417 U.S. 249 (1974) (absent express
assumption of collective bargaining agreement, purchaser of business was under no duty to arbitrate any grievances arising
under the former employer's contract with union).
On the other hand, in cases not involving a successor employer, the Court continued to protect collective bargaining
agreements and the duty to resolve contract disputes under the contracts' arbitration procedures. In Nolde Bros. v. Local
No. 358, 430 U.S. 243 (1977), the Court held that the duty to arbitrate severance pay claims which arose under the
contract continued even though the contract itself had expired.
43. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
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the NLRA does not give any power to the NLRB or a federal court to compel an
employer to enter into any specific collective bargaining agreement, or to agree
to any particular contract term, no matter how egregious the employer's violation of
the duty to bargain in good faith has been. 44 The parties must bargain in good faith,
but they are free to agree or disagree on any given contract proposals. The bargaining
relationship is compelled by law, but the provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement must be the result of voluntary agreement.
Scholars, as well as the Supreme Court, have proposed various ways to
characterize the bargaining agreement produced as a result of the legal compulsion to
bargain in good faith. Professor Clyde Summers argues that, although the collective
bargaining agreement may not be an ordinary contract, it is one variety of contract
nonetheless. 45 Professor David Feller, on the other hand, rejects traditional contract
analysis, arguing that the bulk of the provisions in a collective bargaining agreement
are work rules, which are not judicially enforceable contract terms. In his view, the
contract contains only two judicially enforceable promises: (1) the employer's
promise to resolve any contract disputes through the grievance and arbitration
procedure, 46 and (2) the union's promise not to call a strike during the term of the
contract. 47
44. Id. at 108. The Court relied on the explicit language contained in § 8(d) that the duty to bargain "does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
45. Professor Summers states that although the complex, multi-party nature of collective bargaining agreements
and the ambiguities which the bargainers accept in order to reach agreement distinguish collective bargaining agreements
from many commercial contracts, these characteristics are also found in other types of modem contracts. Further, while
he acknowledges that the employer and union, unlike most commercial parties, have a legal duty to bargain, he notes that
the only compulsion to actually reach an agreement is economic, not legal. He concludes that collective bargaining
agreements are sufficiently in the mainstream of contracts to be governed by general contract principles, such as
recognized guides for interpreting contract ambiguity, but are too different from ordinary contracts to be governed by
specific contract rules, such as third-party beneficiary rules. Summers, supra note 35, at 561-62.
46. It should be noted that under some collective bargaining agreements, unions also promise to grieve and arbitrate
disputes at the employer's request, a so-called bilateral arbitration clause.
47. Feller, supra note 35, at 792-99. Again, in some contracts, the no-strike clause also includes a promise by the
employer not to lock out employees during the term of the contract.
Under the federal common law of § 301 as developed by the Supreme Court, if an employer breaches the contract
during its term, the union must grieve and arbitrate the breach. If a union sues to enforce the contract under § 301, the
judicial remedy is an order of specific performance compelling the employer to arbitrate any breach. Textile Workers v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). As long as a collective bargaining agreement contains an arbitration clause which
arguably covers the dispute between the parties, a federal court will not give damages for breach, but will compel
arbitration. Drake Bakeries v. Bakery Workers Local 50, 370 U.S. 254 (1962); see also the Steelworkers Trilogy, 363
U.S. 564 (1960). On the other hand, if a union calls a strike in breach of its no-strike promise, the employer may sue under
§ 301 to enjoin the strike and recover damages against the union. See § 301(b), 29 U.S.C. § 185(b); Boys Mkts. v. Retail
Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). Employees themselves are not parties to the contract, make no promises under
the contract, and, in turn, cannot be sued by the employer for damages for breach of the contract. Feller, supra note 35,
at 774-92, 803. See also Complete Auto Transit v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401 (1981). Any wildcat strike in breach of contract
by employees, however, may be enjoined.
In contrast to the limitations on the employer's right to sue an employee for breach, an employee can sue individually
to enforce the contract against an employer. See Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 200 (1962). The
employee's right to sue, however, is subject to formidable preconditions: (1) the employee must exhaust any contractual
grievance and arbitration procedures, and (2) to avoid the fimality of a grievance settlement by the union or an arbitration
award, the employee must prove the union breached its duty of fair representation in processing the grievance or in
representing the employee at an arbitration hearing. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 567 (1976); Vaa
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965).
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B. Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act
In addition to the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements in court under
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, the National Labor Relations
Act also contains a proviso in section 8(d) which protects collective bargaining
agreements from modification or premature termination. Under this proviso, an
employer may not modify or terminate a collective bargaining agreement during its
term except upon the consent of the union. 48 Furthermore, when negotiating a new
contract upon expiration of the old one, the parties must fulfill certain notice
requirements which are designed to create a cooling-off period before the union may
strike. 49
Most disputes that arise during the term of a collective bargaining agreement
involve questions concerning the application of specific contract terms to specific
events, such as whether the employer correctly followed the contract's job-bidding
procedures, or whether an employee was discharged for just cause. These disputes are
resolved through the grievance and arbitration procedures set forth in the contract,
and do not normally encompass a claim by the union that the employer is seeking to
modify or change the contract itself. If the union believes, however, that the
employer has not only violated the contracts provisions, but is seeking to modify the
contract, the union may pursue the dispute under both the NLRA and the contract: it
may file an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB under section 8(d), and it may
seek arbitration under the contract. 50
48. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). Section 8(d) provides, in part:
Provided, That where there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering employees in an industry
affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall
terminate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification-
(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed termination or modification
sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof, or in the event such contract contains no expiration date, sixty
days prior to the time it is proposed to make such termination or modification;
(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of negotiating a new contract or a contract
containing the proposed modifications;
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thirty days after such notice of the
existence of a dispute, and simultaneously therewith notifies any State or Territorial agency established to
mediate and conciliate disputes within the State or Territory where the dispute occurred, provided no agreement
has been reached by that time; and
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the terms and conditions
of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the expiration date of such
contract, whichever occurs later:.
. . . the duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either party to discuss or agree to any
modification of the terms and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to
become effective before such terms and conditions can be reopened under the provisions of the contract.
Id. (emphasis added). The effect of this provision is to prohibit any mid-term modification or termination of a contract
for a fixed term except with both parties' agreement.
49. See § 8(d)(1) and (3). Id. These notice provisions also apply to any lock-out by the employer. § 8(d)(4).
50. Although the union may file a charge under § 8(d) and also pursue a grievance under the contract's grievance
and arbitration procedures, this does not mean that both procedures will be followed to completion. If the grievance and
arbitration procedures are completed before the unfair labor practice charges are filed, the Board may defer to the
arbitrator's decision if the proceedings were fair, all parties had agreed to be bound by the arbitrator's award, the legal
conclusions were consistent with Board law, and the statutory issue was factually parallel to the contractual issue. Olin
Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
If an arbitration decision has not yet been rendered, the Board may stay its proceedings pending completion of the
arbitral process. United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984); Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 827
(1971). The Board decides whether prearbitral deferral is appropriate by looking at the parties' bargaining relationship,
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IV. REJECrION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AREEMENTS IN BANKRUrCY
A. Prior to Bildisco
The conflicts between labor law and bankruptcy law arise when an organized
employer files for bankruptcy during the term of a collective bargaining agreement
between the employer and the union. The initial issue in dispute is whether the
employer may reject the collective bargaining agreement under section 365 of the
Bankruptcy Code. If the contract may be rejected, then the second issue, whether the
employer has the right to make unilateral changes, is reached.
To be eligible for rejection under section 365, a contract must be an "executory
contract,"' s for which the Code does not contain any definition. The legislative
history defines the term as including any contract "on which performance remains
due to some extent on both sides."52 The concept of executory contract is difficult to
apply to a collective bargaining agreement.53 Nevertheless, the federal courts have
the presence of any antiunion animus, the scope of the arbitration agreement, and the role of the contract in the dispute.
Id. at 842.
51. Section 365(a) provides that "Mhe Trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor." I1 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982).
52. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 58, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD. News 5787, 5844.
53. On the one hand, all unexpired collective bargaining agreements may be considered executory because they can
never be executed or completed. There is no performance by either the employer or the union which will complete the
contract. The parties have contracted for several things: (1) certain terms and conditions of employment to be maintained
by the employer over a specified period of time; (2) a method for resolving disputes over those conditons; and (3) a
promise not to interrupt production by strikes or lockouts during that time period. The contract governs the entire
relationship between the parties, not a discrete transaction or series of transactions.
On the other hand, because the contract cannot be executed or completed by any given performance, one questions
whether a collective bargaining agreement meets the bankruptcy definition of executory, which requires some
performance to remain due by both parties to the contract. Performance remains due by an employer under many
provisions of a typical collective bargaining agreement, but often a union's only contractual promise, as opposed to
performance, is its no-strike promise. See Feller, supra note 35, at 792, 797-805. It is problematic whether the promise
not to do something is an obligation of future performance sufficient to make the contract executory within the meaning
of bankruptcy law. For example, the courts have disagreed over whether an unexpired promise not to compete is sufficient
performance due to make the contract executory under the Bankruptcy Code. Compare In re Cooper, 47 Bankr. 842
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985), In re Norquist, 43 Bankr. 224 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1984), and In re Rovine Corp., 5 Bankr.
402 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1980) (each finding that an unexpired covenant not to compete does constitute performance due)
with In re Sapse, 31 Bankr. 914 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983) (holding that the contract containing an unfulfilled covenant not
to compete was fully executed and, therefore, could not be rejected because it was no longer executory).
In his historic article on executory contracts published in 1973, Professor Vein Countryman proposed a more precise
definition of the term "executory contract" than the one used by Congress in 1978 and adopted in Bildisco. Professor
Countryman defined an executory contract as "a contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other
party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material
breach excusing the performance of the other." Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 Mm-N. L.
REv. 439,460 (1973). Under Professor Countryman's definition--so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete
performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other-a collective bargaining agreement
would not qualify as an executory contract. Under the federal common law of labor contracts, the failure of either the
employer or the union to perform its promises under the collective bargaining agreement does not constitute a material
breach of the contract and does not excuse the other from continuing to honor the agreement. If employees strike during
the contract's term over an arbitrable grievance, the strike may be enjoined. Boys Mkts. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398
U.S. 235 (1970). Furthermore, if the union was responsible for the strike, the employer can recover damages caused by
the strike. Labor Management Relations Act § 301(b), 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1982). This breach of promise by the union,
however, is not a material breach in that it does not excuse the employer from honoring the contract. The employer may
not rescind the collective bargaining agreement, but remains bound by it. Local 721 v. Needham Packing Co., 376 U.S.
247 (1964); Drake Bakeries v. Bakery Workers Locai 50, 370 U.S. 254 (1962). Although the Court in Drake Bakeries
commented that it was not deciding that under no circumstances could the employer rescind the contract, no subsequent
cases have allowed such a recission.
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assumed, without much discussion, that collective bargaining agreements are
executory under bankruptcy law, except when the contract has already expired by its
own terms. 5
4
Likewise, the union remains bound by its contractual no-strike promise regardless of an employer's breach. The
union's remedy for breach is to sue under § 301 to compel arbitration. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,
455 (1957). The union is not excused by the employer's breach from continuing to honor its promise not to strike.
Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 387 (1974); Boys Mkts. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S.
235, 238 (1970); Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962). The union may strike during the
term of a contract only if the contract expressly gives the union the right to strike or if the strike is over a dispute which
is separate and apart from the contract and which is not arbitrable.
Because neither the failure of the employer nor the union to perform fully is a material breach of contract, excusing
the performance of the other, a collective bargaining agreement is not an executory contract in bankruptcy under Professor
Countryman's definition. The impossibility of creating a material breach of a collective bargaining agreement is consistent
with the Supreme Court's refusal to let rights under a collective bargaining agreement expire, even when the contract itself
expires or is otherwise terminated. Nolde Bros. v. Bakery Workers Local 358, 430 U.S. 243 (1977); John Wiley & Sons
v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
Professor Countryman, in his section on collective bargaining agreements, simply calls them executory and does not
ask the question whether or not collective bargaining agreements do, in fact, meet his definition. Countryman, Executory
Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part II, 58 Mes. L. REv. 479, 492 (1974). In creating his definition of executory contract,
Professor Countryman sets up three categories of contracts: (1) those in which the nonbankrupt party has performed fully;
(2) those in which the bankrupt party has performed fully; and (3) those in which neither party has performed fully. He
does not create a fourth category, however, for those contracts where no material breach will occur even if one party fails
to perform. He does conclude that "a contract so nearly performed by the nonbankrupt party that failure to complete
performance would not be sufficiently material to excuse performance by the bankrupt should not be treated as an
executory contract in bankruptcy." Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439,
457-58 (1973). This description comes close to describing the legal incidents of a collective bargaining agreement.
The difficulty with the concept of executory versus nonexecutory in the labor context is that the Court has so
protected collective bargaining agreements under the common law of § 301 that a collective bargaining agreement can
never be considered executed until it expires. It functions much as a statute passed by a legislature; it govems the conduct
of employer and employee until it is replaced by a new contract or is repealed when the rules expire. Legal language can
be manipulated to fit a collective bargaining agreement into some definition of "executory contract," but these definitions
fail to capture the essence of the collective bargaining agreement. The inability to apply the material breach doctrine to
collective bargaining agreements simply illustrates again their uniqueness as a long-term, governmental-type regulation
of the work place.
54. In the few instances in which a court has ruled that a collective bargaining agreement was not an executory
contract, the collective bargaining agreement had already expired by its own terms. Gloria Mfg. Corp. v. ILGWU, 734
F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1984); In re Pesce Baking Co., 43 Bankr. 949, 957 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio, 1984). The one substantive
discussion of whether any future performance remains due by both parties under a collective bargaining agreement is
contained in In re Total Transp. Serv., 37 Bankr. 904 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio, 1984), in which the court held that the collective
bargaining agreement was no longer executory because the debtor had closed its business and no employees continued to
be employed under the collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, no future performance was due by either the employer
or employees. Id. at 906.
The issue of whether a collective bargaining agreement is an executory contract was not actually litigated in Bildisco
because the parties conceded that the agreement was executory. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 521-22
(1984). Only one amicus brief, that of the United Mine Workers, contested the issue. The Mine Workers contended that
a collective bargaining agreement is not an executory contract because it primarily contains unilateral promises by the
employer and lacks the mutuality of future performance required by the definition. For example, an employer's promise
to follow seniority in job assignments is unilateral, depending in no sense on any future performance by the union. In
addition, many of the promises the employer makes in a collective bargaining agreement are for the payment of benefits
after the employees have fully performed the services for which they are being paid, such as the employer's promise to
continue to pay health benefits for retired and laid-off employees. Brief for the United Mine Workers at 6-7, NLRB v.
Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522 n.6 (1984).
In finding that collective bargaining agreements are executory contracts under § 365, the Supreme Court accepted
the bankruptcy definition as a contract "on which performance is due to some extent on both sides." The Court found
that under the labor agreement between Bildisco and the union, both "had reciprocal obligations, and at any point during
the life of the contract, performance was due by both parties." 465 U.S. 513, 522 n.6. The Court, however, did not
specify what that performance was, and, in particular, did not indicate what performance was still due by the union.
In fact, the contract between Bildisco and the Teamsters Union did not contain an express no-strike promise by the
union, normally the only obligation imposed on the union by a collective bargaining agreement. See Labor Contract
between Bildisco and Teamsters Local 408, reprinted in Joint Appendix at 78-115, NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465
U.S. 513 (1984). Thus, one could argue that no performance at all remained due by the union in Bildisco. Under federal
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Assuming a collective bargaining agreement is an executory contract, section
365 provides that a trustee or debtor in possession "may assume or reject any
executory contract" subject to the approval of the bankruptcy court.55 The debate
over rejection of collective bargaining agreements draws its significance from the
different treatment and priorities afforded various types of claims under bankruptcy
law.5 6 First priority is given to claims for administrative expenses, including
employee wage and benefit claims based on services rendered after the bankruptcy
petition is filed and during the administration of the bankruptcy estate. 57 Although
these wage and benefit claims are entitled to first priority whether or not the collective
bargaining agreement is rejected, rejection of the contract may result in such
labor law principles, however, the Supreme Court has held that a no-strike promise by the union may be implied from
a contract's arbitration provision. See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 382 (1974); Teamsters
Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962). Thus, if the Court had discussed the issue in Bildisco, it may
have implied a no-strike promise from the wording of the arbitration clause, § 22, and from two references in the contract
to the union's right to call a work stoppage upon the occurrence of specific breaches by the employer during the term of
the contract. See Labor Contract between Bildisco and Teamsters Local 408, §§ 1, 13, 22. The Court's eagerness to imply
a no-strike promise makes it largely irrelevant whether the collective bargaining agreement actually contains a no-strike
clause. As another example of a collective bargaining agreement's departure from ordinary contract law, examining the
terms of the contract to determine the future obligations of the parties is not always appropriate for collective bargaining
agreements. Because important obligations are imposed by law, not contract, one cannot look at the written document
itself to discover whether or not performance remains due by both parties in order to decide if the contract is executory.
By creating the new § 1113 on collective bargaining agreements in 1984, Congress has removed most of the
bankruptcy cases involving collective bargaining agreements from § 365 and its language on executory contracts. The
question is not entirely moot, however, because the 1984 amendments on collective bargaining agreements were not
incorporated into the Bankruptcy Code's Chapter 9 on municipal bankruptcy. Chapter 9 does incorporate § 365, so the
status of a collective bargaining agreement with a municipality will continue to be litigated under § 365. See 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 901(a) (West Supp. 1985). § 901(a) lists the sections of title 11 that apply to municipal bankruptcies. § 365 is included
in this list; § 1113 is not.
55. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982). If the debtor rejects or renounces the contract, the debtor is no longer bound by
it, but the other contracting party may claim damages for breach. This breach relates back in time and is deemed to have
occurred on the day before the debtor filed bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g).
If the debtor assumes the contract, it ratifies, confirms, and adopts the contract, assuming all liabilities under the
contract which exist as of the date of assumption. See 2 L. KINo, CoLLr o.N BANrUwvFY 365.01,365.03 (15th ed. 1979).
56. This article will not attempt an exhaustive discussion of the correct priorities to be given to various claims
resulting from breach of a collective bargaining agreement. A brief discussion is necessary, however, because uncertainty
or erroneous assumptions about the possible priority a given collective bargaining agreement claim will receive seems to
have prompted rejection of the collective bargaining agreement in several cases. See, e.g., In re Alan Wood Steel Co.,
449 F. Supp. 165 (E.D. Pa. 1978); In re Salt Creek Freightways, 47 Bankr. 835, 842 n.2 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985); In re
Gray Truck Line Co., 34 Bankr. 174, 179 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983); In re Concrete Pipe Mach. Co., 28 Bankr. 837, 839
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983); In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 25 Bankr. 216, 220-21 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982). See also the
discussion of Bildisco, infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
57. The "expenses of preserving the estate, including wages . . . for services rendered after the commencement
of the case" are administrative expenses, 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1982), entitled to first priority in a plan of
reorganization, 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1982). Whether the contract is assumed or rejected, only employee claims for
wages and benefits due for services actually rendered during administration are entitled to first priority. In re Mammoth
Mart, 536 F.2d 950 (lst Cir. 1976); In re Staus-Duparquet, Inc. v. Local Union No. 3, 386 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1967); In
re Public Ledger, Inc., 161 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1947) (contract assumed by continued employment in accord with its terms;
nevertheless, administrative priority given only to claim for benefits based on postpetition employment, not those due as
a result of prepetition service); In re Cotn Corp., 47 Bankr. 487 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) (even though collective
bargaining agreement rejected, that part of pension plan withdrawal liability attributable to postpetition services of
employees is entitled to administrative expense priority); In re Price Chopper Supermarkets, 19 Bankr. 462 (Bankr. S.D.
Cal. 1982) (even though the collective bargaining agreement was rejected, employees are still entitled to administrative
expense priority for the fair market value of wages and benefits earned during administration); In re Schatz Fed. Bearings
Co., 5 Bankr. 549, 553 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (even though collective bargaining agreement was expressly assumed
with court approval, only vacation pay based on actual postpetition service is entitled to administrative priority). Whether
a claim is entitled to administrative expense priority is determined under § 503 of the Code, not under § 365 on rejection.
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administrative claims being valued at a lower rate. 58 If a contract is rejected, all
contract claims not entitled to administrative expense treatment become unsecured
claims entitled to lower or no priority. Rejection constitutes breach of the contract,
and this breach relates back in time to the date immediately before the bankruptcy
petition was filed. 59 Consequently, claims for breach of a rejected contract become
prepetition unsecured claims. Prepetition unsecured claims for wages or benefits are
entitled to third or fourth priority. 6° Other types of unsecured contract claims receive
no priority. The lower the priority, the less likely the creditor will recover any of its
claim; the greater the amount of administrative expense claims, the less money or
assets available for paying lower priority claims.
Prior to 1984, the only explicit reference to collective bargaining agreements in
the Bankruptcy Code was found in section 1167, which prohibits a bankruptcy court
or trustee from making any changes in the wages or working conditions of railroad
employees who work under a collective bargaining agreement negotiated under the
Railway Labor Act.61 Employers argued that because collective bargaining agree-
58. The expenses of administration are generally set according to the reasonable or fair market value of the services
rendered or the benefit accorded to the estate. See 3 L. KNG, COLuR o. BANKRuprcy 503.04 (15th ed. 1979); In re United
Cigar Stores Co., 69 F.2d 513, 515 (2d Cir. 1934); In re Chakos, 24 F.2d 482, 486 (7th Cir. 1928); Oscar Heineman
Corp. v. Nat Levy & Co. 6 F.2d 970, 971 (2d Cir. 1925). See also Diversified Serv. v. Harralson, 369 F.2d 93, 95 (5th
Cir. 1966) ("Nor can the appropriate rent be limited by the amount that the Referee feels the estate can 'afford to pay'-
to do so would be to confer on general creditors an advantage obtained after bankruptcy at the expense of the
landowner."). When the services or benefit are provided under a contract or lease agreement, the rate set forth in the
contract or lease is generally regarded as setting the reasonable value. See 3 KwG, supra, 503.04; In re Unishops,
Inc., 553 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1977); In re Vil-low Cafeterias, 71 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
Even when a contract or lease is rejected, courts have held that the lease or contract sets the reasonable value for
determining the amount of the administrative expenses. See, e.g., In re Fred Sanders Co., 22 Bankr. 902, 907 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1982); In re Merchants Storage Co., 15 Bankr. 448, 452 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981); In re Dunwoody Village
Sporting Goods, I 1 Bankr. 493, 494-95 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981); In re Keyboard Center, 9 Bankr. 472, 474 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1981); In re Standard Furniture Co., 3 Bankr. 527, 530 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980). Before § 1113 became effective
in 1984, employers were allowed to reduce wages immediately and to eliminate employee benefits when filing
bankruptcy. There are no reported cases, however, where unions or employees have asserted claims for administrative
expenses based on the difference between the reduced wages or benefits and the rejected contract's wage or benefit rates.
The courts and litigants seem to have assumed that once the debtor makes unilateral reductions in pay, any claims for
administrative expenses based on the difference between the contract rate and the actual wages received are precluded.
It appears to be an open question whether rejection of a collective bargaining agreement does in fact preclude
employees from claiming administrative expenses on the basis of the contract rate.
59. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1) (1982).
60. Any prepetition employee claims for wages, vacation pay, severance pay, and sick pay are entitled to third
priority if earned within 90 days of filing bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1982). Employee claims for employer
contributions to employee benefit plans are entitled to fourth priority. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (1982). The combination of
third priority wage claims and fourth priority benefit plan claims cannot exceed a $2000 limit per employee. 11 U.S.C.
§§ 507(a)(3) and (4) (1982). Rejection of a collective bargaining agreement should not affect wages and benefit claims,
however, because, if earned postpetition, they are administrative expense claims regardless of rejection.
61. 11 U.S.C. § 1167 (1982). Section 1167 applies only to railroad employees. It is a part of Chapter 1l's
Subchapter IV on railroad reorganization. Section 103(g) of Title 11 specifies that this subchapter only applies to
railroads. Furthermore, § 1167 is based on § 77(n) of the repealed Bankruptcy Act, former 11 U.S.C. § 205(n), which
explicitly provided that no trustee could change the wages or working conditions of railroad employees. Therefore, this
section has not protected other collective bargaining agreements negotiated under the Railway Labor Act, such as those
of airline employees. In his article on rejection of collective bargaining agreements, Pulliam has taken the position that
§ 1167 protects all contracts negotiated under the Railway Labor Act, not just railroad contracts. Pulliam, The Rejection
of Collective Bargaining Agreements Under Section 365 oftthe Bankruptcy Code, 58 Am. BAnuR. L.J. 1, 10, 14-15, 38
(1984). This conclusion, however, is at odds with current interpretations of both former § 77(n) and present § 1167. See
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522-23 n.8 (1984); Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA
Express, 523 F.2d 164, 169, nn.3-4 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Air Florida Sys., 48 Bankr. 440 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); In
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ments covering other employees were not excluded from section 365, by negative
implication the Bankruptcy Code allowed such collective bargaining agreements to be
rejected.
In contrast to the Bankruptcy Code's lack of any specific language on the
collective bargaining agreements of nonrailroad employees, the NLRA explicitly
provides that a debtor-in-possession is an employer under the Act and is bound by its
unfair labor practice provisions. The definition of "employer" in the NLRA includes
any "person," which is defined as including a bankruptcy trustee.62 The courts have
been unanimous in ruling that the debtor-in-possession, which assumes the same
status as a bankruptcy trustee, is an "employer" within the meaning of the NLRA.63
Prior to 1975, there were relatively few cases involving rejection of collective
bargaining agreements in bankruptcy. 64 Employers, or their lawyers, may have
generally assumed that because of section 8(d), added to the NLRA in 1947, it was
not possible to terminate such contracts in bankruptcy. 65 Perhaps employers were
re Braniff Airways, 25 Bankr. 216, 217 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982); Note, America's Airlines Discover Chapter 11: Is it
Reorganization or Union-Busting?, 11 J. Co.vrEmp. L. 375, 382 (1984).
62. Section 2 of the NLRA provides, in part:
(1) The term "person" includes one or more individuals, labor organizations, partnerships, associations,
corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in cases under Title 11, or receivers.
(2) The term "employer" includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly[.]
29 U.S.C.A. § 152(1) and (2) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). See NLRB v. Baldwin Locomotive works, 128 F.2d
39 (3d Cir. 1942), in which the court held:
[A] debtor in possession is responsible for the unfair labor practices which occur during a reorganization. Its
status as an employer is no different, so far as the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.,
is concerned, than that of any other employer. Court supervision of corporate reorganization affords the
operating possessor no freedom from its statutory duty to its employees.
Id. at 43.
63. The Supreme Court so acknowledged in Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528. See also Local Joint Executive Bd. v.
Hotel Circle, 613 F.2d 210, 215 (9th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Bachelder, 120 F.2d 574, 576 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 647 (1941); Burgmeyer Bros., 254 N.L.R.B. 1027 (1981); Oxford Structures, Ltd., 245 N.L.R.B. 1180, 1183
(1979); and infra note 107.
64. Only six cases involving rejection of collective bargaining agreements were reported before 1975. Rejection
was granted in three of them: In re Business Supplies Corp., 72 Lab. Cas. (CCH) S 13,940 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Carpenter's
Local No. 2746 v. Tumey Wood Prod., 289 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Ark. 1968); and In re Klaber Bros., 173 F. Supp. 83
(S.D.N.Y. 1959). Rejection was denied in three: the lower court opinion in Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin
Steel Prod., 381 F. Supp. 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, 238 F. Supp. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); and
In re Mamie Conti Gowns, 12 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1935). See also Countryman, Part II, supra note 53, at 492-96
(1974); Comment, Collective Bargaining and Bankruptcy, 42 S. CAL. L. Rsv. 477 (1969).
In a seventh case, In re Public Ledger, Inc., 161 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1947), the court assumed a collective bargaining
agreement could be rejected, but the issue litigated concerned assumption of the contract and the priorities to be accorded
vacation and severance pay. An eighth case, Designer's Guild of Ladies Apparel, Local 30 v. Hers Apparel Indus., 88
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3254 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), discussed rejection of a collective bargaining agreement but avoided a ruling,
holding that the two individual contracts of employment in question, entered into under the auspices of a collective
bargaining agreement, were severable from it and could be rejected separately as individual employment contracts.
There is also one early case discussing wage agreements under the Railway Labor Act (RLA) which held that a
bankruptcy receiver could not reduce wages unilaterally without complying with the negotiation and mediation procedures
of the RLA. Burke v. Morphy, 109 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1940).
In contrast to these relatively few cases, 36 cases involving rejection of collective bargaining agreements were
reported from 1975 until the Supreme Court's opinion in Bildisco in 1984. See infra note 72.
65. It is interesting that neither of the two articles published before 1975 discussing rejection of collective
bargaining agreements under the Bankruptcy Act mentioned § 8(d) of the NLRA and its possible conflict with the
bankruptcy provisions. See Countryman, Parts I and II, supra note 53, and Comment, supra note 64. The earliest
reference to the NLRA's prohibition on midterm contract termination appears in the district court's opinion in the Kevin
Steel case in 1974. 381 F. Supp. 336, 338.
Professor James White states in his recent article on Bildisco and the 1984 bankruptcy amendments that "it was well
known that section 365 would apply ... to collective bargaining agreements" and that the section "seems to have
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simply not willing to risk a strike by their employees if the collective bargaining
agreement was rejected. 66
The present use of bankruptcy law to abrogate collective bargaining agreements
began in 1975 with the decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Shopmen's
Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products.67 For the first time, a court of appeals
was confronted with the argument that the bankruptcy court's approval of rejection of
a collective bargaining agreement conflicted directly with section 8(d)'s prohibition
of unilateral termination of a collective bargaining agreement. 68 In resolving the
conflict between these two coequal areas of federal law, the Second Circuit found that
bankruptcy law should take precedence over the labor statute and ruled that collective
bargaining agreements could be rejected in bankruptcy without regard to section 8(d).69
caused little controversy in the past." White, The Bildisco Case and the Congressional Response, 30 WAYNE L. REv.
1169, 1171, nn.7-8 (1984). His sources indicate, however, that only the few cases already cited, see supra note 64,
discussed the issue before 1975. Furthermore, his quotations from the legislative history of the 1976 municipal bankruptcy
amendments suggest that Congress' realization of the conflict between the NLRA and the Bankruptcy Code over the
rejection of collective bargaining agreements began with the Second Circuit's opinion in Kevin Steel. Id. at 1171 n.8,
quoting from 122 CoNG. REc. 7972 (1976).
66. See Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prod., 519 F.2d 698, 703 (3d Cir. 1975); In re Public
Ledger, Inc., 161 F.2d 762, 766-67 (3d Cir. 1947).
As long as a collective bargaining agreement containing an express or implied no-strike clause remains in effect, a
strike over an issue which may be arbitrated under the contract is a breach of the contract and may be enjoined. Boys Mkts.
v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). Once the contract is terminated, however, the employees are free to
strike and the federal courts have no jurisdiction to enjoin the strike. See the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15
(1982).
Furthermore, if the strike occurs during bankruptcy, the courts may not enjoin the strike, even if the strike is for the
purpose of collecting a prepetition debt by forcing the debtor to pay back wages or benefits. See Briggs Transp. Co. v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 739 F.2d 341 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 295 (1984); In re Crowe & Assoc.,
713 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1983); In re Petrusch, 14 Bankr. 825 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Catamount Dyers, 24 Bankr. 59
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1982); In re Tom Powell & Son, 22 Bankr. 657 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982).
67. 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975).
68. See text of § 8(d), supra note 48. The facts of Kevin Steel are unusual in that the company was seeking to reject
a contract it had never signed, but which the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had ordered it to sign. This was
the first case involving rejection in which company was embroiled in NLRB unfair labor practice proceedings before
bankruptcy was filed, thus leading to a direct conflict between the NLRA and the Bankruptcy Act.
The long sequence of events in Kevin Steel began in 1973. Kevin Steel's contract with the Shopmen's Union was
due to expire on June 30, 1973. In February, the employees went on strike in response to the employer's failure to make
its required pension fund contributions. After one week, the company made the payments and the employees called off
the strike, but the company refused to allow the employees to return to work. 381 F. Supp. 336, 337. Nevertheless, in
May 1973 the union began negotiating with the company for a new contract. As alleged by the union and found by the
NLRB, the union and the company reached an interim agreement to extend the old contract until a new agreement was
reached between the same union and an association of steel industry employers in the area. The union and the company
were then to adopt the same contract as that negotiated with the association. Kevin Steel Prod., 209 N.L.R.B. 493,
497-98 (1974). When the union asked the company to sign the document embodying this interim agreement, the company
refused. The company later refused to sign a new collective bargaining agreement based on the union's agreement with
the association reached in July, 1973. Id. at 498-99. The union filed unfair labor practice charges; a complaint was issued
by the NLRB General Counsel, and subsequently heard by an administrative law judge in August, 1973. In September,
1973, Kevin Steel filed its bankruptcy petition seeking an arrangement under Chapter 11. 519 F.2d 698, 700. The
administrative law judge issued his recommended order in November, 1973, finding Kevin Steel guilty of an unfair labor
practice for refusing to sign the interim agreement with the union. The NLRB adopted the administrative law judge's
recommendation on March 8, 1974, ordering the company to sign the interim agreement and the subsequently negotiated
collective bargaining agreement. 209 N.L.R.B. 493, 500.
At some point, Kevin Steel petitioned the bankruptcy court for rejection of the collective bargaining agreement,
which apparently it had never voluntarily signed. The bankruptcy court granted the rejection petition, also in March of
1974, but the district court judge later reversed the rejection order. 381 F. Supp. 336, 338. Kevin Steel appealed the
district judge's reversal of rejection, and the NLRB petitioned the Second Circuit for enforcement of its order, the two
eases were consolidated by the Second Circuit. 519 F.2d 698, 700-01.
69. The Court of Appeals relied on two Supreme Court cases in which, the bankruptcy context, the Court had
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Soon after Kevin Steel, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued a second
decision, Brotherhood of Railway Airline and Steamship Clerks v. REA Express,70
allowing rejection of a collective bargaining agreement negotiated under the Railway
Labor Act.71 This pair of opinions triggered a long line of cases involving rejection
of collective bargaining agreements. 72 By 1984, three other circuits had joined the
interpreted the word "wages" in a literal fashion to exclude fringe benefits, even though this narrow reading conflicted
with the meaning of "wages" under labor law. See United States v. Embassy Restaurant, 359 U.S. 29 (1959) (employer
contributions to welfare fund were not "wages" entitled to priority in bankruptcy); Joint Indus. Bd. of Elec. Indus. v.
United States, 391 U.S. 224 (1968) (employer contributions to annuity plans were not "wages"). It is interesting to note
that the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the term "wages," adopted in Kevin Steel, was reversed by Congress
when it passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the new Bankruptcy Code. The legislative history of 11 U.S.C. §
507(a)(4), giving a fourth priority to contributions to employee benefit plans, specifies that § 507(a)(4) "overrules United
States v. Embassy Restaurant." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 69, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNo. & An.
NEws 5787, 5855.
The Kevin Steel court also pointed to the fact that the Bankruptcy Act exempted railroad employees' collective
bargaining agreements from rejection, implying a Congressional intent not to exclude other collective bargaining
agreements from rejection. See § 77(n) of the Bankruptcy Act, former I1 U.S.C. § 205(n) (now § 1167 of the Code). 519
F.2d 698, 704-05.
In addition to ruling that Congress intended the Bankruptcy Act to circumscribe § 8(d), the Second Circuit
propounded an alternative theory in order to avoid any conflict whatsoever with § 8(d)-its "new entity" theory. Id. at
704. The court explained that under bankruptcy law, when an employer files bankruptcy, it becomes a debtor-in-
possession, a new entity with specified rights and duties subject to the supervision of the bankruptcy court. As a
debtor-in-possession, the employer is not the same entity as the prebankruptcy employer, but a different entity created by
the bankruptcy proceedings. The court found that, although this new entity is bound by the obligations of the NLRA to
bargain in good faith for a new contract, it is not a party to nor bound by the old contract, and, consequently, is not bound
by the termination prohibitions or the termination procedures of § 8(d): "Until the debtor here assumes the old agreement
or makes a new one, it is not a 'party' under section 8(d) to any labor agreement with the union and is simply not subject
to the termination restrictions of the section." Id. at 704.
70. 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1975).
71. The Railway Labor Act is codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982).
72. By February, 1984, there were at least 34 reported cases on rejection of collective bargaining agreements
decided since Kevin Steel and REA Express in 1975. Rejection was granted or affirmed in 24 cases: Borman's, Inc. v.
Allied Supermarkets, 706 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1983) (rejection was opposed only by business competitors, not the union),
aff'g, 6 Bankr. 968 (E.D. Mich. 1980), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908 (1983); In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d
890 (1lth Cir. 1983); In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd., 465 U.S. 513 (1984); Local Joint Executive Bd.
v. Hotel Circle, 613 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Alan Wood Steel Co., 449 F. Supp. 165 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Bohack
Corp. v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807, 431 F. Supp. 646 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); In re Parrot Packing Co., 42 Bankr.
323 (N.D. Ind. 1983); In re Handy Andy, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2657 (W.D. Tex. 1983); In re Ryan Co., 83 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) 110,487 (D. Conn. 1978); In re Penn Fruit, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3548 (E.D. Pa. 1976); In re Rath Packing Co.,
36 Bankr. 979 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984); In re Gray Truck Line Co., 34 Bankr. 174 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983); In re
Concrete Pipe Mach. Co., 28 Bankr. 827 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983); In re J.R. Elkins, Inc., 27 Bankr. 862 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Commercial Motor Freight, 27 Bankr. 293 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1983); In re Braniff Airways, 25
Bankr. 216 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982); In re U.S. Truck Co., 24 Bankr. 853 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982); In re Southern
Elec. Co., 23 Bankr. 348 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982); In re Hoyt, 27 Bankr. 13 (Bankr. D. Or. 1982); In re Yellow
Limousine Serv., 22 Bankr. 807 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); In re Reserve Roofing Fla., 21 Bankr. 96 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1982); In re Ateco Equip., 18 Bankr. 915 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982); In re Allied Technology, 8 Bankr. 366 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1980). In In re Blue Ribbon Transp. Co., 30 Bankr. 783 (Bankr. R.I. 1983), the court granted rejection, but only
on condition that management first reduce its salaries and benefits within five days of the court's order. Id. at 788.
In two additional cases, In re Letterman, 29 Bankr. 351 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1983), and In re Price Chopper
Supermarkets, 19 Bankr. 462 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982), rejection was deemed to have occurred automatically sixty days
after conversion from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7.
Rejection of a collective bargaining agreement was reversed or denied in 8 cases: In re Figure Flattery, 88 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) 11,850 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Maverick Mining Corp., 36 Bankr. 837 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1984); In re
Kirkpatrick, 34 Bankr. 767 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983); In re Tinti Const. Co., 29 Bankr. 971 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1983); In
re Miles Machinery Co., 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3114 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982); In re Louis F. Sammarco Elec. Co.,
109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3288 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1982); In re David A. Rosow, Inc., 9 Bankr. 190 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1981); In re Connecticut Celery Co., 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2847 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1980).
In one additional case, In re St. Croix Hotel Corp., 18 Bankr. 375 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1982), the court denied the
debtor's request to reject its duty to bargain with the union; no collective bargaining agreement between the parties was
then in effect.
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Second Circuit in ruling that either the Bankruptcy Act or the Code took precedence
over section 8(d) and allowed rejection of collective bargaining agreements. 73 No
federal court disagreed.
The only issue which remained in dispute among the circuits was the standard
a bankruptcy court should use in approving rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement. 74 Both Kevin Steel and REA Express recognized that a collective
bargaining agreement was not an ordinary contract. The standard of rejection
developed by the courts and used to determine whether various commercial contracts
should be rejected is called the "business judgment test. "75 Because of national labor
policy under section 301 and the contract's protection under section 8(d), the courts
agreed the business judgment test was not appropriate.7 6 The courts could not agree,
73. The Ninth Circuit in 1980, in Local Joint Executive Bd. v. Hotel Circle, 613 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1980), the Third
Circuit in 1982, in In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982), and the Eleventh Circuit in 1983, in In re Brada Miller
Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890 (1lth Cir. 1983).
74. For discussion of the standard to be used in rejecting collective bargaining agreements, see Pulliam, supra note
61; Bordewieck and Countryman, The Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements by Chapter 11 Debtors, 57 Am.
Ba,ns. L.J. 293 (1983); Eighth Circuit Survey: The Accommodation of the Bankruptcy and Labor Acts in Chapter 11
Reorganizations, 16 CRMFGHTON L. REv. 859 (1983); Note, Kevin Steel and REA Express Revisited: When Is a Collective
Bargaining Agreement Burdensome?, 56 Tess. L.Q. 252 (1983); Note, The Labor-Bankruptcy Conflict: Rejection of a
Debtor's Collective Bargaining Agreement, 80 MicH. L. REv. 134 (1981); Note, The Bankruptcy Law's Effect on
Collective Bargaining Agreements, 81 CoLutm. L. Rev. 391 (1981); Note, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements
As Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy-Receiver's Authority to Unilaterally Assume or Adopt Collective Bargaining
Agreements, 27 \VAaE L. REv. 1601 (1981); Note, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Chapter XI
Arrangement Proceedings, 17 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REv. 192 (1976); Comment, Rejection of Collective Bargaining
Agreements by Trustees in Bankruptcy, 81 DicK. L. Rev. 64 (1976); Note, Executory Labor Contracts and Municipal
Bankruptcy, 85 YALE L.J. 957 (1976); Note, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements as Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy, 22 \VA-m L. REv. 165 (1975).
75. The power to reject executory contracts in bankruptcy has existed since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act
in 1898. See §§ 70(b), 313, 413, 613 of the Bankruptcy Act, now repealed, former 11 U.S.C. §§ 110(b), 713, 813, 1013.
The bankruptcy trustee's ability to reject a contract arose out of the historical right of the trustee to abandon property that
was burdensome to the bankruptcy estate. 2 L. KiNG, CoU.ne ON BAN eUVrcv 365.0111] (15th ed. 1979).
The "burdensome" test, first used to govern rejection, was defined in American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. New
York Rys. Co., 278 F. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1922), as allowing rejection of a contract which resulted in "a positive loss or
encroachment on the corpus or capital of the estate." Id. at 843. The "burdensome" standard, requiring an actual loss
by the estate before rejection could be approved, was eventually rejected in favor of the more lenient "business judgment"
test, adopted by the Supreme Court in Group of Inst. Investors v. Chicago, MR., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523
(1943). The Court rejected the argument "that only burdensome leases may be rejected" and held that "the question of
whether a lease should be rejected . . . is one of business judgment." Id. at 549-50 (emphasis in original). Under this
test, even a profitable commercial contract may be rejected if a more profitable arrangement is possible. See KiNo, supra,
at 365.03.
76. See Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, 523 F.2d 164, 169 (2d Cir. 1975); Shopmen's
Local Union No. 455 v Kevin Steel Prod., 519 F.2d 698, 707 (2d Cir. 1975). Under the "business judgment" test,
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement is certain to be approved. Few, if any, employers regard a collective
bargaining agreement as a benefit to the estate. Instead, a collective bargaining agreement is a limitation on an employer's
freedom to conduct its business in light of its own business judgment. Furthermore, if the contract's wage rate exceeds
S3.35 per hour, it is always a burden in that it obligates the employer to pay more than it is obligated to pay by the federal
minimum wage law. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (1982). An employer's motivation to enter into a collective bargaining
agreement is not the profit incentive, but the obligation to bargain imposed by the NLRA and the anticipation of a
disruptive strike if the employer refuses to reach agreement. The primary profit an employer reaps from a collective
bargaining agreement is industrial peace and the presumed noninterruption of its business during the contract's term
guaranteed by the union's promise not to strike. Employers' motivation to enter into or preserve collective bargaining
agreements may have declined significantly as a result of the recession of the 1980s because unions have been very
reluctant to call strikes. See supra note 6. In today's economy, an employer's business judgment would probably tell it
to reject a collective bargaining agreement as burdensome if that will enable it to reduce its labor costs and expand its
freedom to reorganize its workforce while facing a minimal strike risk. On the other hand, perhaps the recent strike of
the Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. by the Steelworkers Union, called as soon as the bankruptcy court approved rejection
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however, on an alternative standard. The Kevin Steel court adopted a "balancing of
the equities" standard from a previous case involving rejection of a collective
bargaining agreement, 77 whereas the REA Express court developed a more stringent
standard. 78
The first case to reach the courts of appeal on rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement under the new Bankruptcy Code was In re Bildisco,79 decided by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in June 1982. With a few differences, the facts of Bildisco
generally followed the scenario outlined above.80 Beginning in January 1980 the
employer, Bildisco & Bildisco, failed to meet its obligations under its contract with
the Teamsters Union: it stopped making health and pension benefits payments and
stopped remitting to the union the dues withheld from employees' wage payments.
The employer filed its bankruptcy petition under Chapter 11 in April, 1980. In May
1980 Bildisco refused to begin paying a wage increase scheduled to go into effect
under the collective bargaining agreement. The union filed an unfair labor practice
charge under section 8(d) with the NLRB in June, claiming that Bildisco was
unilaterally modifying the contract. In January 1981 Bildisco moved orally at a
bankruptcy hearing to reject the union contract. The bankruptcy court approved
of the collective bargaining agreement, reflects a reversal in the decline of strikes and will give employers greater
incentive to maintain their collective bargaining agreements. See Wall St. J., July 22, 1985, at 3, col. I.
At least one bankruptcy court disagrees with the assumption that all collective bargaining agreements burden the
estate. The court in In re Pesce Baking Co., 43 Bankr. 949 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984), found this approach too simplistic.
"It is more likely that a collective bargaining agreement imposes benefits and burdens alike, on each of the parties." Id.
at 958. The only benefit to the employer that the court discusses, however, is the union's promise not to strike. If a
contract is rejected and a strike results, "then, with the wisdom of hindsight, the contract may not have seemed so
burdensome." Id., quoting In re C & W Mining Co., 38 Bankr. 496,' 503 (Bankr. W.D. Ohio 1984). Again, the
only incentive for an employer to honor its collective bargaining agreement is to protect itself from a strike, which is a
strong or weak incentive depending on the likelihood of the employees actually going on strike.
In Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prod., 381 F. Supp. 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd, 519 F.2d 698
(2d Cir. 1975), the court rejected as beside the point the NLRB's argument that every employer considers its collective
bargaining agreement onerous. This particular employer was suffering sufficient financial distress to justify bankruptcy
reorganization and to entitle it to relief from any onerous obligation. The court denied rejection of the collective bargaining
agreement, however, based on the contract's protection under the NLRA. Id. at 338.
For agreement with the position that all employers regard collective bargaining agreements as onerous and
burdensome, see In re Miles Mach. Co., 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3114, 3116 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982); In re Connecticut
Celery Co., 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2847 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1980).
77. The court in Kevin Steel required the bankruptcy court to "scrutinize with particular care" any application for
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement. 519 F.2d 698, 706. The court found that the normal "business judgment"
standard was inadequate for collective bargaining agreements: "The decision to allow rejection should not be based solely
on whether it will improve the financial status of the debtor." Id. at 707. Instead, rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement should be permitted "only after thorough scrutiny, and a careful balancing of the equities on both sides[.J"
Id. at 707, quoting and adopting the standard set forth in In re Overseas Nat'l Airway, 238 F. Supp. 359, 361-62
(E.D.N.Y. 1965). Presumably, this "thorough scrutiny" and "balancing of the equities" is to be performed only in the
event the bankruptcy court finds the collective bargaining agreement to be "sufficiently burdensome and onerous" to
warrant rejection, a finding which was made by the bankruptcy court and specifically affirmed by the court below in
Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prod., 381 F. Supp. 336, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
78. The court in REA Express held that before rejection may be approved, not only must the court find that the
contract is onerous or burdensome and the balance of the equities favors rejection, but the court must find that operating
under the collective bargaining agreement "will thwart efforts to save a failing [employer] from collapse." 523 F.2d 164,
169. In other words, a court should authorize rejection "only where it clearly appears to be the lesser of two evils and
that, unless the agreement is rejected, the [employer] will collapse and the employees will no longer have their jobs." Id.
at 172.
79. 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982).
80. This summary of the facts is taken from the opinion of the NLRB in Bildisco & Blldisco, 255 N.L.R.B. 1203
(1981), and from the Third Circuit's opinion, In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72, 75 (3d Cir. 1982).
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rejection of the collective bargaining agreement ten days later. Eventually, in April
1981 the NLRB issued its decision, ruling that Bildisco had violated section 8(d)
beginning in January 1980 by unilaterally altering the terms of the contract. 8t The
union appealed the bankruptcy court's order granting rejection, and the NLRB
petitioned the Third Circuit Court of Appeals for enforcement of its unfair labor
practice order. The cases were consolidated on appeal.
In the first portion of its opinion dealing with rejection, the court agreed with
Kevin Steel and REA Express that collective bargaining agreements could be rejected
in bankruptcy. 82 The court discussed the differing standards governing the rejection
decision and chose the Kevin Steel "balancing of the equities" standard over the
more restrictive REA Express "only if the employer will collapse" standard. 83 In the
second part of its opinion, the court ruled that, in spite of section 8(d) of the NLRA,
the employer was permitted to modify or terminate the collective bargaining
agreement unilaterally and immediately on filing bankruptcy without waiting for a
bankruptcy court to rule on rejection. 84
B. Rejection in Bildisco
The United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco85 on February 22, 1984. As framed by the Court, the first question in
Bildisco was "under what conditions a Bankruptcy Court can... permit a debtor-
in-possession to reject a collective bargaining agreement"?86 The Court was
unanimous in agreeing with all prior appellate court decisions that Congress intended
section 365 to apply to collective bargaining agreements.87 The Court pointed out that
although section 365 contains special provisions for some types of contracts, such as
nonresidential leases, 88 it makes no special provision for collective bargaining
agreements. Of even greater significance to the Court was the fact that Congress in
section 1167 exempted the collective bargaining agreements of railroad employees
from section 365, but provided no special exemption for any other collective
bargaining agreements. 89 The Court held that section 365, allowing rejection, takes
81. Bildisco & Bildisco, 255 N.L.R.B. 1203, 1204-05 (1981). Note that Bildisco committed several unfair labor
practices, some before bankruptcy was filed and some after.
82. In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72, 78 (3d Cir. 1982).
83. In rejecting the REA Express standard, the Third Circuit pointed out that it is impossible to predict the future
success of a reorganization at the time the rejection decision must be made. Furthermore, the REA Express formulation
"unduly exalts the perpetuation of the collective bargaining agreement over the more pragmatic consideration of whether
the employees will continue to have jobs at all." Id. at 80. In reaffirming the standard set forth in Kevin Steel, the court
specified that the debtor-in-possession must first demonstrate that the continuation of the collective bargaining agreement
would be burdensome to the estate. Once the court has made that threshold determination, "the debtor-in-possession must
make a factual presentation sufficient to permit the Bankruptcy Court to weigh the competing equities." Id. at 81. The
Bankruptcy Court must consider the rights of the covered employees as well as the sacrifices which other creditors are
making in order to allow the debtor to be successfully organized, and the court must make a reasoned determination that
rejection of the labor contract will assist the debtor-in-possession or the trustee to achieve a satisfactory reorganization.
Id.
84. Id. at 78-79, 82-83.
85. 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
86. Id. at 516.
87. Id. at 522 n.6. See supra note 53.
88. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b) and (c) (1982).
89. 465 U.S. 513, 522-23.
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precedence over section 8(d), prohibiting termination of a collective bargaining
agreement during its tenn. 9
The Court then proceeded to determine which of the various standards should
govern rejection of a collective bargaining agreement. The Court held that because of
the special nature of a collective bargaining agreement "and the consequent 'lav of
the shop' which it creates," a standard more searching than the "business judgment"
test should control. 91 The Court resolved the debate over the rejection standard by
agreeing with the Third Circuit that Kevin Steel, not REA Express, provided the
appropriate accommodation between the national labor law policy, protecting
collective bargaining agreements, and the policy of the Bankruptcy Code, encour-
aging successful reorganizations of failing businesses. 92 The Supreme Court held that
"the Bankruptcy Court should permit rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement ... if the debtor can show that the collective-bargaining agreement
burdens the estate, and that after careful scrutiny, the equities balance in favor of
rejecting the labor contract." ,93 In balancing the equities, the Court placed the greatest
weight on whether rejection will promote successful rehabilitation of the debtor. The
Court stated:
Since the policy of Chapter 11 is to permit successful rehabilitation of debtors, rejection
should not be permitted without a finding that that policy would be served by such
action.... Determining what would constitute a successful rehabilitation involves
balancing the interests of the affected parties--the debtor, creditors, and employees. The
Bankruptcy Court must consider the likelihood and consequences of liquidation for the
debtor absent rejection, the reduced value of the creditors' claims that would follow from
affirmance and the hardship that would impose on them, and the impact of rejection on
the employees. In striking the balance, the Bankruptcy Court must consider not only the
degree of hardship faced by each party, but also any qualitative difference between the
types of hardship each may face.
... The Bankruptcy Code does not authorize freewheeling consideration of every
conceivable equity, but rather only how the equities relate to the success of the
reorganization. 94
In interpreting the Court's rejection standard, the balance seems to be tipped in
favor of rejection as long as the possibility exists that the business may be
rehabilitated. The Court emphasized that the goal of Chapter 11 is rehabilitation, not
liquidation: "The fundamental purpose of reorganization is to prevent a debtor from
going into liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs and possible misuse of economic
90. The Court was unanimous in this regard. Id. at 522-23 (Rehnquist, J., for the majority); id. at 535 (Brennan,
J., concurring in part).
91. Id. at 524 (citing John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964) and United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-79 (1960)).
92. 465 U.S. 513, 523-24. The Court also endorsed the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in In re Brada Miller Freight
Sys., 702 F.2d 890 (1983), and its application of the "balancing of the equities" standard. Id. at 525-26.
93. 465 U.S. 513, 526.
94. Id. at 527. We will examine these factors that go into the balancing of the equities in some detail below,
because this Bildisco standard serves as the basis for the standard adopted by Congress in § 1113. See infra notes 293-326
and accompanying text.
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resources." 95 If, however, it appears that it will not be possible to rehabilitate the
business, then, under the Court's approach, rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement should be denied. When Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings are used
for liquidation, not rehabilitation, the debtor should not be entitled to reject its
collective bargaining agreement under Bildisco.
By stressing the goal of rehabilitation, and predicating a ruling in favor of
rejection on such a finding, the Court modified the prevailing view of the law. In
several cases prior to Bildisco, rejection had been granted when the debtor-in-
possession was in the process of liquidation. 96 After Bildisco, rejection should be
denied in similar settings because the policy of successful rehabilitation will not be
served by such rejection.
In allowing rejection of labor contracts under section 365, the Court recognized
national labor policy, not only by adopting a rejection standard more stringent than
that applied to commercial contracts, but by including a bargaining component in the
process of rejection. The Court required an employer to make reasonable efforts to
negotiate a voluntary modification of the collective bargaining agreement as a
prerequisite to a ruling on rejection:
Before acting on a petition to modify or reject a collective bargaining agreement,
however, the Bankruptcy Court should be persuaded that reasonable efforts to negotiate
a voluntary modification have been made and are not likely to produce a prompt and
satisfactory solution. The NLRA requires no less.... If the parties are unable to agree,
a decision on the rejection of the collective bargaining agreement may become necessary
to the reorganization process. At such a point, action by the Bankruptcy Court is required,
while the policies of the Labor Act have been adequately served since reasonable efforts
to reach agreement have been made. That court need not determine that the parties have
bargained to impasse or make any other determination outside the field of its expertise.97
The Court did not define "reasonable efforts" except to indicate that such
efforts do not include a duty to bargain to impasse. 98 Nevertheless, many of the same
factors considered by the NLRB and the courts in determining whether parties have
bargained in good faith will be relevant in determining whether the parties have
made reasonable efforts to reach agreement on modifications. A decision on what
efforts are reasonable will depend on the specific facts of each case, just as a good
faith bargaining deternination under the NLRA depends on the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the parties' negotiations for a new contract. 99
95. 465 U.S. 513, 528. The dissenters agreed with the majority on this point: "[tlhe primary goal of Chapter 11
is to enable a debtor to restructure his business so as to be able to continue operating." Id. at 550 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96. See, e.g., In re Alan Wood Steel Co., 449 F. Supp. 165 (E.D. Pa. 1978); In re Concrete Pipe Mach. Co., 28
Bankr. 837 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983); In re Allied Technology, 8 Bankr. 366 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980).
97. 465 U.S. 513, 526-27.
98. At least one commentator has argued that the bargaining duty prior to rejection under Bildisco is the same as
the duty to bargain under the NLRA. See Kilroy, In re Bildisco: New Hurdlesfor the Rejection of a Collective Bargaining
Agreement in Bankruptcy, 35 LABOR L.J. 368, 372 (1984). Without the requirement of impasse, however, this is not the
case.
99. Presumably, defining "reasonable efforts" will depend on the circumstances: how much advance notice the
employer was able to give the union of its decision to file bankruptcy; whether the employer discussed the possibility of
filing bankruptcy with the union before doing so; how long a period of time has passed since the employer filed
bankruptcy; how many negotiation sessions have been held; how much time has actually been spent in negotiations;
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Furthermore, this duty to make reasonable efforts to negotiate modifications is
a duty which, in this context, must be fulfilled only by the employer. Obviously, the
union will not be able to prevent a bankruptcy court from ruling on the employer's
rejection application by refusing to make any reasonable efforts to negotiate a
modified agreement. The court's sanction for a union's refusal to make reasonable
efforts will be to grant the employer's rejection application. On the other hand, if the
employer does not make reasonable efforts, the sanction against it presumably will be
to refuse to rule on or to deny its rejection application. Whether this somewhat limited
bargaining duty on the part of the employer will result in any meaningful settlement
agreements remains to be seen in those remaining cases to which the Bildisco opinion
applies-any bankruptcy cases filed before July 10, 1984, the effective date of the
new amendments to the Code. 100
V. THE EMPLOYER'S RIGHT TO MAKE UNILATERAL CHANGES DURING
BANKRUPTCY
The Court's decision on the first issue in Bildisco, the power to reject collective
bargaining agreements and the applicable standard to use, provoked relatively little
reaction from the labor community. In contrast, its decision on the second area of
conflict between labor law and bankruptcy, the right of an employer to make
unilateral changes during bankruptcy, created a storm of protest. Once rejection of a
collective bargaining agreement becomes a possibility, the second question must be
addressed: whether or not an employer may unilaterally alter working conditions
without first fulfilling its bargaining obligations under sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the
NLRA.
whether both sides made proposals and counterproposals; and whether there has been significant give and take. Many of
these factors are the same factors the NLRB and the federal appellate courts use in deciding whether the parties are
bargaining in good faith under the "totality of the circumstances" approach of the NLRA. See infra notes 294-96 and
accompanying text.
100. 126 Bssiz. L. REP. (CCH) 2 (July 12, 1984). The new section on rejection of collective bargaining agreements,
11 U.S.C.A. § 1113 (West Supp. 1985), took effect on the date of enactment, July 10, 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-353, §
541(c), 98 Stat. 333, 391.
It will be impossible to judge the real effectiveness of the Court's "reasonable efforts" requirement because, if a
settlement is reached, any rejection motion on file will become moot and no decision of the court will be issued or
reported. In examining those cases which have been decided under Bildisco, substantial efforts were made by debtors to
negotiate contract modifications in some cases. See, e.g., In re Air Florida Sys., 48 Bankr. 440 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985)
(although the debtor unilaterally suspended its collective bargaining agreement upon filing bankruptcy per Bildisco, it
negotiated a short term interim agreement with the union; after the debtor petitioned for rejection, the court continued the
hearing on three occasions and directed the parties back to bargaining, which included multiple sessions conducted with
the assistance of the National Mediation Board); In re Briggs Transp. Co., 39 Bankr. 343 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) (debtor
met with international union president in Washington, D.C., and local officials in Chicago before filing for rejection and,
at court's insistence, made another attempt to negotiate following rejection hearing). Apparently, no efforts to negotiate
contract modifications were made in other cases. See, e.g., In re Robinson Truck Line, 47 Bankr. 631 (Bankr. N.D. Miss.
1985) (the debtor merely informed the union of its unilateral termination of its employee health and welfare plan, which
the court allowed it to reject); In re C & W Mining Co., 38 Bankr, 496 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984) (although the union
made several attempts to negotiate concessions after the debtor closed down its mining operations, the debtor never
responded; court denied rejection for several reasons, including the bad faith of the debtor).
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A. The Right of an Employer to Modify or Terminate the Contract Pre-Bildisco
Outside of the labor relations context, the ability of the debtor-in-possession to
make changes in its operations in response to rejection of a contract is assumed. Once
the contract is terminated, the debtor is free to conduct its business without regard to
the previous contracting party.
Under labor law, however, different rules apply. Assuming a bankruptcy court
approves rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, rejection results in termina-
tion of the contract. There is then no collective bargaining agreement in effect
between the parties. The parallel situation in normal, nonbankruptcy labor relations
occurs when a collective bargaining agreement expires at the end of its term. As
discussed above, when a collective bargaining agreement expires, the employer is
obligated to bargain with the union for a new contract. This bargaining duty includes
the requirement that the employer continue to abide by the existing terms and
conditions of employment until it either enters into a new contract or bargains to
impasse. If impasse is reached without agreement on a new contract, the employer
may then unilaterally implement changes in the status quo consistent with its last
bargaining offer to the union. 0 1
Thus, even if section 8(d)'s prohibition on unilateral midterm termination or
modification is superseded by section 365 of the Code, once the collective bargaining
agreement is terminated via rejection, the employer has a duty under section 8(a)(5)
to bargain for a new contract. As a corollary of this duty, the employer may not make
any actual changes in wages or employment conditions in order to reduce costs until
it fulfills this bargaining obligation.
Enforcement of the section 8(a)(5) duty to bargain against a bankruptcy trustee
or debtor-in-possession has been fairly straightforward in the absence of a dispute
over rejection of a collective bargaining agreement.10 2 In the first appellate court
decision on this issue under the new Bankruptcy Code, Yorke v. NLRB,103 the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an NLRB unfair labor practice order against
a Chapter 11 trustee for failing to bargain with the union about the effects of closing
the business during the term of a collective bargaining agreement.10 4 The court stated:
We start with the proposition that a Trustee in Bankruptcy, like any other employer, must
abide by the labor laws, as long as they prescribe conduct consistent with the duties
imposed by the Bankruptcy Code ....
101. See supra notes 24, 29 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text, discussing the debtor-in-possession's status as an "employer"
within the meaning of the NLRA.
103. 709 F.2d 1138 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1023 (1984).
104. Id. at 1144. The effects of closing a business are mandatory subjects of bargaining under § 8(a)(5), whereas
the actual decision to close is not. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981), resolved a conflict
between the circuits on the duty to bargain over plant closure. The Court held that bargaining was not required over an
economically-motivated decision to partially close a plant or business, but bargaining over the effects of the closure was
required. Similarly, in a line of cases dealing with total plant closure, the NLRB has held that bargaining over the effects
of the closure is mandatory. See Merryweather Optical Co., 240 N.L.R.B. 1213, 1215 (1979); Stagg Zipper Corp., 222
N.L.R.B. 1249, 1249 (1976); Automation Inst. of Los Angeles, 208 N.L.R.B. 725, 726 (1974); Triplex Oil Ref. Div.
of Pentalic Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. 500, 504 (1971); Interstate Tool Co., 177 N.L.R.B. 686, 687 (1969); Transmarine
Navigation Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 389, 389 (1968), on remand from 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1967).
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The law in question-the duty to bargain over the effects of a decision to terminate
operations-strikes us as critical to protect employees from the ravages of economic
dislocation ....
We believe that recognizing a duty to bargain would not unduly impede the Trustee's
discharge of his responsibilities.10 5
The court enforced the NLRB's order under section 8(a)(5), requiring the trustee
to bargain with the union in good faith and to pay the employees a certain amount of
back pay as an administrative expense.' 0 6
In contrast to Yorke, the federal courts have given only limited effect to the
employer's duty to bargain when rejection of a collective bargaining agreement has
been the issue. The courts have universally repeated that after rejection has been
granted, the employer is bound by the NLRA to bargain in good faith for a new
contract.t0 7 However, the courts have removed from this bargaining obligation the
section 8(a)(5) limitation on the employer's right to make unilateral changes prior to
reaching impasse.
The first federal court to recognize and deal with the limitation on an employer's
right to make unilateral changes in the rejection context was the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals in REA Express. 0 8 The REA Express case involved employees of a public
105. Yorke v. NLRB, 709 F.2d 1138, 1142-43 (7th Cir. 1983). Although the court found that the trustee's failure
to notify the union before shutting down the plant was excused by the emergency nature of the decision, the trustee's
subsequent refusal to bargain over the effects of the shutdown was not excusable: "Once operations bad been terminated,
the emergency situation ended." Id. at 1144. The court agreed with the NLRB that the trustee violated § 8(a)(5) by
refusing to bargain over the effects of closing the business, such as the layoff and recall of employees, transfer rights, and
severance pay.
106. Id. at 1144-46. The NLRB had required the trustee to pay the laid off employees their normal wages computed
from the date of the trustee's initial refusal to bargain. The court modified the back pay order to run from the date of the
court order until a settlement agreement was reached, or until the parties bargained to impasse, with the qualification that
the employees receive at least two weeks of back pay. Id. at 1146. This back pay award for a minimum of two weeks
pay is known as the Transmarine remedy, adopted by the Board in Transmarine Navigation Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 389
(1968), as a remedy for an employer's refusal to bargain over the effects of closing a plant. The two week minimum
backpay award is used to discourage the employer from attempting to reach a premature impasse in bargaining.
Furthermore, the court agreed with the bankruptcy court below that the NLRB monetary award for failure to bargain
in good faith was entitled to priority as an administrative expense, because the decision to close the business and the
subsequent failure to bargain were attributable to the trustee's efforts to "preserve the estate" on the creditors' behalf
within the meaning of the administrative expense priority. Yorke v. NLRB, 709 F.2d 1138, 1143 (7th Cir. 1983). See
11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1) (1982) for the general definition of an administrative expense, and supra note 57.
107. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 534 (1984) ("debtor-in-possession remains obligated to
bargain in good faith under NLRA § 8(a)(5) over the terms and conditions of a possible new contract"); In re Brada Miller
Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890, 899 (11th Cir. 1983) ("debtor-in-possession, even after rejection, is compelled to bargain
with an established bargaining unit in an attempt to execute a new collective bargaining agreement"); In re Bildisco, 682
F.2d 72, 80 (3d Cir. 1982) ("the debtor-in-possession who rejects a collective bargaining agreement remains an employer
and is still required by the NLRA to bargain with the representatives of its employees").
In Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prod., 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975), when the Second Circuit
created its "new entity" theory, it stated that even as a new entity, the debtor must comply with the obligations of the
NLRA: "[i]t must be remembered that . . . the Bankruptcy Act . . . does not authorize a debtor-in-possession to ignore
its obligations under the Labor Act any more than it can ignore those imposed by the Internal Revenue Code." Id. at 706.
108. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1017 (1975). The court phrased the issue as "whether, in addition to being required to bargain with the unions... the
debtor-in-possession, as a new employer, is also obligated to maintain the status quo, i.e., adhere to the terms and
conditions of employment presently in effect pending negotiations with the union for collective bargaining agreements."
Id. at 170.
Whether an employer could make unilateral changes without first bargaining to impasse was not an issue in Kevin
Steel because the collective bargaining agreement being rejected had never been entered into by the employer, so there
was no contract status quo to protect. See note 68 supra for facts of Kevin Steel.
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carrier subject to the provisions of the Railway Labor Act (RLA), not the NLRA. The
RLA's limitation on unilateral changes after a contract has expired is similar to that
of the NLRA, except that in the RLA the limitation is specifically set forth in the
statutory language, not implied by judicial construction as it is under the NLRA. 109
In addition, the prohibition extends until protracted bargaining, mediation, and
cooling-off procedures are completed, not just until impasse is reached. 0 In spite of
this explicit language, the court in REA Express allowed the employer to change
existing working conditions without following the RLA provisions and without
bargaining to impasse.'
As justification, the court in REA Express adopted the "new entity" theory
developed by the Kevin Steel court." 2 The court held that as a new successor
employer, the debtor-in-possession was obligated to bargain for a new contract with
the representative of the employees it has taken on, but it was not obligated to
maintain the status quo then in effect, relying on the Supreme Court's opinion in
NLRB v. Burns Security Services. " 3 The court was of the opinion that the freedom
given to a successor employer under labor law to restructure the business was
particularly important in bankruptcy: "Unless the debtor-in-possession is permitted to
act promptly, albeit unilaterally, in avoiding onerous employment terms that will
prevent it from continuing as a going concern, the enterprise, and with it the
employment of its workers, may fail."" 4 The court believed that maintaining the
status quo pending the protracted negotiations required by the RLA, including
arbitration and mediation, would make it impossible for the debtor's business to
survive.
The court did not give the debtor an entirely free hand, however. It required the
debtor "to give reasonable notice of its proposed terms and to negotiate in good faith
for a reasonable length of time" before implementing its changes." 5 Faced with the
109. Section 6 of the RLA provides that "rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered by the carrier
until the controversy has been finally acted upon as required by section [5] .... 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1982). Section 5
provides that if mediation has failed: "for thirty days thereafter, . . .no change shall be made in the rates of pay, rules,
or working conditions or established practices in effect prior to the time the disputes arose." 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1982).
110. Section 6 of the RLA sets forth a complicated procedure for negotiating a new contract. The party desiring
changes must fast give the other party 30 days written notice of intended changes. Then, within 10 days, the parties must
set the time and place of the fast bargaining session. This session must take place within the 30 day notice period.
If the parties cannot agree, the changes can be made 10 days after the last conference, unless either party requests
the Mediation Board to mediate. If mediation fails, the Board will try to convince the parties to accept arbitration. If either
party refuses to accept arbitration, the requested changes still cannot be made for another 30 days. 45 U.S.C. §§ 155, 156
(1982).
111. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline and S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, 523 F.2d 164, 170 (2d Cir. 1975).
112. Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prod., 519 F.2d 698, 704 (2d Cir. 1975); see supra note 69.
113. 406 U.S. 272 (1972); Brotherhood of Ry., Airline and S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, 523 F.2d 164, 170-71 (2d
Cir. 1975). For a discussion of Burns, see supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
The court went on to discuss dicta in Burns in which the Supreme Court suggested that in some situations, in which
it is clear that a successor employer will retain all the employees in a bargaining unit, the successor should consult with
the union before changing the status quo. NLRB v. Bums Security Servs., 406 U.S. 272, 294-95 (1972). The Second
Circuit decided that this should apply only when employees are led to believe that their employment will continue with
the successor under the old contract's terms and conditions. The REA Express court argued that the fact the employer had
filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter XI put the employees on notice that changes in the terms of employment
would be required to avert the company's collapse. 523 F.2d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 1985).
114. 523 F.2d 164, 170-71 (2d Cir. 1985).
115. Id. at 171. Except for the requirement of actually bargaining to impasse, this bargaining obligation imposed by
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RLA's time-consuming requirements, the court viewed this modified negotiation
requirement as the most appropriate way to reconcile the employer's bargaining
obligations under the RLA with the bankruptcy objective of preserving the estate for
a successful reorganization.
After REA Express, the next court to address the issue was the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit in In re Bildisco. 16 The Third Circuit did not explicitly deal with
the right of an employer to make unilateral changes under section 8(a)(5), but dealt
with the conflict in terms of the employer's right to modify the contract under section
8(d). 117 In also adopting the "new entity" theory of Kevin Steel and treating the
debtor-in-possession as a successor employer, the court held that the employer is no
longer bound by the collective bargaining agreement as soon as it files bankruptcy. I18
By terminating the contract immediately upon the debtor's bankruptcy filing,
and without imposing any duty to bargain before the employer may make unilateral
changes, the Third Circuit greatly expanded the employer's freedom of action under
the NLRA in comparison with the REA Express court's more limited compromise
under the RLA. The court did recognize that a portion of the unfair labor practices
had been committed by Bildisco before the bankruptcy was filed.19 On remand of the
Board order, the court asked the NLRB to separate the prepetition violations from the
postpetition ones. The prepetition unfair labor practices could eventually serve as the
basis for a claim against the estate, whereas the postpetition ones no longer existed. 120
The Third Circuit did acknowledge, however, that once rejection of the
collective bargaining agreement was approved, the employer was under a duty to
bargain with the union for a new contract. In discussing rejection under the
"balancing of the equities" standard, the court commented:
The bankruptcy court [in balancing the equities] must understand that the debtor-in-
possession who rejects a collective bargaining agreement remains an employer and is still
required by the NLRA to bargain with the representatives of its employees... and that
its employees retain their right to strike should negotiations fail.' 21
The court seemed to imply that this duty to bargain did not arise until after rejection
of the old contract was granted.
the REA Express court would meet the requirements of § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA even though it did not begin to meet the
much more complicated procedures of the RLA.
116. 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982).
117. Id. at 78. The NLRB had defined the unfair labor practice at issue in Bildisco as solely a violation of § 8(d)
in altering or terminating the collective bargaining agreement itself. No separate § 8(a)(5) violation based on the
employer's unilateral change in the status quo would have been raised in the NLRB proceedings because the contract was
still in effect.
118. Id. at 83 ("The debtor-in-possession's position is analogous to that of a successor employer: it may be requited
to recognize and bargain with the union, but it is not a party to its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement unless
it assumes that agreement.").
119. For a summary of the facts in Bildisco, see supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
120. 682 F.2d 72, 84 (3d Cir. 1982). The court found that if rejection of the collective bargaining agreement was
approved on remand of the rejection issue to the bankruptcy court, "the Board would be bound by that determination,
which would preclude any post-petition unfair labor practice arising from the rejected agreement." Id.
121. Id. at 80.
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B. Unilateral Termination of the Contract in Bildisco
The Bildisco case at last reached the Supreme Court, which, in a five-to-four
split, made explicit what the Third Circuit had implied. The majority, per Justice
Rehnquist, phrased the second issue in Bildisco as follows:
(2) May the National Labor Relations Board find a debtor-in-possession guilty of an unfair
labor practice for unilaterally terminating or modifying a collective-bargaining agreement
before rejection of that agreement has been approved by the Bankruptcy Court.-2n
Although the issue was phrased solely in terms of "terminating or modifying"
the contract, the Court's discussion recognized that "modifying" or "terminating"
the contract included the question whether the employer could actually change
working conditions before rejection and without bargaining with the union. 23
In ruling on this second issue, the majority held that the power to reject a
collective bargaining agreement under section 365 included the right of the employer
to modify the contract and change terms and conditions of employment immediately
upon filing bankruptcy. 124 Although the Court rejected the lower courts' "new
entity" theory, recognizing it as a fiction in the bankruptcy context, 125 the majority
agreed with the Third Circuit that the collective bargaining agreement becomes
unenforceable on the date the employer files bankruptcy. The Court based its
elimination of any postpetition unfair labor practice on a different rationale. Justice
Rehnquist stated that although the debtor-in-possession was the same entity which
existed before the bankruptcy filing, the debtor was "empowered by virtue of the
Bankruptcy Code to deal with its contracts and property in a manner it could not have
employed absent the bankruptcy filing."'126 After tracing the path of a claim resulting
from rejection of a contract through the bankruptcy process, the Court simply
concluded that the NLRB is precluded from enforcing the provisions of section 8(d)
during the interim period between a debtor's bankruptcy filing and a court's ruling on
rejection. 127
If section 8(d) were enforced, "the practical effect ... would be to require
adherence to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement." 28 However, the
Court continued, "the filing of the petition in bankruptcy means that the collective-
bargaining agreement is no longer immediately enforceable, and may never be
enforceable again."' 29 Requiring adherence to the contract "would run directly
counter to the express provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and to the Code's overall
122. 465 U.S. 513, 516 (1984).
123. Justice Rehnquist explained: "Our rejection of the need for full compliance with § 8(d) procedures of necessity
means that any corresponding duty to bargain to impasse under § 8(a)(5) and § 8(d) before seeking rejection must also
be subordinated to the exigencies of bankruptcy." Id. at 533.
124. Id. at 528-29.
125. Id. at 528 ("Obviously, if the [debtor-in-possession] were a wholly 'new entity,' it would be unnecessary for
the Bankruptcy Court to allow it to reject executory contracts, since it would not be bound by such contracts in the first
place.").
126. Id.
127. Id. at 531-33.
128. Id. at 532.
129. Id.
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effort to give a debtor-in-possession some flexibility and breathing space."' 130 If the
collective bargaining agreement could not be modified, and, presumably, unilateral
changes in working conditions could not be made, whatever benefit the debtor
receives from its right to reject the contract would be undermined. 13 1
The Court held that from the filing of a petition in bankruptcy "until formal
acceptance, the collective bargaining agreement is not an enforceable contract within
the meaning of NLRA section 8(d)."1 32 The Court stated that the modification of the
contract is accomplished, not by the employer's unilateral changes in the contract, but
by operation of law upon filing bankruptcy. 133 Section 8(d) is not applicable to this
modification by law, and the NLRB is precluded from enforcing section 8(d) to
prevent an employer's unilateral rejection of a collective bargaining agreement.
Although the Supreme Court rejected the "new entity" theory as a fiction, it appears
to have created a fiction of its own: it is the Bankruptcy Code, not the employer's
actions, which modifies the contract. Therefore, section 8(d) has not been violated.
The Court majority disposed of any argument in regard to the section 8(a)(5)
prohibition of unilateral changes by subsuming it under the termination procedures of
section 8(d) and tying it to the employer's bankruptcy right to seek rejection. After
holding that the collective bargaining agreement is not enforceable under section 8(d)
from the bankruptcy filing until formal acceptance, if any, the Court phrased the
union's alternative argument as follows: Whether the debtor-in-possession "should be
required to 'bargain to impasse' prior to seeking rejection from the Bankruptcy
Court." 34 The Court did not phrase the issue as whether or not the debtor-in-
possession should be required to bargain to impasse prior to making any unilateral
changes in terms and conditions of employment, but tied the bargaining obligation to
the filing of the rejection petition. In this way, the Court made it easy to eliminate any
duty to bargain by initially suggesting that the NLRA bargaining obligation might be
a precondition or limitation on the employer's exercise of its bankruptcy rights, and
then repudiating any such suggestion. The Court answered its formulation with a
single sentence: "Our rejection of the need for full compliance with § 8(d) procedures
of necessity means that any corresponding duty to bargain to impasse under § 8(a)(5)
and § 8(d) before seeking rejection must also be subordinated to the exigencies of
bankruptcy."' 135 In a footnote, the Court cited NLRB v. Katz, 136 the seminal case
holding that an employer must bargain to impasse before making unilateral changes
in the status quo. The Court, however, quickly distinguished Katz because it "did not
address the effect of the bankruptcy laws on an employer's duty to bargain under
section 8(a)(5).' 1 37 The Court stated that if section 8(a)(5) prohibited unilateral
changes between the date bankruptcy was filed and the date the court authorized
130. Id.
131. Id. at 529.
132. Id. at 532.
133. Id. at 533.
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. Id.
136. 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
137. 465 U.S. 513, 533 n.14 (1984).
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rejection, such a result "would largely, if not completely, undermine whatever
benefit the debtor-in-possession otherwise obtains by its authority to request rejection
of the agreement."' 38 Consequently, under the Court's holding, the NLRB cannot
enforce either section 8(d) or section 8(a)(5) after the debtor has filed bankruptcy and
while the rejection application is pending in the bankruptcy court.
The majority asserted that the result in Bildisco "does not undermine the policy
of the NLRA ."139 In part, the Court justified its holding by pointing out that the
Bildisco opinion does not relieve the bankrupt employer of all its obligations under
the NLRA: "A debtor-in-possession is an 'employer' within the terms of the
NLRA ... and is obligated to bargain collectively with the employees' certified
representative over the terms of a new contract pending rejection of the existing
contract or following formal approval of rejection by the Bankruptcy Court. 1 40
Under this language, the employer may presumably make any unilateral changes it
wishes on filing bankruptcy, but, at some point in the rejection process, the duty to
bargain magically reappears. According to the Court, pending rejection, or following
approval of rejection, the employer must begin to bargain for a new contract.
In an opinion joined by three other Justices, Justice Brennan dissented on the
second issue in Bildisco, opposing the employer's right to modify or terminate the
contract on filing bankruptcy. 141 The debtor-in-possession, he believed, does commit
an unfair labor practice by unilaterally modifying the collective bargaining agreement
and changing terms and conditions of employment before rejection has been approved
by the bankruptcy court. Although Justice Brennan did not directly address the issue,
he also suggested that even if rejection is granted, the employer must still bargain to
impasse per Katz before making any unilateral changes in working conditions.142 The
138. Id. at 528-29.
139. Id. at 534. In the final paragraph of the majority's slip opinion, this sentence and the following sentence read:
Our determination that a debtor-in-possession does not commit an unfair labor practice by failing to comply with
§ 8(d) prior to formal rejection of the collective-bargaining agreement does undermine the policy of the NLRA,
for that policy, as we have noted, is to protect the process of labor negotiations, not to impose particular results
on the parties. . . Nevertheless, it is important to note that the debtor-in-possession is not relieved of all
obligations under the NLRA simply by filing a petition for bankruptcy.
Slip. op. at 19, 104 S. Ct. 1188, 1200-01 (1984)(emphasis added)(citations omitted).
The author was informed by the Office of the Reporter of Decisions, U.S. Supreme Court, per a telephone call, that
the word "not" was inserted in the first sentence at the request of the Justice after the slip opinion was published. The
sentence now reads: "Our determination . .. does not undermine the policy of the NLRA . 465 U.S. 513, 534
(1984)(emphasis added).
The addition of the negative reverses the import of the first sentence, but makes the remainder of the sentence
meaningless and is inconsistent with the word "nevertheless" at the beginning of the next sentence. This change in the
opinion appears to be a substantive one, not the mere correction of a typographical error. The entire paragraph makes
sense only with the original wording, causing one to speculate why the "not" was later added.
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackman. Id. at 535.
142. In a footnote, Justice Brennan stated that even if the collective bargaining agreement was not in effect, or
became unenforceable on the debtor's bankruptcy filing per the majority's opinion, "it does not necessarily follow that
the debtor in possession may unilaterally alter terms and conditions of employment." Id. at 546 n.14 (citing NLRB v.
Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962) (an employer's unilateral change in the terms and conditions of employment during the
negotiation of an initial contract violates § 8(a)(5)). The dissent pointed out that "it has been widely held that an employer
generally may not make unilateral changes in matters that are mandatory subjects of bargaining even after a
collective-bargaining agreement has expired." Id. (citing Peerless Roofing Co. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 734, 735 (9th Cir.
1981); Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc. v. NLRB, 632 F.2d 721, 729 (9th Cir. 1980); Hinson v. NLRB, 428 F.2d 133, 136
(8th Cir. 1970)).
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dissent agreed with the majority that section 8(d) does not control or limit a
bankruptcy court's ability to approve rejection of that contract, but strenuously
objected to the majority's conclusion that the bankruptcy provisions render the NLRA
requirements a nullity as soon as a bankruptcy petition is filed.
Justice Brennan outlined a middle ground which would accommodate both
bankruptcy and NLRA policies during the interim period: Section 8(d)'s proviso
should remain in effect and should be enforceable against the debtor-in-possession
until rejection has been approved by the bankruptcy court. 143 Only when rejection is
approved should the collective bargaining agreement be considered terminated. The
section 8(d) proviso does not prohibit termination by way of rejection, but it does
limit the employer's freedom to terminate the collective bargaining agreement prior
to court approval. In the dissent's view, a debtor-in-possession commits an unfair
labor practice if it unilaterally alters the terms of a contract immediately on filing
bankruptcy. The dissent agreed that the ability to reject a collective bargaining
agreement is essential, "[b]ut the option to violate a collective bargaining agreement
before it is rejected is scarcely vital to insuring successful reorganization."' 144 In fact,
because such immediate and unilateral alterations of labor contracts by debtors-in-
possession have led to labor strikes, violations of section 8(d) may even decrease, in
the dissent's opinion, the possibility of a successful rehabilitation.1 45
C. An Evaluation of Bildisco
From one perspective, the Court's treatment of the collective bargaining
agreement in Bildisco can be viewed as a continuation of the more restrictive scope
given to labor contracts in the successor employer cases under section 301 and the
NLRA. 146 Although the Court rejected the appellate courts' "new entity" theory as
derived from the Court's successorship doctrine, it used the policy behind the
successorship cases to support its result. In Burns, the Court justified its holding that
a successor employer was not bound by its predecessor's collective bargaining
agreement in the following words:
143. 465 U.S. 513, 550-53 (1984).
144. Id. at 550.
145. Id. Justice Brennan argued:
Plainly, the need to prevent "economic warfare" resulting from unilateral changes in terms and conditions of
employment is as great after a bankruptcy petition has been filed as it is prior to that time. I do not think that
there is any question that the threat to labor peace stemming from a unilateral modification of a collective
bargaining agreement is as great one day after a bankruptcy petition is filed as it was one day before the petition
was filed.
Id. at 548-49. The dissent then noted that Continental Airlines' abrogation of its collective bargaining agreements upon
filing bankruptcy in September 1983, resulted in an immediate strike by the pilots and flight attendants. Id. at 549 n.16.
The flight attendants at Continental Airlines ended their strike in April 1985, but as of September 1985, after two
years, the pilots still remained on strike. Although the parties have been bargaining under order of the bankruptcy judge
handling the case, no agreement has been reached and Continental is now attempting to withdraw recognition from the
pilots' union. See 118 Las. REL. REP. (BNA) 324 (April 29, 1985), and 120 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 11 (September 2,
1985).
146. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. For an alternative view that Bildisco can be viewed as an
extension of the Court's decision in First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981), giving the employer
the unencumbered prerogative to close a portion of its business without bargaining with the union, see Gregory, Labor
Contract Rejection in Bankruptcy: The Supreme Court's Attack on Labor in NLRB v. Bildisco, 25 B.C.L. REv. 539,
597-603 (1984).
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A potential employer may be willing to take over a moribund business only if he can make
changes in corporate structure, composition of the labor force, work location, task
assignment, and nature of supervision. Saddling such an employer with the terms and
conditions of employment contained in the old collective-bargaining contract may make
these changes impossible and may discourage and inhibit the transfer of capital. 47
The Court in Bildisco cited this language and stated that a "similarly beneficial
recapitalization could be jeopardized if the debtor-in-possession were saddled auto-
matically" with its prior collective bargaining agreement. 48 By use of the word
"prior," the Court is treating a debtor-in-possession's collective bargaining agreement
as if it were the contract of a previous employer. The successorship cases provide a
convenient framework for the court because a successor employer's freedom to change
terms and conditions of employment before becoming subject to any bargaining
obligation offers the only labor law parallel to the result reached in Bildisco. In this
light, Bildisco can be viewed as an extention, in a different context, of the Court's
successorship doctrine.
From another perspective, however, the Supreme Court's treatment of the col-
lective bargaining agreement in Bildisco marks a fundamental shift in the Court's
historical deference to labor agreements. 149 Instead of giving an expansive interpre-
tation to the contract and its role in the parties' relationship, the Court has shortened
its life with this premature termination in bankruptcy. The Court has zealously
protected collective bargaining agreements in the past in order to promote the reso-
lution of labor disputes through the contract's arbitration procedures. In this way, the
Court has sought to maintain industrial peace by preventing unions from going on strike
as long as a collective bargaining agreement remains in effect.150 As a result of the
holding in Bildisco, however, a union is free to strike as soon as the contract is no
longer in effect-in other words, as soon as the employer files bankruptcy. The
contract's arbitration provisions become unenforceable and the union is no longer
bound by its no-strike promise.
Evidently, in this day of relatively few strikes, the Court majority does not seem
so concerned about the possibility of economically disruptive strikes. Perhaps the
147. 406 U.S. 272, 287-88 (1972).
148. 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984).
149. Professor White also views Bildisco as a symbolic decision on a broader scale, indicating a fundamental
skepticism by the Court toward modem unions. White, supra note 65, at 1201, 1202-03 n. 103. All members of the Court
rejected the union's position on § 8(d) and agreed that a collective bargaining agreement could be rejected in bankruptcy
despite the NLRA. Professor White comments:
That an occasional union might have its collective bargaining agreement rejected in bankruptcy is a small
matter. That the 9-0 vote in Bildisco shows the Court to have adopted the negative polar view of unions is a
matter of great importance.
* * " [It] has a meaning for every case involving union rights that comes before the Supreme Court in the
foreseeable future. It means that their arguments will be met with a skepticism formerly reserved for the rich
and selfish, not with the traditional sympathy accorded the working man. It means that the assertion that the
union speaks for and correctly represents the individual's interest will now be open to question. Worse, it may
mean that lower courts, taking their lead from the Supreme Court, will be more hostile to the union's interests
in a whole host of ways.
It is ironic therefore, that Bildisco, touted as a critical bankruptcy case, may have only a modest impact
on the bankruptcy law, and yet, may have a far-reaching impact on labor law.
Id. at 1203 n.103.
150. See supra note 47.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Court expects relatively few unions or employees to be so foolhardy as to jeopardize
their jobs and the possibility of a successful reorganization by going on strike. 51 The
dissent, on the other hand, cites the case of Continental Airlines as the premiere
example of labor strife resulting directly from the employer's unilateral termination
of a contract upon filing bankruptcy.' 52 Furthermore, the Court majority may not be
as anxious to discourage strikes today as it has been in the past because of the ease
with which employers are currently able to replace striking employees.1 53 In these
days of economic woe, particularly in those industries with frequent bankruptcies, a
strike generally means permanent replacement of the unionized employees with new
employees hired at lower wages and benefits-just the result the employer may want
and need for a successful reorganization.
In addition to departing from its traditional protection of labor contracts,
Bildisco's holding that both the labor agreement and the provisions of section 8(d)
become unenforceable the day the debtor files bankruptcy significantly alters the
balance of economic power between the debtor and the union. In the nonbankruptcy
context, once a union has been chosen by a group of employees, the employees either
have the right to compel the employer to bargain with them or they have the protection
of a collective bargaining agreement. The employer's freedom to make unilateral
changes is limited to those contained in its final bargaining proposals only if impasse
is reached and no contract has been agreed upon. By limiting the scope of changes
to those presented in bargaining, the union has had an opportunity to evaluate the
proposed changes and to decide whether to accept them. The union retains a further
measure of control in the normal bargaining context by virtue of the fact that, by
altering its bargaining position, it can eliminate any impasse and force the employer
back to the table. If bargaining is eventually successful and a contract signed, the
employees exchange their rights to bargain over working conditions for the protection
offered by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement with its grievance and
arbitration enforcement mechanisms.
UnderBildisco, the employees and their union have lost both of these fundamental
protections. On the one hand, the employees cannot enforce their contract under
section 301 by compelling arbitration of grievances, because the court has said the
contract is unenforceable except through the bankruptcy claims procedure.' 54 On the
151. For figures on the dramatic decline in the annual number of strikes, see supra note 8. The recent
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel strike, however, is an example of a union and its members willing to risk liquidation of an
employer by a strike. See infra note 317.
152. See supra note 145.
153. When employees go on strike, the employer may not fire or terminate the strikers, but it may hire permanent
replacements in their stead. NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). When employees offer to return
to work at the end of the strike, the employer is not obligated to lay off the permanent replacements. The employer is only
required under the NLRA to reinstate the strikers when or if future vacancies occur. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389
U.S. 375 (1967); Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920
(1970).
154. Although the contract's arbitration provisions may no longer be judicially enforceable, the bankruptcy court,
either in its discretion or on stipulation of the parties pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019(c), could authorize referral of any
claims for breach of the collective bargaining agreement to a labor arbitrator under the contract's arbitration provisions.
The arbitrator's role would be to evaluate the merits of the claim under the contract and determine the amount of any
monetary award. This award would then be filed as a claim in the bankruptcy proceeding, with the bankruptcy court ruling
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other hand, the employees and their union cannot force the employer to bargain by
filing unfair labor practice charges under section 8(a)(5) because the Supreme Court
has said the provisions of the NLRA must give way to the exigencies of bankruptcy.
The Court has thereby created a gap period during which the employer is not bound
by either a contract or a bargaining obligation. Instead, the employer is free to make
unlimited unilateral changes, a situation unthinkable under labor law.
The effect of the Court's opinion is to maximize the employer's economic power
by permitting the employer to make these unlimited changes before it must make
reasonable efforts to reach agreement on contract modifications or begin bargaining
for a new contract. The majority of the Court was of the view that allowing an
employer to reject its collective bargaining agreement, without giving it the right to
immediately reduce wages and benefits, "would largely, if not completely, under-
mine whatever benefit the debtor-in-possession otherwise obtains by its authority to
request rejection of the agreement." 155 The Court has put the employer in the
strongest possible negotiating posture vis-a-vis the union by allowing it to implement
its own reduced wage package before coming to the bargaining table.
The Court's imposition in Part I of Bildisco of an obligation on the employer to
make reasonable efforts to negotiate contract modifications is inconsistent with its
imposition in Part II of a duty to bargain for a new contract, a duty which arises pending
a ruling on rejection. The Court has subjected the parties to contradictory obligations
during the same period of time: to bargain over contract modifications on the one hand,
and over a new contract on the other. Furthermore, by suggesting that the duty to
bargain for a new contract may attach before rejection is granted, the Court seems to
be assuming that the bankruptcy court will always grant rejection of the old contract.
There would be no need to bargain for a new contract if the bankruptcy court denies
rejection. If rejection is truly an open question, the duty to bargain for a new contract
should not begin until rejection of the old has already been granted. Perhaps the
majority is taking the position that if no voluntary modifications are agreed upon before
rejection, then rejection should be granted. In the Court's view, giving the debtor
whatever freedom it needs to save its business may always be more important than
preserving an old collective bargaining agreement which the debtor no longer wants.
The impact of the Bildisco opinion is not limited to its effect on the bargaining
relationship between the debtor and the union. The Court has also eliminated both the
NLRA provisions and the collective bargaining agreement from serving as the basis
for any first priority employee claims for administrative expenses. Despite Justice
Rehnquist's disclaimer that priority of claims is not the primary issue of the rejection
controversy, 156 his rationale for refusing to enforce section 8(d) rested on the
perceived need to eliminate section 8(d) as a source for administrative expense
claims. After a very confusing discussion of the effects of either rejecting or assuming
a contract on the priority of any claims arising under the contract, he concluded that,
on its allowance and its priority. For a discussion of this possibility after the Bildisco decision, see Berger, The Collective
Bargaining Agreement in Bankruptcy: Does the Duty to Arbitrate Survive?, 35 LB. L.J. 685 (1984).
155. 465 U.S. 513, 529 (1984).
156. Id. at 531-32.
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"though the Board's action is nominally one to enforce § 8(d) of that Act, the
practical effect of the enforcement action would be to require adherence to the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement." 1 57 Justice Rehnquist offered no explanation
for this conclusion. The dissent interpreted this statement to mean that because any
back pay awards for section 8(d) violations will be entitled to first priority as an
administrative expense, financial pressure on the debtor to abide by the agreement
will necessarily follow. 158 The majority's assumption that an employer will refrain
from modifying a contract in violation of section 8(d), because it would thereby
create employee administrative expense claims, is not borne out by the facts of
Bildisco itself or numerous other rejection cases. t59 One is left with the firm
impression, nonetheless, that a significant factor in the majority's resolution of the
section 8(d) issue was the elimination of any possibility that section 8(d) would serve
as the basis for employee administrative expense claims.
In addition to making any NLRA obligations unenforceable, the majority
opinion also attached great importance to making the collective bargaining agreement
itself unenforceable immediately upon the debtor's bankruptcy filing. The necessity
of making the contract unenforceable was again presumably based on Justice
Rehnquist's view regarding the priority to be given to claims for breach of contract.
Several of Justice Rehnquist's premises seem flawed. For example, he apparently
presumed that a debtor must either reject or assume every executory contract.' 60 The
dissent, on the other hand, was of the opinion that in some cases a contract may
simply "ride through" a Chapter 11 bankruptcy and be binding on the debtor even
after discharge is granted.' 61 When a debtor-in-possession neither rejects nor assumes
an executory contract, the general rule has been that the contract remains in effect
during the bankruptcy proceedings and passes through the bankruptcy unaffected.1 62
157. Id. at 532.
158. Id. at 551 & n.19. For such back pay awards to receive fist priority as an administrative expense, however,
the back pay must be attributable to services rendered during administration of the estate (i.e., after the bankruptcy petition
was filed). NLRB back pay awards are entitled to the same priority to which the wages they represent would be entitled.
Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25 (1952). If the back pay awards are in lieu of wages which would have been earned
during administration, but for the employer's unfair labor practice, then they are entitled to the administrative expense
priority.
159. As in Bildisco, supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text, many employers have modified or breached their
collective bargaining agreements before filing bankruptcy. These employers have not begun abiding by the contracts
during bankruptcy in order to avoid creating any additional administrative expense claims. See, e.g., In re Midwest Emery
Freight Sys., 48 Bankr. 566 (Bankr. N.D. i. 1985) (employer reduced employee wages and performed union work with
nonunion employees); In re C & W Mining Co., 38 Bankr. 496 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984) (stopped paying health
insurance premiums and workmen's compensation contributions); In re Tinti Const. Co., 29 Bankr. 971 (Bankr. E.D.
Wis. 1983) (performed union work with nonunion employees); In re Commercial Motor Freight, 27 Bankr. 293 (Bankr.
S.D. Ind. 1983) (announced unilateral reduction of wages); In re Southern Elec. Co., 23 Bankr. 348 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1982) (violated seniority provisions of collective bargaining agreement); In re Louis F. Sammarco Elec. Co., 109
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3288 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1982) (performed union work with nonunion employees); In re Connecticut
Celery Co., 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2847 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1980) (ceased payments to pension and health and welfare
funds).
160. 465 U.S. 513, 531 & n.13 (1984).
161. Id. at 546 n.12.
162. See, e.g., Federal's, Inc. v. Edmonton Inv. Co., 555 F.2d 577, 579 (6th Cir. 1977); Smith v. Hill, 317 F.2d
539, 542 n.6 (9th Cir. 1963); Hotz v. Federal Reserve Bank, 108 F.2d 216, 219 (8th Cir. 1939); Consolidated Gas Elec.
Light & Power Co. v. United Ry. & Elec. Co., 85 F.2d 799, 805 (4th Cir. 1936). Perhaps Bildisco will alter this rule
for contracts other than collective bargaining agreements.
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The question whether a contract must be either assumed or rejected, or whether
it may simply "ride through" a Chapter 11 reorganization, also affected the
majority's view of what claims receive first priority as administrative expenses.
Justice Rehnquist's discussion of contract claims in bankruptcy implied that if the
contract is assumed, all contract damages and liabilities, not just those expenses
attributable to wages and other forms of compensation earned during the period of
administration, will be administrative expenses. 163 Under this construction, if
rejection is not granted, any claims under the contract for severance pay, medical or
retirement benefits, pension plan withdrawal liability, or any other claims would
become administrative expenses regardless whether they were claims based on
services rendered during the administration of the estate. This would increase
substantially the first priority claims over what appears to be the current law. In the
dissent's view, and under the majority of court decisions which have decided the
issue, only contract claims for wages and benefits attributable to services rendered
during administration are entitled to first priority. 64 Justice Rehnquist's implication
that if the contract is not rejected it is assumed, and that all breach of contract claims
become administrative expenses, is not supported by the language of section 365 or
by case law. Nevertheless, to eliminate the possibility that this would occur, the
majority simply declared the contract unenforceable the day the debtor files
bankruptcy.
Despite the majority's insistence that it was attempting to accommodate both
labor law and bankruptcy, no accommodation of labor law seems to have occurred.
As the dissent emphasized, the Court recognized only the employer's bankruptcy
rights, and avoided several logical ways of accommodating both bankruptcy and labor
law. Under the dissent's accommodation, the NLRA would remain enforceable, and
the contract would remain in effect until the bankruptcy court granted rejection. The
Court also failed to consider a second approach which would provide some accom-
modation of labor law principles, but would give greater flexibility to the debtor than
the dissent's position. If the collective bargaining agreement becomes unenforceable
with the bankruptcy filing, then the duty to bargain for a new contract under section
8(a)(5) should also attach with the bankruptcy petition. Under this accommodation,
however, the employer would not be free to make immediate and unilateral changes
in working conditions. Instead, the employer would first have to bargain to impasse,
delaying, but not denying, this employer prerogative. This accommodation would
make the employer's labor law obligations during bankruptcy comparable to, if not
the same as, the employer's obligations when a contract expires by its own terms.
Because impasse in this emergency context may be reached quickly, requiring
the employer to bargain to impasse on proposed changes may not protect employees'
wages and benefit levels for any significant amount of additional time. Imposing this
163. 465 U.S. 513, 531-32 (1984).
164. Id. at 546. See supra note 57 and cases cited therein. Whether the Court's erroneous presumptions about
automatic assumption of the contract in the absence of rejection, or its statement that all liabilities under an assumed
contract are entitled to the administrative expense priority, will be carried over to other bankruptcy cases outside the
collective bargaining context remains to be seen.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
duty to bargain, however, is important because it recognizes the legitimate role the
union has been given by the NLRA in representing the employees and the limitations
the Act imposes on employer action. It accords the union that fundamental level of
respect and consideration mandated by labor law statutes and national labor policy.
Furthermore, by enforcing an impasse requirement instead of requiring only
reasonable efforts, and by imposing the requirement before instead of after any
changes have been made, greater pressure would be placed on the employer to
bargain with a degree of seriousness it may otherwise lack. Such an accommodation
would have preserved a more equal bargaining relationship between the debtor and
the union consistent with the NLRA.
VI. THE 1984 BANKRUPTCY CODE AMENDMENTS ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINNG
AGREEMENTS
The Supreme Court's five-to-four split in Bildisco, allowing an employer to
terminate a collective bargaining agreement unilaterally and declaring the contract
unenforceable under the NLRA, created a storm of protest from the labor community.
Bankruptcy legislation was already pending in Congress in the spring of 1984 due to
the bankruptcy courts' jurisdictional crisis created by the 1982 Supreme Court opinion
in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 165 Congress con-
tinued to pass temporary extensions of the interim jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court
system in March, April, May, and June of 1984, while it attempted to pass permanent
legislation in the aftermath of Bildisco.166 The House and Senate reached general
agreement on the jurisdictional amendments to the Bankruptcy Code in March, when
the House of Representatives passed H.R. 5174.167 The debate over collective bar-
gaining agreements in bankruptcy continued, however, and was eventually resolved
by a joint House and Senate conference committee on June 28, 1984, one day after
all previous jurisdictional extensions of the bankruptcy system had expired. 168 Both
houses of Congress passed the conference committee's compromise on June 29, 1984,
and it was signed into law by the President on July 10, 1984.169
165. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). In Marathon, a plurality of the Court had held that under the Constitution the broad
jurisdiction given bankruptcy courts under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code may be exercised only by article III courts.
Bankruptcy judges created by the Bankruptcy Code were not article UI judges, as they did not have life tenure or
protection against the diminution of their salary. Therefore, the 1978 jurisdictional grant to the bankruptcy courts was
unconstitutional. The court stayed the effect of the judgment, however, from June 28, 1982, initially until October 4,
1982, and then until December 24, 1982, to allow Congress time to reconstitute the bankruptcy system. Id. at 88; 459
U.S. 813 (1982).
166. See Pub. L. No. 98-249, 98 Stat. 116 (March 31, 1984) (jurisdiction extended until May 1); Pub. L. No.
98-271, 98 Stat. 163 (April 30, 1984) (extended until May 26); Pub. L. No. 98-299, 98 Stat. 214 (May 25, 1984)
(extended until June 21); Pub. L. No. 98-325, 98 Stat. 268 (June 20, 1984) (extended until June 27).
167. H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 Co.xG. REc. H1832-43 (daily ed. March 21, 1984).
168. 130 Cos;o. REc. S8887, H7490 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
169. Co.n. REc. at S8900, 117500; Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 392 (1984); 126 BANm. L. Rm. (CCH) 2 (July 12, 1984). For a thorough description of the
legislative activity resulting in the enactment of § 1113, see Rosenberg, Bankruptcy and the Collective Bargaining
Agreement-A Brief Lesson in the Use of the Constitutional System of Checks and Balances, 58 Ams. BANR. L.J. 293,
312-21 (1984).
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The new section 1113 on collective bargaining agreements is an entirely new
section which significantly alters the law as it existed after Bildisco.170 In brief, the
section does four things: (1) it specifies that the collective bargaining agreement
remains in effect and cannot be unilaterally terminated by the employer during
bankruptcy; (2) on the other hand, it allows the bankruptcy court to approve interim
changes pending a ruling on rejection; (3) it sets up a new bargaining procedure under
which the employer must propose, prior to filing an application for rejection,
necessary modifications to the collective bargaining agreement; and (4) it adopts,
170. The text of § 1113 provides:
Rejection of collective bargaining agreements
(a) The debtor in possession, or the trustee if one has been appointed under the provisions of this chapter,
other than a trustee in a case covered by subchapter IV of this chapter and by title I of the Railway Labor Act,
may assume or reject a collective bargaining agreement only in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(b)(1) Subsequent to filing a petition and prior to filing an application seeking rejection of a collective
bargaining agreement, the debtor in possession or trustee (hereinafter in this section 'trustee' shall include a
debtor in possession), shall-
(A) make a proposal to the authorized representative of the employees covered by such agreement, based
on the most complete and reliable information available at the time of such proposal, which provides for those
necessary modifications in the employees [sic] benefits and protections that are necessary to permit the
reorganization of the debtor and assures that all creditors, the debtor and all of the affected parties are treated
fairly and equitably; and
(B) provide, subject to subsection (d)(3), the representative of the employees with such relevant
information as is necessary to evaluate the proposal.
(2) During the period beginning on the date of the making of a proposal provided for in paragraph (1) and
ending on the date of the hearing provided for in subsection
(d)(1), the trustee shall meet, at reasonable times, with the authorized representative to confer in good faith
in attempting to reach mutually satisfactory modifications of such agreement.
(c) The court shall approve an application for rejection of a collective bargaining agreement only if the
court finds that-
(1) the trustee has, prior to the hearing, made a proposal that fulfills the requirements of subsection (b)(l);
(2) the authorized representative of the employees has refused to accept such proposal without good cause;
and
(3) the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection of such agreement.
(d)(l) Upon the filing of an application for rejection the court shall schedule a hearing to be held not later
than fourteen days after the date of the filing of such application. All interested parties may appear and be heard
at such hearing. Adequate notice shall be provided to such parties at least ten days before the date of such
hearing. The court may extend the time for the commencement of such hearing for a period not exceeding seven
days where the circumstances of the case, and the interests of justice require such extension, or for additional
periods of time to which the trustee and representative agree.
(2) The court shall rule on such application for rejection within thirty days after the date of the
commencement of the hearing. In the interests of justice, the court may extend such time for ruling for such
additional period as the trustee and the employees' representative may agree to. If the court does not rule on such
application within thirty days after the date of the commencement of the hearing, or within such additional time
as the trustee and the employees' representative may agree to, the trustee may terminate or alter any provisions
of the collective bargaining agreement pending the ruling of the court on such application.
(3) The court may enter such protective orders, consistent with the need of the authorized representative
of the employee to evaluate the trustee's proposal and the application for rejection, as may be necessary to
prevent disclosure of information provided to such representative where such disclosure could compromise the
position of the debtor with respect to its competitors in the industry in which it is engaged.
(e) If during a period when the collective bargaining agreement continues in effect, and if essential to the
continuation of the debtor's business, or in order to avoid irreparable damage to the estate, the court, after notice
and a hearing, may authorize the trustee to implement interim changes in the terms, conditions, wages, benefits,
or work rules provided by a collective bargaining agreement. Any hearing under this paragraph shall be
scheduled in accordance with the needs of the trustee. The implementation of such interim changes shall not
render the application for rejection moot.
(f) No provision of this title shall be construed to permit a trustee to unilaterally terminate or alter any
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement prior to compliance with the provisions of this section.
II U.S.C.A. § 1113 (West Supp. 1985).
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with two preconditions and a slight change in wording, the "balance of the equities"
standard for rejection of the collective bargaining agreement. Each of these four areas
will be examined in terms of its meaning under the new law and in terms of the impact
on the employer's obligation under the NLRA.
A. The Prohibition on Unilateral Termination of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement
Congress explicitly overruled that portion of the Bildisco opinion allowing an
employer unilaterally to terminate or modify its collective bargaining agreement.
Section 1113(f) provides:
No provision of this title shall be construed to permit a trustee [or debtor-in-possession]
to unilaterally terminate or alter any provisions of a collective bargaining agreement prior
to compliance with the provisions of this section. 17'
In addition, the statute describes the collective bargaining agreement as remaining in
effect until an application for rejection is ruled on by the court.172
The 1984 amendments, however, were by no means a clear victory for labor. As
part of the thirteenth hour compromise on the bankruptcy package, Congress
protected the contract for only a limited period of time. First, Congress sought to
speed up the rejection process by establishing explicit time limits for the bankruptcy
court to hear and rule on a rejection application. A hearing on rejection must be held
by fourteen to twenty-one days after the application for rejection is filed. 73
Second, the old contract, the one still in effect, is protected for only an additional
thirty days after the beginning of the hearing on rejection. Section 11 13(d)(2) provides
that, if the court does not rule on an application for rejection within thirty days after
commencement of the rejection hearing, "the trustee may terminate or alter any
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement pending the ruling of the court on
the [rejection] application." 1 74 Note that this unilateral alteration or termination by the
debtor is temporary pending a final ruling by the court on rejection. 75
171. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(0 (West Supp. 1985). Section 1113(a) provides that the term "trustee" includes a
debtor-in-possession.
172. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(e) (West Supp. 1985).
173. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(d)(1) (West Supp. 1985). The court may extend this period by seven days "where the
circumstances of the case and the interests of justice require." The time may be extended for more than seven days, but
only if the parties agree. Id.
174. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(d)(2) (West Supp. 1985). This 30-day period may be extended, but only by agreement
of the trustee or debtor-in-possession.
175. This exception to the prohibition on unilateral changes in § 1113(0 is a revised version of a provision offered
by the National Bankruptcy Conference and introduced into the Senate by Senators Thurmond and Heflin. 130 Co.G. REc.
S6107 (daily ed. May 21, 1984) (text of proposed amendment No. 3083, by Sen. Thurmond and Sen. Heflin, to HR
5174). Under the National Bankruptcy Conference's proposed language, the collective bargaining agreement would have
automatically ceased to be in effect 30 days after an application for rejection was filed. Id., § 561(2). The final language,
allowing a debtor to alter or terminate a collective bargaining agreement 30 days after conmmencement of the hearing,
protects the contract for an additional 14 to 21 days, unless the debtor agrees to a longer period of time.
Furthermore, under the National Bankruptcy Conference's proposal, this unilateral action by the debtor would have
been permanent, not subject to the ruling on rejection. 130 CONG. REc. S6126 (daily ed. May 21, 1984) (Thurmond
amendment, § 561(2)).
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In summary, the effect of the 1984 amendments is to prohibit unilateral
employer action vis-a-vis the contract for a limited period of time after the employer
files bankruptcy but before the employer files for rejection, and while the employer's
rejection application is pending. The employer controls the actual time period the old
contract remains in effect because the relevant time limits are triggered by the
employer's filing for rejection. The union and the employees can be sure of no more
than forty-four to fifty-one days of protection under the old contract once the
employer petitions for rejection. 176 In addition, at least some time will elapse between
the bankruptcy filing and the rejection filing because under section 1113 an employer
may no longer file an application for rejection of its collective bargaining agreement
contemporaneously with its bankruptcy petition. It must first make its proposal to the
union under the new prerejection bargaining procedures discussed below. 177
It is hoped that the bankruptcy courts will understand the need for making
prompt decisions on the rejection applications they hear. As Senator Packwood
characterized the thirty day post-hearing period in the discussion of the conference
report, the onus of allowing the debtor to make unilateral changes in the contract will
fall on the bankruptcy court due to its delay in ruling on the application; only where
"the court wrongly fails to decide the rejection application in the prescribed time"
may the trustee terminate or alter any contract provisions. 178 Senator Packwood also
pointed out some of the ramifications of the debtor making such unilateral changes
pending a rejection ruling:
Obviously if the court ultimately refuses to approve rejection of the contract, then the
trustee will have to pay back any wages or benefits withheld unilaterally and unpaid wages
and benefits will be treated as costs of administration. In addition, if the trustee makes any
such unilateral changes, than [sic] the union is also free to engage in strike activity since
its no-strike obligation would no longer be binding. 79
176. The hearing must be held in 14 to 21 days, with the court having 30 days to rule.
177. § 1113(b)(1) provides:
(b)(1) Subsequent to filing a petition and prior to filing an application seeking rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement, the debtor in possession or trustee . . shall-
(A) make a proposal to the authorized representative of the employees covered by such
agreement . . . and
(B) provide . . . the representative of the employees with such relevant information as is necessary to
evaluate the proposal.
Theoretically, the bankruptcy petition could be filed, the proposal be made, the relevant information given to the union,
and the rejection application filed all in one day, as long as these events took place in the correct sequence. Normally,
however, one would assume the debtor would undertake these various tasks over a period of several days, thus filing its
rejection application several days after its bankruptcy petition. White suggests that, in addition to making the proposal and
providing the union with the relevant information, the debtor may have to wait for the union to have time to evaluate the
proposal before filing for rejection. White, supra note 65, at 119 n.93.
In In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3277 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 120
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2198 (V.D. Pa. 1985), the union argued that a 22-day period between the date the debtor gave its
bargaining proposal to the union and the date it filed its petition to reject the contract indicated bad faith bargaining by
the debtor over the proposal. Both the bankruptcy court and the district court rejected this argument. The district court
pointed out that "§ 1113 has no time restraint relative to when the debtor, following the submission of a proposal, may
file its rejection application." 120 L.R.R.M. at 2204.
178. 130 CoNG. REc. S8898 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood).
179. Id. Senator Packwood is correct about the administrative expense priority, but is not correct about the union's
right to strike if the employer only modifies the contract and does not terminate it. The union may still be bound by the
contract's no-strike clause, with the right to grieve and arbitrate the modification as a breach of the contract. See supra
note 47 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, as pointed out by two of the House members in their analysis of the
compromise bill, the courts are expected as a matter of course to meet the time limits,
but in the unlikely event that a court should not do so, expeditious mandamus relief
would be available in the appellate courts. 180
It is likely that under the provisions of section 1113(d)(2) a failure by the
bankruptcy court to rule on rejection within thirty days of the rejection hearing will
be tantamount to an approval of the application for rejection. It will be interesting to
see whether bankruptcy judges take advantage of this time limit to rule by default
without making a timely decision. Although it is theoretically possible that a court
could still deny rejection, even after the thirty days had passed and the debtor had
unilaterally terminated the contract, this seems very unlikely. The resurrection of the
collective bargaining agreement would assure that any employee claims for lost
wages and benefits resulting from any employer reductions would be treated as first
priority expenses of administration.'18 The pressure on the bankruptcy court will be
just the opposite-to approve rejection so that the reasonable value of services
rendered during administration are the reduced amount the debtor is paying, not the
previous contract rate. In addition, ultimate rejection of the contract will assure that
any claims for breach not otherwise entitled to administrative expense priority will
relate back to the date the bankruptcy petition was filed and become prepetition,
unsecured claims entitled to only the more limited wage or fringe benefit priorities.1 82
B. The Duty to Bargain Prior to Rejection
Aside from overruling the second part of Bildisco by prohibiting immediate and
unilateral termination of the contract by the employer, the major thrust of section
1113 is to require the debtor-employer and the union to bargain over modifications in
the existing collective bargaining agreement before allowing a bankruptcy court to
rule on rejection. The language creating this rather strange bargaining process was
taken from Senator Packwood's proposed amendment, offered in May 1984.183 This
new bargaining procedure contains the operative NLRA language establishing the
duty to bargain in good faith, but it sets up a bargaining framework more like the
one-sided final offer arbitration procedure occasionally found in public sector
collective bargaining.' 84 The heart of section 1113 is subsection (b):
(b)(1) Subsequent to filing a petition and prior to filing an application seeking rejection of
a collective bargaining agreement, the debtor in possession ... shall-
180. 130 CoNG. REc. H7496, S8899 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Rep. Hughes and Rep. Morrison on
H.R. 5174).
181. It is possible that even with rejection the amount of wages lost could serve as an administrative expense claim.
See supra notes 57-58.
182. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (third priority for wages), § 507(a)(4) (fourth priority for benefits). See supra note 60.
183. 130 CoNG. Rec. S6181 (daily ed. May 22, 1984).
184. Final offer arbitration is an impasse resolution technique in which each side's final offer is presented to an
arbitrator. The arbitrator may not create a compromise position, but must choose between the offers presented. In some
cases the choice is made issue by issue. In others, an entire package must be chosen. P. Faints, Fm. Ornm Asarr aso
(Public Employee Relations Library No. 50, 1975). See also H. EDwARDs, R. CLARK & C. CRvR, LABsR RELA1S L.,w
Im H PUBuC SEcToR 620-21, 622-23 (2d ed. 1979), and sources cited therein.
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(A) make a proposal to the authorized representative of the employees covered by
such agreement, based on the most complete and reliable information available at the time
of such proposal, which provides for those necessary modifications in the employees [sic]
benefits and protections that are necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor and
assures that all creditors, the debtor and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and
equitably; and
(B) provide ... the representative of the employees with such relevant information
as is necessary to evaluate the proposal.
(2) During the period beginning on the date of the making of a proposal... and
ending on the date of the hearing [on rejection], the trustee shall meet, at reasonable
times, with the authorized representative to confer in good faith in attempting to reach
mutually satisfactory modifications of such agreement. 85
Section 1113 provides in subsection (c) that a bankruptcy court shall approve an
application for rejection only if (1) the debtor has made a proposal under subsection
(b), (2) the employee representative "has refused to accept such proposal without
good cause," and (3) the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection. 186
1. The Scope of the Required Proposal
a. The Proposal is Limited to Modifications "Necessary" to Permit
Reorganization
Under this new bargaining procedure, the first requirement is that the debtor-
employer make a proposal which contains only those modifications necessary to
permit the debtor's reorganization. 187 Senator Packwood indicated that this concept
was based on a recommendation by Professor Countryman and Mr. Bordewieck in
their article on rejection of collective bargaining agreements:
185. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(b) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
186. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(c) (West Supp. 1985). In In re American Provision Co., 44 Bankr. 907 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1984), the first reported rejection case under § 1113, the court analyzed the new statute by breaking it down into nine
requirements:
While § 1113 is not a masterpiece of draftsmanship, I think nine requirements for court approval of the rejection
of collective bargaining agreements can be gleaned from § 1113.
1. The debtor in possession must make a proposal to the Union to modify the collective bargaining
agreement.
2. The proposal must be based on the most complete and reliable information available at the time of the
proposal.
3. The proposed modifications must be necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor.
4. The proposed modifications must assure that all creditors, the debtor and all of the affected parties are
treated fairly and equitably.
5. The debtor must provide to the Union such relevant information as is necessary to evaluate the proposal.
6. Between the time of the making of the proposal and the time of the hearing on approval of the rejection
of the existing collective bargaining agreement, the debtor must meet at reasonable times with the Union.
7. At the meetings the debtor must confer in good faith in attempting to reach mutually satisfactory
modifications of the collective bargaining agreement.
8. The Union must have refused to accept the proposal without good cause.
9. The balance of the equities must clearly favor rejection of the collective bargaining agreement.
Id. at 909 (footnotes omitted).
187. 11 U.S.C.A. § 11 13(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1985). Senator Packwood's original language contained in his May
22 amendment limited the required proposal to minimum modifications that would permit reorganization. 130 Coso. REc.
S6181 (daily ed. May 22, 1984).
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At the very minimum, no bankruptcy court should authorize the rejection of a collective
bargaining agreement until the debtor establishes that it bargained in good faith with the
union with respect to modifications in the collective bargaining agreement deemed
necessary by the debtor for continuation of the business enterprise, and that the union
refused to agree to these modifications.188
During the debate on the conference committee's report, Senator Packwood
emphasized that it was the committee's intent to limit strictly the employer's proposal
to necessary modifications:
[O]nly modifications which are necessary to a successful reorganization may be proposed.
Therefore, the debtor will not be able to exploit the bankruptcy procedure to rid itself of
unwanted features of the labor agreement that have no relation to its financial condition
and its reorganization and which earlier were agreed to by the debtor. The word
"necessary" inserted twice into this provision clearly emphasizes this required aspect of
the proposal which the debtor must offer and guarantees the sincerity of the debtor's good
faith in seeking contract changes. 89
Presumably, if the debtor's proposal contains additional items which it may
desire, but which are not necessary to reorganization, the proposal does not fulfill the
requirements of section 1113(b) and the employee representative would have good
cause to refuse to accept the proposal. Thus, under section 1113(c), the bankruptcy
court would not be allowed to approve rejection, in the event no agreement on
voluntary modifications is reached, if the proposal contains items that are not necces-
sary.
b. The Debtor Must Continue to Be the Employer
This requirement, "necessary to permit . . . reorganization," presumes that the
debtor will continue to operate the business which is employing those who work
under the collective bargaining agreement. It presupposes that the debtor's reorga-
nization proceedings involve a rehabilitation of the business, not a liquidation or a
sale of the business to a new employer. Although a reorganization proceeding under
Chapter 11 may be pursued for the purpose of liquidation, not rehabilitation, rejection
of a collective bargaining agreement should never be allowed under section 1113 if
the debtor does not intend to rehabilitate the employing enterprise. 19
188. Bordewieck & Countryman, supra note 74, at 317, quoted in 130 CoNG. Rsc. S6184 (daily ed. May 22, 1984)
(emphasis added by author). Note that this description contains both the term "necessary" and the phrase "for
continuation of the business," a combination of the "necessary" language used in § 1113(b) and the phrase "essential
to the continuation of the business" used in § 1113(e) on interim relief. See infra notes 335-37 and accompanying text.
189. 130 CoNG. REc. S8898 (daily ed. June 29, 1984). Similarly, in the House, Rep. Morrison stated that § 1113(b)
"makes plain that the trustee [or debtor] must limit his proposal to modify a collective bargaining agreement to only those
modifications that must be accomplished if the reorganization is to succeed. The key phrase is 'necessary' modificatios."
Id. at H7496.
190. Senator Packwood used the term "successful reorganization" in discussing the "necessity" requirement. The
Supreme Court in Bildisco talked about "successful rehabilitation" and "successful reorganization" interchangably,
describing either as an alternative to a sale or liquidation:
Since the policy of Chapter I l is to permit successful rehabilitation of debtors, rejection should not be permitted
without a finding that that policy would be served by such action .... Determining what would constitute a
successful rehabilitation involves balancing the interests of the affected parties-the debtor, creditors, and
employees. The Bankruptcy Court must consider the likelihood and consequences of liquidation for the debtor
absent rejection, the reduced value of the creditors' claims that would follow from affirmance and the hardship
that would impose on them, and the impact of rejection on the employees.
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If the debtor is going to liquidate the business by laying off all the employees,
terminating its operations, and selling its assets for scrap, it will have no employees
left working under the contract. Consequently, no modifications will be necessary
because the contract will no longer have any effect on the operation of the business. 19'
If the employer is unable to meet its contractual obligations during the process of
liquidation, the employees will simply be entitled to file administrative claims in the
bankruptcy proceedings for any lost wages or benefits using the contract rate as the
reasonable value of services rendered.1 92 No modifications of the contract will be
"necessary to permit reorganization" because no reorganization will be taking place.
If one reads section 1113(b) in light of the Supreme Court's emphasis in Bildisco on
successful rehabilitation and the remarks of the conference committee members on the
floor, Congress did not intend the term "reorganization" to include liquidation of the
employing unit.193
In other Chapter 11 proceedings, the debtor may not liquidate its employing unit,
but it may sell the business to a new employer as a functioning operation. In this
situation as well, no contract modifications will be necessary to permit reorganization.
Under the Supreme Court's labor law successorship doctrines, a buyer of a business
concern is not bound by the seller's collective bargaining agreement with its employees
unless the buyer expressly assumes the contract. If a successor employer continues to
employ a majority of the former owner's employees, it may be under a duty to
recognize and bargain with the employees' union, but it is not bound by the debtor's
collective bargaining agreement. 194 No modifications in the contract will be necessary
because the contract will no longer apply to the employees when the buyer takes over
the business. If no contract modifications are necessary because no employees will
continue to be employed under the contract, then rejection of the contract is precluded.
This requirement that rejection of a collective bargaining agreement is permis-
sible only if the debtor is planning to continue to operate its business may seem
obvious, but previously has not been required by the courts under section 365. Some
* . * The Bankruptcy Code does not authorize free-wheeling consideration of every conceivable equity,
but rather only how the equities relate to the success of the reorganization ....
The fundamental purpose of reorganization is to prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an
attendant loss of jobs and possible misuse of economic resources.
465 U.S. 513, 527-28 (1984). See also Gibson, The New Law on Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements in
Chapter M: An Analysis ofll U.S.C. § 1113, 58 AM. B AxR. L.J. 325, 337-38 n.53 (1984).
191. In In re Total Tramp. Serv., 37 Bankr. 904 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984), the court ruled that rejection of the
collective bargaining agreement was not possible because no more employees were going to be employed under the
contract. The court found that because all employees had been laid off and the business had ceased, the contract was no
longer executory, and therefore was not eligible for rejection. Id. at 906. The court also found that in the alternative the
balance of the equities did not favor rejection because it would serve no rehabilitative purpose. Id. at 907.
192. See supra notes 57-58.
193. This interpretation of § 1113(b) is reinforced by the language of § 1113(e) which specifies that interim relief
from the contract's terms may be authorized by the court only if it is "essential to the continuation of the debtor's
business." 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(e) (vest Supp. 1985).
194. See supra note 42. In addition, the buyer is free to set new initial terms of employment, reducing the wages
and benefits the employees were receiving under the contract with the debtor. In this situation, only the debtor-as-seller
remains obligated under the collective bargaining agreement. The union and employees may pursue arbitration against the
seller, seeking an award of damages for any breach, including a breach of any clause that the contract will be binding on
the employer's successors or assigns. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
This award could then be presented in bankruptcy as a claim against the estate.
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bankruptcy courts have granted rejection primarily to allow the debtor-in-possession
to sell the business free of the restrictions of the collective bargaining agreement. 195
If the debtors, their lawyers, or the bankruptcy courts had been aware of or had
properly applied the doctrine of successorship under labor law, they would have
realized that rejection was not necessary in order for the buyer to purchase the
business free of the collective bargaining agreement. 196 In the event of a liquidation
or sale, the effect of rejection is limited to the possibility of converting some of the
employees' claims against the debtor for breach of the contract from first priority
administrative expense claims to prepetition claims with third, fourth, or no
priority. 197 Under section 1113, this possible change in the priority of employee
claims is not sufficient, by itself, to justify rejection. Section 1113 was drafted on the
assumption that the debtor will be attempting to rehabilitate its business and will
continue to have persons employed under the collective bargaining agreement,
thereby necessitating contract modifications.
c. Financial Impact is Needed for Modifications to be "Necessary"
The few court opinions issued under section 1113 indicate that in order to find
that proposed modifications are necessary, the debtor must introduce financial evi-
dence showing that the modifications will have a significant monetary impact on
improving the debtor's financial condition. 198 In In re American Provision Co., 199 the
court denied rejection, finding the proposed modifications not necessary to the debtor's
reorganization because they would have saved the debtor only around two percent of
195. In In re J.R. Elkins, Inc., 27 Bankr. 862 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983), the court found that in order for the debtor
to reorganize under Chapter 11, "a buyer must be found quickly." The court continued:
The evidence presented indicates that a prospective buyer has made a finm offer to purchase the debtor's assets.
That offer is, however, conditioned on a renegotiation of the collective bargaining agreement between the debtor
and the Union. The purchaser is adamant in its refusal to assume the agreement as it now exists. If this
renegotiation is not accomplished the offer will be withdrawn.
Id. at 863. Likewise, in In re Concrete Pipe Mach. Co., 28 Bankr. 837 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983), the court granted
rejection in part because, the court explained, "[tihe prospective purchasers of the company have declined to make
binding offers while the collective bargaining agreement is still in effect. It is virtually certain that no purchasers can be
found if the collective bargaining agreement is not rejected." Id. at 839.
196. The only court to recognize explicitly that rejection may not be necessary in this situation has been the Ninth
Circuit in Local Joint Executive Bd. v. Hotel Circle, 613 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1980). There, the receiver had negotiated
a proposed sale of the hotel with the sale conditioned on the purchaser taking clear of any existing collective bargaining
agreement. Id. at 212. The court commented: "In some cases the bankruptcy court will not need to reach the rejection
issue. . . .Under Burns and other cases, there may not be a need for the bankruptcy court to act any further as the new
owner may be insulated under the successor employer doctrine." Id. at 214 n.3. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the
bankruptcy court's approval of rejection.
In a recent case under § 1113, In re Fiber Glass Indus., 49 Bankr. 202 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1985), the reorganization
of the debtor was premised on a sale of corporate stock to new management, not sufficient to make the new owner a
successor employer. As in the above cases, however, the completion of the transaction was premised on rejection of the
collective bargaining agreement. The court, however, refused to be bound by this condition, stating that: "This Court
cannot subordinate the statutory standard outlined in § 1113 for rejection of a collective bargaining agreement to a
condition in a contract clearly inserted for [the new chief executive officer's) benefit and capable of being waived by
him." Id. at 207.
197. See supra notes 57, 60.
198. The one exception is the five-year contract term proposed in Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel. See infra notes
208-15 and accompanying text.
199. 44 Bankr. 907 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
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its monthly operating expenses. 2°° In In re K & B Mounting, Inc.,201 rejection was
denied, in part, because the debtor did not introduce any detailed financial evidence
supporting the necessity of its proposal, relying solely on its bankruptcy filings.20 2 On
the other hand, the court in In re Allied Delivery System Co.,203 found the debtor's
proposed modifications necessary based on its general conclusion that the proposed
modifications would have "substantially reduced" the debtor's labor costs, which
constituted approximately eighty-seven percent of its gross revenues. 204
Thus, the focus of the "necessity" requirement has been on the monetary impact
of any changes on the debtor's financial condition.20 5 At issue should be the
economic items contained in a collective bargaining agreement, not its noneconomic
provisions. 20 6 Under section 1113(b), changes in noneconomic items, such as work
rules, seniority, and grievance and arbitration procedures, would not come within the
scope of the permissible proposal unless the debtor can establish a clear monetary
impact on reorganization. 20 7
200. Id. at 910.
201. 50 Bankr. 460 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985).
202. Id. at 467-68. Similarly, in In re Fiber Glass Indus., 49 Bankr. 202 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1985), the court found
that the debtor's cost reduction proposal was presented "without any specifies supporting the reductions except an obvious
need to control operating expenses." Id. at 206. The court continued:
Merely demonstrating a resultant savings to the debtor to justify a modification does not appear to meet the
statutory standard without the additional showing that but for this particular savings reorganization cannot be
achieved. No evidence was offered by the debtors as to how the precise figure of $130,000 was keyed into an
overall plan of reorganization.
Id.
203. 49 Bankr. 700 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
204. Id. at 702. According to the court's opinion, when current employee pension and health and welfare benefits
were included, the union labor costs exceeded 100% of the debtor's gross revenues. Id.
205. See also Gibson, supra note 190, at 337.
206. The distinction between the economic and noneconomic provisions of a collective bargaining agreement is one
generally followed in the bargaining process. Economic items, which include those "directly susceptible to monetary
evaluation, such as wages, vacations, holidays, and pension and welfare contributions," are customarily considered only
after agreement has been reached on noneconomic items. Hart, Techniques of Collective Bargaining, PRAc. LAw., Jan. 15,
1980, at 9, 17. Noneconomic items include such things as a "management rights" clause, grievance and arbitration
provisions, union security, a no-strike promise, and seniority provisions. Id.; Federal Mogul Corp., 212 N.L.R.B. 950,
952 (1974), enforced, 524 F.2d 37 (6th Cir. 1975).
207. In one recent case, In re Salt Creek Freightways, 47 Bankr. 835 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985), the union attempted
to contest proposed modifications in the grievance procedure, a noneconomic item, as not necessary to reorganization, but
failed to offer any evidence in support of its claim. According to the court, the debtor had presented a prima facie case
that all its proposed changes were necessary for the company to remain in business, and the union failed to carry its burden
of producing evidence to rebut this showing. Id. at 838. The court did not summarize the financial evidence or indicate
what monetary impact the debtor's proposed changes would have, but merely concluded that the debtor's witness
established that each of the proposed modifications "impacted upon the debtor's operations and was therefore necessary
to enable the debtor to remain in business." Id. If this case is any example, once a debtor employer offers evidence that
a proposed change in a noneconomic item will have a monetary impact on the company's reorganization, the union must
be prepared to offer evidence of its own that this monetary impact will not occur, or will be insignificant, in order to keep
the modification of a contract's noneconomic items from being considered necessary.
In analyzing the differing treatment given to a contract's economic items, as opposed to noneconomic items, it is
interesting to contrast this opinion of the court on rejection of the debtor's collective bargaining agreement with its earlier
opinion authorizing interim changes in the same collective bargaining agreement. See In re Salt Creek Freightways, 46
Bankr. 347 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985). Finding that the standard for authorizing interim relief, as opposed to rejection, was
the stricter standard derived from REA Express, the court granted interim relief on economic items only. The court noted
that the debtor's proposal to the union contained modifications in several noneconomic provisions, but found that there
was no evidence before the court that "these other changes, referred to as 'noneconomic' by the parties, are necessary
for the continuation of the debtor's business." Id. at 351. Therefore, the court limited the interim changes to reductions
in six economic items: wages, health and welfare fund payments, pension fund payments, paid sick leave, paid holidays,
and paid vacations. Id.
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The one major exception so far to a determination of necessity by an
examination of the financial impact of the proposals has been the bankruptcy court's
evaluation of Wheeling-Pittsburgh's proposal to modify its collective bargaining
agreement by extending it for an additional five-year term. 20 8 By the time the
company moved to reject the collective bargaining agreement, there were only two
issues in dispute: The company's proposal to reduce labor costs from $21.40 to
$15.20 per hour, and its proposal to extend the contract, with this modification, for
an additional five years. The contract would otherwise have expired thirteen months
later on July 31, 1986.209 The labor cost proposal had an obvious financial impact.
The five-year extension of the contract, however, was supported by testimony on the
company's need for labor stability during its reorganization period which, according
to the bankruptcy court, was likely to last at least five years. 210 The union's
argument that sufficient labor stability could be achieved by negotiating a new
three-year agreement when the old one expired fell on deaf ears. The bankruptcy
court found that because the reduction in labor costs to $15.20 per hour was
necessary for reorganization, "there is no need, reason, or justification for waiting
13 months for relief from a losing situation." '211
The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's finding of necessity, finding
that the "necessary" standard of section 1113 "does not mean 'absolutely essen-
tial"' as the union contended. Instead, in order to prevent the debtor from going into
liquidation, with the consequent loss of jobs, Congress intended the "necessary"
standard "to be satisfied by consideration of feasibility for reorganization.' '212
Furthermore, the district court held that, even if it may not have made the same
findings of fact as the bankruptcy court, the district court on appeal could reverse the
bankruptcy court only under the "clearly erroneous" standard.21 3
The ultimate irony of basing a finding of necessity for a five-year contract term
on the need for labor stability was the fact that this finding was one of the steps along
the way which made rejection of the collective bargaining agreement possible.
Rejection in turn provoked a four-month strike by the Steelworkers Union, which in
the view of many observers was virtually certain to hasten the liquidation of the
company. 214 The bankruptcy court discussed the need for labor stability in evaluating
the company's proposal without even referring to the possibility of a strike occurring
in the event rejection was granted. Even more disturbing was the fact that neither the
bankruptcy court nor the district court mentioned or appeared to recognize that, by
seeking a five-year contract term, the company was in effect asking the union to
relinquish its right to bargain over working conditions for this five-year period. In a
field of business changing as rapidly as the steel industry, giving up all bargaining
208. In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2198 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
209. Id. at 2201.
210. Id. at 2202 (quoting the Bankrhptcy Court's opinion. See 119 L.R.R.M. 3277, 3284 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1985)).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 2203.
214. See Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 1985, at 3, col. 2, and Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1985, at 17, col. I; see also infra note
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rights for such an unusually long period of time was obviously more than the union
was willing to concede. 215
The bankruptcy court must decide whether the debtor's proposed modifications
are necessary only if the parties have failed to reach agreement on a modified
contract. Therefore, by the time the court hears the evidence on necessity, the real
issue before the court is whether the court may proceed to consider and approve the
debtor's rejection request. If the court finds that the modifications the debtor has
proposed are not necessary, then, in effect, the court is denying rejection. If the
court finds the proposal contains only necessary changes, then the court is allowing
itself to reach the issue of rejection. It is therefore difficult-if not impossible-to
divorce a ruling on the necessity requirement from the rejection issue itself. This
leads to a certain rigidity and mechanical application of the section 1113
prerequisites to rejection. Because a failure to comply fully with the "necessity"
requirement is so severely sanctioned by refusal to reach the rejection issue, courts
such as the bankruptcy court in Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel are very reluctant to rule
against the debtor. This is one of the built-in weaknesses of section 1113. If the
bankruptcy court felt it had other options, such as continuing the hearing, directing
the debtor to delete or modify one or more of the specific items in its section 1113(b)
proposal, and directing the parties to bargain again, it might be more willing to find
that not all the debtor's proposals are necessary.
d. The Proposal Must Assure Fair and Equitable Treatment
In addition to containing only those modifications which are necessary, the
debtor's proposal must "assure that all creditors, the debtor and all of the affected
parties are treated fairly and equitably." 216 The phrase "all of the affected parties"
was intended primarily, but not exclusively, to include the unionized employees
working under the collective bargaining agreement. As Senator Packwood explained,
if the employees and their union are reassured that they are not being asked to
contribute more than their share of concessions to the reorganization effort, they will
be more willing to agree to contract modifications:
This language [assuring fair and equitable treatment] guarantees that the focus for cost
cutting must not be directed exclusively at unionized workers. Rather the burden of
sacrifices in the reorganization process will be spread among all affected parties. This
consideration is desirable since experience shows that when workers know that they alone
are not bearing the sole brunt of the sacrifices, they will agree to shoulder their fair share
and in some instances without the necessity for a formal contract rejection.217
215. Collective bargaining in the steel industry is in a state of flux due to the economic crisis in American steel
manufacture and the termination of coordinated bargaining by the five major producers of domestic steel. For the first time
in 30 years, each of the major steel companies will be bargaining individually with the Steelworkers Union for new
collective bargaining agreements to take effect in July 1986. See Wall St. J., July 22, 1985, at 3, col. 1.
216. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(b)(l)(A) (Vest Supp. 1985).
217. 130 Coss. REc. S8898 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Packwood). Senator Pack-wood went on to
discuss approvingly the approach one bankruptcy court took in In re Blue Ribbon Transp. Co., 30 Bankr. 783 (Bankr.
D.R.I. 1983). In Blue Ribbon, the court found that the business would collapse if required to adhere to the collective
bargaining agreement. The court, however, made authorization of rejection conditional, requiring that the debtor first
reduce excessive management costs by lowering the three owner-managers' salaries, by reducing the number of company
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In contrast to this emphasis on the organized employees, those conferees
opposed to the prounion amendments wanted to make it clear that this language also
includes the debtor's nonunion employees. 21 8 Consequently, inclusion of this
requirement mandates that the debtor support its section 1113(b) proposal with
comparisons between the financial impact the proposed contract modifications will
have on its unionized workers, and the impact other cost-cutting measures will have
on the salaries and perquisites of management and on the wages and benefits of any
nonunion employees.2 19
As interpreted by one bankruptcy judge, fair and equitable treatment of all the
affected parties, including the various classes of employees, does not mean "identical
or equal treatment. "220 In In re Allied Delivery System, the union opposed the
cars from seven to one and using the car only for company business, by cancelling company gasoline credit cards, and
by limiting the company's contributions to management's medical and pension plans to the same pro rata amount
contributed to employees' plans. The court gave the debtor five days to comply, in which event rejection of the contract
would be approved. The court's order was to insure that the employees were not the only ones being required to make
sacrifices. Id. at 787-88.
Another example which Senator Packwood could have used to illustrate fair and equitable treatment was the district
court's conditional approval of rejection in In re Parrot Packing Co., 42 Bankr. 323 (N.D. Ind. 1983). In this case the
court conditioned rejection on percentage reductions in nonunion employees' compensation to equal the percentage
reductions unionized employees had already suffered plus the reduction which would occur as a result of rejection. Id.
at 334-35. The wages of the organized employees had already been reduced by 28%, whereas some of the nonunion
employees' compensation had increased approximately 1% and others' had increased 13% over the past year. Id. at 326.
In contrast to these two cases, one bankruptcy court had actually approved rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement where, three months before filing bankruptcy and requesting rejection, the company's five officer-owners had
each received an annual raise of $12,000, and the directors had decided to give themselves a director's fee of S2,500 per
quarter. In re Commercial Motor Freight, 27 Bankr. 293, 296 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1983). The court justified the debtor's
actions in these words:
That while the action of Commercial Motor Freight's directors in awarding themselves significant salary
increases and other benefits was highly improvident under the circumstances, the court is not of the opinion that
such action evinces bad faith; and that, further, the monetary amount involved is de minimus as compared to
the total labor costs required by the contracts[.]
Id. at 297. This sequence of events should not be allowed to repeat itself under § 1113.
218. This is most clearly shown in the remarks of Senator Thurmond:
The phrase "all of the affected parties" is obviously not meant to include any party which might conceivably
be affected in any minor way, but is intended to encompass those parties directly affected. This phrase clearly
includes, however, all nonunion employees of the debtor, whose interests should be as carefully considered by
the court as those of any union employees.
130 CO No. REe. S8888 (daily ed. June 29, 1984). Senator Hatch gave a very expansive definition of the term "affected
parties": "those parties with a contractual, legal, or financial tie to the debtor." Id. at S8892.
219. This requirement to treat all parties fairly and equitably is a revision of Senator Packwood's original language,
which required the debtor's proposal to take into account "the best estimate of the sacrifices expected to be made by all
classes of creditors and other affected parties to the reorganization." 130 Coxo. Rce. S6181 (daily ed. May 22, 1984).
The criticism of the original Packwood proposal was that it would require the debtor or court to predict at the beginning
of the bankruptcy proceeding the impact of a future reorganization plan, regarded as an impossible task at this early stage
of the proceedings. The language finally adopted is less specific and allows greater leeway for varying interpretations by
bankruptcy judges.
As Senator Hatch explained in opposing the Packwood amendment:
[Riequiring the parties in negotiation-and the court thereafter-to "estimate" the "sacrifices" ... "to be
made by all classes of creditors and other affected parties" is simply unworkable. It stands the chapter 11
proceedings on its head. To me, there is no way, at the outset of a reorganization proceeding, to divine what
contributions and sacrifices might be required of all creditors. That is the job of the creditors' committee, of
which the union would be a part. At the outset of a chapter 11, all creditors are not even known, nor are the
amount of the obligations of the business known. To say at the outset, when the business must solve its cash
flow problem to survive, that it must discern what all creditors may eventually have to sacrifice to keep the
company alive, in my opinion, is nearly impossible, at least in the more complex bankruptcy situations.
130 CONG. Rae. S6191 (daily ed. May 22, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Hatch). See also id. at S6187 (remarks of Sen. Dole).
220. In re Aied Delivery Sys., 49 Bankr. 700, 703 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
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proposed contract modifications as unfair because the unionized employees' wages
and benefits were going to be cut approximately twenty percent, while the other
employees were not going to suffer as high a percentage reduction. The court rejected
the union's argument, finding that the evidence demonstrated that the wages of
nonunion employees had been reduced on a graduated basis based on earnings, and
that the value of their wages and benefits did not equal that of the union employees,
primarily because they did not have a pension plan.22 1 Similarly, in In re Salt Creek
Freightivays, the bankruptcy court found the debtor's proposal fair and equitable
because the company had substantially reduced the wages and benefits of all
nonunion employees, including top management.222 In contrast, one of the reasons
the court denied rejection in In re K & B Mounting was that the debtor had structured
its finances so that, upon filing bankruptcy, it had no secured debts and its only major
unsecured debt was to its union employees' health, welfare, and pension plan.223 As
a result, the debtor's section 1113(b) proposal affected only one party in interest: its
unionized employees. As the court said, "The debtor has not shown that its proposal
requires all parties directly affected-management, non-union employees, suppliers
as well as unionized workers-to sacrifice to a similar degree. ' 224 The debtor was
unsuccessful in evading the obligations of section 1113 through this rather unusual
method of paying cash for supplies and equipment, rather than using credit, in order
to eliminate most of its debts, except the debt to its union employees, before filing
its bankruptcy petition.
The requirement that the proposed modifications treat all parties fairly and
equitably parallels the "balancing of the equities" rejection standard itself, and is
drawn from general language used by the courts prior to Bildisco to explain their
rejection standards. 225 Again, this language describing the debtor's required proposal
collapses a bankruptcy court's ruling on whether the modification proposal meets
these requirements with the court's ultimate ruling on rejection. As Senator Hatch
explained in supporting the conference committee's compromise: "This fair and
equitable language was intended by the conference to insure that the type of balancing
that takes place when the court finally rules on rejection also takes place during these
preliminary negotiations." ' 226 Thus, in ruling on the conditions required prior to
rejection, if the court concludes that the debtor's proposal treats all parties fairly and
equitably, and, in spite of that, the union has refused to agree, the court will probably
approve rejection after again balancing these same equities. On the other hand, if the
union is able to rebut the debtor's evidence and sustain its position that the employer's
221. Id.
222. 47 Bankr. 835, 839 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).
223. 50 Bankr. 460, 468 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985).
224. Id.
225. See, e.g., In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72, 79-81 (3d Cir. 1982):
[The polestar is to do equity between claims which arise under the labor contract and other claims against the
debtor, . . . the court must consider the rights of covered employees as supported by the national labor policy
as well as the possible "sacrifices which other creditors are making" in the effort to bring about a successful
reorganization.
Id. at 81 (quoting Group of Inst'l Investors v. Chicago, Mil., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523, 550 (1943)).
226. 130 CoZOG. Rrc. S8892 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
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proposal does not treat everyone involved fairly and equitably, then presumably the
union will have good cause to refuse to accept the proposal and rejection will not be
granted.
2. Disclosure of Information
The section 1113 bargaining procedure also contains provisions requiring the
debtor to disclose relevant information to the union to enable it to evaluate the
debtor's proposal. Similar disclosure requirements are part and parcel of the duty to
bargain in good faith under the NLRA. One may presume these bankruptcy disclosure
provisions have their roots in labor law because Congress has integrated them into the
prerejection bargaining process, which incorporates the duty to bargain in good faith
as found in the NLRA. 2 27 Section 1113 first provides that the debtor's proposal of
necessary modifications must be "based on the most complete and reliable informa-
tion available at the time of such proposal.' 228 Second, after making the proposal,
the debtor must "provide ... the representative of the employees with such relevant
information as is necessary to evaluate the proposal. "229 This disclosure requirement
is, in turn, qualified by the provisions of section 11 13(d)(3):
The court may enter such protective orders, consistent with the need of the authorized
representative of the employee[s] to evaluate the trustee's proposal and the application for
rejection, as may be necessary to prevent disclosure of information provided to such
representative where such disclosure could compromise the position of the debtor with
respect to its competitors in the industry in which it is engaged.230
The first provision, that the proposal be based on the most complete and reliable
information available, is not a direct disclosure requirement, but when coupled with
the second provision, it describes the same information that the union needs in order
to evaluate the proposal. The court in In re K & B Mounting collapsed the two
requirements into one in its ruling on the debtor's failure to comply:
227. For discussion of the incorporation of the NLRA's duty to bargain into § 1113, see infra notes 244-57 and
accompanying text. In fact, Senator Thurmond was primarily concerned that the disclosure requirements not go beyond
existing labor law disclosure obligations. In response to Senator Packwood's earliest amendment, which contained very
similar disclosure requirements, Senator Thurmond remarked:
A question should also be raised regarding subsection (b)(1)(B) requiring the debtor to provide "information
necessary to evaluate such proposal." Since relevant information is already available to the unions under
existing rules of discovery, I question the necessity of a new statutory provision requiring the release of what
may be very sensitive financial information. If this provision is intended to go beyond existing law, I think that
fact should be acknowledged, explained, and clearly justified. A concern was raised at our April 10 hearing that
this type of requirement might increase an employer's disclosure obligations under the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA). Herbert P. Minkel, testifying on behalf of the National Bankruptcy Conference, stated that, since
the requirement to provide information related to the ability to confirm a plan, union representatives may be able
to obtain information which they would not be entitled to receive under the NLRA. I suggest that existing law
in this area should be maintained.
130 Cox o. Rc. S6194 (daily ed. May 22, 1984).
228. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (Vest Supp. 1985).
229. I1 U.S.C.A. § 113(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1985). The final compromise version added the word "relevant"
to this same phrase as it appeared in the earlier Packwood amendment. See 130 Coxo. REc. S6181 (daily ed. May 22,
1984).
230. I1 U.S.C.A. § 1113(d)(3) (West Supp. 1985). This section was first introduced as part of Senator Pack'ood's
amendment. Only minor changes were made in its wording in the final compromise version. See 130 Coxn. Rc. S6182,
§ 1113(d)(3) (daily ed. May 22, 1984).
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However, neither the union nor the court could assess the necessity of these modifica-
tions, since the debtor did not substantiate its proposal with "relevant" information
selected from "the most complete and reliable information available" when the debtor
made its proposal. As stated above, the debtor's bankruptcy filings are hardly suffi-
cient.2'
In order for either the court or the union to determine whether the proposal is
based on "the most complete and reliable information," the information serving as
the basis of the proposal must be disclosed to both the union and the court.
Questions will no doubt arise concerning the scope of the disclosure require-
ment. In K & B Mounting, the court gave the provisions a fairly broad scope: "The
union should be supplied with detailed projections and recommendations, perhaps
made by a management consultant, preferably one who is independent of the
interested parties. The debtor should present full and detailed disclosure of its
difficulties and its proposed short-run and long-run solutions."3 2 More specifically,
in In re Fiber Glass Industries,233 the court found that under section 1113 the debtor
should have disclosed to the union that it was planning to lay off one-third of the
unionized employees: "The anticipated possibility or probability, as it were, that
one-third of the Union work force would have to be laid off appears to be 'relevant
information,' as the term is used in § 11 13(b)(1)(B), which ought to have been
disclosed to the Union representative.' '234
On the other hand, the courts in Allied Delivery and Salt Creek Freightways
interpreted these provisions narrowly. In Allied Delivery, when the debtor made its
proposal, it gave the union its most current financial statement, but refused to furnish
the union with copies of its financial statements for the three-year period prior to its
bankruptcy filing. Although the court did not say a debtor would never be required
to furnish such information, the court held that the union had not shown why the
previous financial statements were necessary to evaluate the proposal:
The statutory requirement is that the information provided be such "relevant information
as is necessary to evaluate the proposal." The proposal is one for modifications necessary
to permit the debtor's reorganization. This Court finds that in the absence of the union's
showing of a need for specific information beyond the current financial information
provided by the debtor, the debtor has complied with this requirement. 235
231. 50 Bankr. 460, 467 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985).
232. Id.
233. 49 Bankr. 202 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1985).
234. Id. at207.
235. 49 Bankr. 700, 703 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985). It appears the court may have allocated the burden of proof on
the disclosure requirement improperly. Generally, the courts have agreed that the burden of proof in regard to rejection
is on the debtor. In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72, 79 (3d Cir. 1982) ("The burden of persuading the bankruptcy court to permit
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement must be placed on the moving party: the debtor-in-possession or the
trustee."). In In re American Provision Co., 44 Bankr. 907 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984), the court broke the statute down
into nine requirements. See supra note 186. The court found that the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the
evidence lies with the debtor on all nine requirements of § 1113. The court recognized, however, that in regard to item
five, on providing relevant information to the union, once the debtor has carried its burden of showing what information
it has provided, "[ilt is then incumbent upon the union to produce evidence that the information provided was not the
relevant information which was necessary for it to evaluate the proposal." Id. at 909-10 (emphasis added). In Allied
Delivery, on the other hand, the court seems to have reversed the burden of persuasion and the burden of production:
[O]nce the debtor has produced evidence that it provided information to the union, the burden is on the union to
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Similarly, in Salt Creek Freightways, the court interpreted the disclosure
provisions in a relatively narrow fashion, limiting the required disclosure to the
debtor's initial disclosure at the time of making its original proposal. The court
refused to broaden the requirement at the union's request to include a duty to disclose
company information relevant to evaluating the union's counterproposals. The debtor
had conveyed its cost estimates of the union's counteroffer orally during negotiations,
and the court found the debtor was not required to provide the union with the written
materials it had prepared on these cost estimates. 236
Such narrow interpretations of the disclosure requirements are not consistent
with the purpose of section 1113. If the courts are truly interested in supporting
Congress' goal of encouraging negotiations and the settlement of contract modifica-
tion disputes prior to rejection, the disclosure requirements should be interpreted as
broadly as possible, with use made of protective orders under section 11 13(d)(3) if
there is any real threat to the competitive interests of the debtor. First, there is no hint
in either Allied Delivery or Salt Creek Freightways of the reason the debtor was
unwilling to furnish the requested information. It would have involved no burden for
the debtor to compile or produce the information because the materials requested
were already in written form, having been prepared for the company's own use.
Without any additional facts, the refusal of the debtor to disclose readily accessible
information on its past, present, or future financial condition seems like a deliberate
ploy to antagonize the union over a fairly petty issue.
Second, and more important, the NLRA's duty to bargain in good faith as
interpreted by the courts includes a very broad disclosure requirement. As explained
by the Supreme Court: "Good-faith bargaining necessarily requires that claims made
by either bargainer should be honest claims .... If ... an argument is important
enought to present in the give and take of bargaining, it is important enough to require
some sort of proof of its accuracy.' '237 This duty to furnish information to support
claims made or positions taken at the bargaining table has evolved into a general rule
that whenever information is relevant to a mandatory subject of bargaining, the party
with the information is obliged to provide it to the other side upon request.23 8 The
courts and the NLRB have given relevancy a very broad definition, likening it to the
demonstrate that that information was not sufficient, for whatever reason." 49 Bankr. 700,703 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1935)
(emphasis added). The court concludes that the union made no showing of why the financial information for previous
years was necessary to evaluate the proposal. Id.
236. 47 Bankr. 835, 839 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).
237. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1956).
238. Although both management and the union have a duty to disclose relevant information, most of the relevant
data is in the hands of the employer, with the majority of litigation involving union requests for employer information.
See generally MORius, supra note 23, at 606-29.
Originally, a union had to demonstrate that requested information was relevant and necessary to its duty to bargain
intelligently over specific issues raised in negotiations. See, e.g., Aluminum Ore Co., 39 N.L.R.B. 1286, enforced, 131
F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1942). Noting that some types of information were nearly always found to be relevant and necessary,
the NLRB eventually adopted a role of presumptive relevance for wage data and information directly related to it.
Boston-Herald Traveler Corp. v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 58 (lst Cir. 1955). Slowly, the NLRB began to extend the presumption
of relevance to information directly related to all mandatory subjects-a presumption which has been endorsed by the
courts. See White Farm Equip. Co., 101 L.R.R.M. 1470 (1979), enforced, 650 F.2d 334 (D.C. Cir. 1980); San Diego
Newspaper Guild Local No. 95 v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1977); Teleprompter Corp. v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 4 (1st
Cir. 1977); Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 266 N.L.R.B. No. 135 (1983).
1986] BILDISCO AND THE DUTY TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH 121
liberal definition of relevancy as used in determining the scope of pretrial discovery
under the federal rules of procedure. 239
Moreover, to bargain in good faith, an employer is obligated to make even
broader disclosures when the employer makes a claim at the bargaining table that it
lacks the ability to pay the wages and benefits demanded by the union. Once an
employer claims inability to pay, as opposed to an unwillingness to pay, the scope of
the employer's duty to furnish information becomes significantly wider: the employer
must open up its financial records to the union for independent verification and
substantiation of its allegedly poor financial condition .24 Any negotiation of contract
modifications in the bankruptcy context necessarily involves a claim on the
company's part that it is unable to pay what the contract requires, let alone pay any
wage increases.
Consequently, under the provisions of section 1113, it makes little sense to limit
the kinds of information the union may obtain from the debtor if, under the duty to
bargain in good faith, the union is entitled to even greater disclosure by the company.
The word "relevant" as used in section 11 13(b)(1)(B) should be construed
consistently with the same term as used and understood in the disclosure component
of the NLRA's duty to bargain in good faith. Disclosure of the requested information
should have been ordered in both Allied Delivery and Salt Creek Freightways as part
of the debtor's obligation to bargain in good faith over the proposed modifications.
To give meaning to both the good faith bargaining obligation of section 1113 and the
disclosure requirements, these provisions-obligating the debtor to both utilize and
239. In NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967), the Court described the disclosure standard as requiring
"the probability that the desired information was relevant, and that it would be of use to the union in carrying out its
statutory duties and responsibilities." Id. at 437. The Court went on to describe this as a "discovery-type standard,"
quoting Moore's Federal Practice to the effect that discovery during the pre-trial phase is governed by a more liberal
standard of "relevance" because the issues in dispute are not as well defined. Id. at 437 & n.6. See also NLRB v.
Yawman & Erbe Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 947, 949 (2d Cir. 1951) (disclosure rule in accord with the prevailing discovery
practice under "modem codes"); Morris, supra note 23, at 612-13.
240. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). In Truitt, the union requested a wage increase of 10 cents
an hour, the company responded that an increase of more than 2 1/2 cents an hour would put it out of business. The union
asked for substantiation of this claim and that a CPA be allowed to examine the company's books. When this was denied,
the union requested "full and complete information with respect to [the company's] financial standing and profits." Id.
at 150. This was also refused. The NLRB found that this refusal to provide the requested information was an unfair labor
practice and ordered the company to give the union information that would "substantiate the Respondent's position of its
economic inability to pay the requested wage increase." Id. at 151. The Fourth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board
order. 224 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1955), denying enforcement to 110 N.L.R.B. 856 (1954).
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "a refusal to attempt to substantiate a claim of inability to pay increased
wages may support a finding of a failure to bargain in good faith." NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956).
The Court dealt with the company's objection that "the Board's order might be unduly burdensome or injurious to its
business" by noting that the Board's policy had consistently been that the information may be "made available in a
manner not so burdensome or time-consuming as to impede the process of bargaining." Id. at 151 (quoting Old Line Life
Ins. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 499, 503 (1951) and Cincinnati Steel Castings Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 592, 593 (1949)).
This duty to disclose information has been further developed in Metiox Mfg. Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1388 (1965),
enforced, 378 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1037 (1968). The Ninth Circuit upheld the Board's
determination that, when the employer claimed inability to grant a wage increase and supplied the union only with a
three-year old profit and loss statement, the employer had violated the duty to bargain by not supplying enough
information. The Board found that the profit and loss statements did not furnish the union with enough information to
evaluate the employer's claim. Id. at 1396. This duty of disclosure under the NLRA is consistent with the court's
suggestion in K & B Mounting that the union be supplied with detailed projections and recommendations by an
independent management consultant. See supra text accompanying note 232.
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furnish complete, reliable, and relevant information-should be interpreted in a
manner consistent with the disclosure requirements of the NLRA.241
If the employer has legitimate concerns about the damages any disclosure of
such information could have on its competitive position in its business, then the court
may enter a protective order under section 1113(d)(3) in order to prevent any
disclosure by the union to third parties. This form of protection has proved
satisfactory in the labor law context and orders have been issued under the NLRA to
protect sensitive company information such as confidential employee data. 242 For
example, as unions have become more concerned about the exposure of their
members to toxic substances at work, they have been requesting data on substances
used in manufacturing. The NLRB and the courts have found that the requested
information is relevant, but they have ordered the parties to bargain over the form of
disclosure and over restrictions on the union's use of the information. 243 Similarly,
under section 1113, the courts can require that disclosure be made to the union, but
they are free to restrict both the manner in which the disclosure is made and any
subsequent use of the information by the union, in order to protect the competitive
interests of the company.
Again, the difficulty with the disclosure requirement in section 1113 is the lack
of any practical way to deal with a debtor's failure to disclose all relevant information
short of the court's denial or refusal to consider rejection. This sanction is too severe,
making it difficult for courts to require greater disclosure unless they are inclined to
deny rejection anyway. Under the NLRA, if the Board determines that additional
disclosure in bargaining is required, it will order the disclosure to be made and order
a resumption of good faith bargaining. Perhaps the bankruptcy courts could continue
the rejection hearing for a limited period of time, order additional disclosure, and then
give the parties time for additional bargaining before reconvening the hearing. This
would have to be accomplished, however, within the thirty-day limit for the court's
ruling on rejection set by section 1113(d)(2). Otherwise, the debtor would be
rewarded by the delay in that it could temporarily terminate the contract unilaterally
pending the court's ultimate ruling on rejection.
3. The Definition of the Duty to Bargain
It is the imposition of a duty to bargain, prior to rejection, that forms the heart
of the 1984 bankruptcy compromise on collective bargaining agreements. After
requiring the debtor to make a fair and equitable proposal limited to necessary
modifications, section 11 13(b)(2) directs the trustee or debtor to "meet at reasonable
241. See the suggestion of Senator Thurmond that the disclosure requirement be interpreted as consistent with
existing law, supra note 227.
242. See Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979) (disclosure of employee psychological aptitude test
scores conditioned on obtaining each employee's written consent).
243. In a single decision, the D.C. Circuit enforced three orders of the NLRB finding health and safety information
requested by the unions relevant because it had "a bearing on the bargaining process." Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers
v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 348, 359-61 & nn.25-30 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Because of the employers' legitimate concerns over
protecting their trade secrets, as well as confidential employee medical information, however, blanket disclosure was not
required, but the parties were ordered to bargain over the extent and conditions of the disclosure to be made. Id. at 361.
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times" and "confer in good faith" in an attempt to reach "mutually satisfactory"
modifications of the collective bargaining agreement. 244 The two phrases, "meet at
reasonable times" and "confer in good faith," are taken directly from the definition
of the duty to bargain in good faith under the NLRA, as set out in section 8(d).245 The
brief legislative history indicates that, in adopting this language, Congress intended
to place upon the parties a duty to bargain in good faith as defined by labor law
principles. 246 Consequently, precedent under section 8(d) interpreting the words
"meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith" will be helpful in interpreting
and applying the same words as used in section 1113(b)(2). 247 Congress' hope in
passing section 1113 was that, by requiring bargaining before rejection, more debtors
and unions would reach agreement on necessary modifications to their collective
bargaining agreements so that court-ordered rejection would not be necessary. 248
The duty to bargain in good faith continues until the parties are at impasse. 249
Given the bankruptcy context and the premium on a quick determination of the
244. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(b)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
245. N.L.R.A. § 8(d); 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). See text of § 8(d), supra note 48.
246. Senator Moynihan described § 1113(b) as follows:
The conference agreement also provides that a company must meet with its employee representatives in good
faith, to reach an agreement concerning the labor contract modifications. This provision, then, embodies the
basic principles of collective bargaining established by Congress in the National Labor Relations Act. Section
8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act makes it a violation of the Nation's labor laws to refuse to
collectively bargain with the representative of employees ....
* * * [tlhis conference report, consistent with the intent of Congress in the National Labor Relations Act,
provides that the company must try to negotiate with employees to work out the changes necessary to prevent
the company from failing.
130 CoNcG. REc. S8900 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Moynihan) (emphasis added).
Gibson makes the argument that the bargaining procedure was devised by Congress to follow the "reasonable
efforts" requirement of Bildisco, not the good faith bargaining requirements of the NLRA. Gibson, supra note 190, at
329-30. The bankruptcy court in Wheeling-Pirtsburgh Steel, relying on Gibson's article, stated that "Congress apparently
did not intend bankruptcy courts to interpret the 'good faith' element of § 1113(b)(2) in compliance with labor law
precedent." In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3277, 3281 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1985). The
court then quotes Senator Hatch's remarks that the § 1113 bargaining requirement preserves the spirit of Bildisco,
concluding that the good faith element of § 11 13(b)(2) can be satisfied by the reasonable efforts imposed on the debtor
by Bildisco. Id. at 3282. The district court accepted this conclusion without discussion. In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel
Corp., 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2198, 2204 (W.D. Pa. 1985). The language of § 1113, however, makes it clear that
Congress did not enact Bildisco and has required more than reasonable efforts. See infra notes 252-54 and accompanying
text.
247. For a discussion of good faith bargaining under § 8(d)'s definition, see supra notes 19-29 and accompanying
text.
248. In describing § 1113, Senator Packwood commented:
On balance, I think the bill should stimulate collective bargaining and limit the number of cases when a judge
will have to authorize the rejection of a labor contract ....
After the proposal is made, and until a hearing on the motion to reject, the parties must bargain in good
faith. This provision places the primary focus on the private collective bargaining process and not in courts.
130 Coso. REc. S8898 (daily ed. June 29, 1984). Senator Kennedy agreed, stating that the purposes of § 1113 are "to
overturn the Bildisco decision which had given the trustee all but unlimited discretionary power to repudiate labor
contracts and to substitute a rule of law that encourages the parties to solve their mutual problems through the collective
bargaining process." Id. In the House, Rep. Morrison described § 1113 as follows:
The compromise that has been achieved is one that favors procedures which allow for negotiations between the
debtor and the labor union for the resolution of these problems when they arise.
The language agreed to by the conferees moves us in the direction of a negotiation process rather than a
litigation process to save companies that are in trouble without permitting any abuse of chapter 11 to vitiate
improperly [sic] labor contracts.
Id. at H7495.
249. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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contract issues, impasse may be reached very quickly. Senator Packwood described
the process of bargaining he envisioned in the following terms:
So the amendment I have offered, expressed in lay language, does the following: Assume,
first, that you file bankruptcy ....
Second, you then go to the union.... You say, "We're paying you $10 an hour and
we'll go bankrupt. We want to lower the wages to $8 an hour."
The union says: "No; we can't go below $9.25. We won't do that."
You bargain, and you come to an impasse. The employer says, "I can't do it." The
union says, "We can't afford to accept that." You are at an impasse.
That does not take very long in collective bargaining .... If you are bargaining
every day, you can reach an impasse quite quickly. Under my amendment, it is to the
employer's interest to bargain every day. If an impasse is going to be reached, the
employer can reach it as soon as possible; and you then go to the bankruptcy court and
say: "I have bargained with the union in good faith, and we have reached an impasse; we
cannot agree. I ask you for the right to discharge the contract."
The court will give its approval if-and here is the key-it finds that the union was
unjustified in rejecting the offer and if the balance of equities clearly favors rejection of
the contract.250
As Senator Packwood has illustrated, how quickly impasse is reached depends
on the circumstances. In emergency situations, or whenever time is an important
factor, impasse may be reached very quickly with few meetings.351
In Bildisco, the Supreme Court held that the parties were required to make
reasonable efforts to negotiate a voluntary modification of the contract252 The Court
refused to impose the NLRA duty to bargain in good faith, specifically the duty to
bargain to impasse, because the Court felt any finding of impasse would be outside
a bankruptcy court's expertise253 By using the NLRA's definition of the duty to
bargain, however, and imposing this duty on the debtor in section 1113, Congress has
expanded the role of the bankruptcy courts in supervising the behavior of both the
employer and union after a bankruptcy petition has been filed. In effect, the
bankruptcy courts are being called upon to develop whatever expertise is necessary
to decide whether the parties have, as required by the statute, met at reasonable times
and conferred in good faith.254
250. 130 CoxG. REc. S6182 (daily ed. May 22, 1984). Although Senator Packwood was describing the process under
his earlier amendment, § 1113(b)(2) of the Packwood Amendment was adopted verbatim as § 1113(b)(2) in the final
legislation. See the Packwood Amendment printed at 130 CoNo. REc. S6182-82 (daily ed. May 22, 1984).
251. See, e.g., Lou Stecher's Super Mkts., 275 N.L.R.B. No. 71, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1129 (May 21, 1985)
(impasse reached after three meetings); Bell Transit Co., 271 N.L.R.B. 1272, 117 L.RR.M. (BNA) 1113 (1984) (three
meetings); Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., 126 N.L.R.B. 473 (1960) (two meetings), enforcement denied on other grounds,
301 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1962); Wells Dairies Co-op, 111 N.L.R.B. 1192 (1955) (three meetings); Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94
N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951) (impasse may have been reached at second meeting).
252. 465 U.S. 513, 526 (1984).
253. Id. at 533-34.
254. Because this duty to bargain in good faith under § 1113 is a part of the bankruptcy proceedings, it will be the
bankruptcy courts, not the NLRB, who will be making these determinations.
The NLRB will have no jurisdiction to enforce this duty to bargain. Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code, not
the NLRA, and specifically mandated that the bankruptcy court find that the parties have met at reasonable times and
conferred in good faith before ruling on or granting a debtor's rejection application. It was clearly Congress' intent to keep
these issues in the bankruptcy court, or in the federal district court, if either party seeks transfer under 28 U.S.C.A. §
157(d) (West Supp. 1985). See infra note 256.
Congress did not amend the NLRA when it amended the Bankruptcy Code. Under § 8(d) of the NLRA, there is no
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A determination that the parties have bargained in good faith is not a particularly
esoteric matter requiring substantial labor law experience, but is an imprecise
generalization based on the fact finder's common sense and good judgment. It is a
legal conclusion reached after examining all the factual circumstances involved in
each case. 55 A bankruptcy court, ultimately charged with balancing all the equities,
in order to determine whether or not rejection should be granted if negotiations fail,
will have adequate information to determine whether or not the parties have bargained
in good faith. Furthermore, it will be in an adequate position to judge whether or not
additional negotiations would be futile: a finding of impasse. 256
If the question of the meaning of the duty to bargain in good faith under section
1113 reaches the Supreme Court, the Court should give recognition to the fact that
Congress did not enact the accommodation between labor law and the Bankruptcy
Code which the Court devised in Bildisco. Given the fact that in section 1113
Congress adopted the NLRA language defining the duty to bargain, which includes
the impasse obligation, the Court should be willing to modify its position and require
that bargaining continue until either the parties reach impasse or the rejection hearing
occurs.
Imposing an obligation to bargain in good faith as developed under the NLRA
will not thwart the bankruptcy goal of successful reorganization of the business.
Bargaining to impasse does not necessarily take any more time than making
reasonable efforts, but it implies a seriousness and requires a more determined effort
on the part of each party to make accommodations in order to reach agreement on
mutually satisfactory modifications. It recognizes that the union must be taken into
account by the employer and given the opportunity to participate in the process of
restructuring the business. The union and the employees it represents will be more
willing to cooperate throughout the reorganization period if they realize the employer
understands its bargaining obligations and is sincere in attempting to negotiate a
compromise, instead of imposing a predetermined result on the employees. The
impression the labor community had received from the numerous pre-Bildisco
duty on either party to bargain over modifications in a contract during its term. One must bargain over modifications only
upon notice given 60 days prior to the termination date contained in the contract. See supra note 49.
255. Because the concept of good faith is so elusive and so fact sensitive, the possible fact patterns and cases
discussing good faith bargaining are endless. For a summary of good faith bargaining determinations, see Moans, supra
note 23, at 570-606.
256. If the parties do not have confidence in the bankruptcy judge's expertise to make determinations regarding good
faith bargaining or impasse, either party may request that the rejection issues under § 1113 be referred to the district court
judge for decision. Under § 157(d), the district judge may withdraw any core bankruptcy proceeding from the bankruptcy
court on the motion of any party for cause shown. The statute continues:
The district court shall, on timely motion of a party, so withdraw a proceeding if the court determines that
resolution of the proceeding requires consideration of both title 11 and other laws of the United States regulating
organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce.
28 U.S.C.A. § 157(d) (West Supp. 1985). This provision was added as a part of the 1984 Amendments. Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 341. In discussing § 1113, Rep.
Morrison pointed out that because rejection of collective bargaining agreements implicates national labor policy, "if the
union or trustee so move, such an application is to be heard by a U.S. district judge." 130 CoNo. REc. H7496 (daily ed.
June 29, 1984).
A finding of impasse takes on added importance if it is required before a debtor may make any immediate changes
in working conditions in the event the bankruptcy or district court grants the rejection application. See infra notes 364-82
and accompanying text.
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rejection cases, and from the Court's elevation of bankruptcy concerns over labor
obligations in Bildisco, was that the bankruptcy courts would not take the Supreme
Court's requirement of reasonable efforts very seriously. Congress has emphasized
the importance of the bargaining obligation imposed under section 1113 by ignoring
the Court's concept of reasonable efforts and by adopting the NLRA bargaining
language instead.
On the other hand, one of the difficulties of enforcing the section 1113 duty to
bargain is that the sanction for a debtor's failure to bargain in good faith may be too
severe. If the bankruptcy court finds the debtor has not bargained in good faith, the
court must refuse to consider or must deny the employer's rejection application.25 7 A
bankruptcy court may be of the opinion that the debtor has not engaged in any
meaningful give and take with the union, but that the debtor still needs relief from the
collective bargaining agreement. Because the court cannot order the parties to agree
to any specific modifications, and because the court may not order only partial
rejection of the contract, the court is faced with an all or nothing choice: either keep
the contract in effect, or reject it in its entirety. There should be a way for the
bankruptcy court to mandate further and more serious negotiations while holding the
rejection application in abeyance. If the employer has not bargained in good faith by
the time of the rejection hearing, or if the parties have not yet reached impasse, the
court could continue the hearing for another two or three weeks, giving the parties
another chance to reach agreement. If no agreement has been reached by thirty days
after the initial hearing date, then, but only then, is the court required to rule on the
rejection application.25 8 Every effort should be made to assist the parties in
negotiating a modified contract. Reaching an agreement will not only avoid rejection,
but will also serve the goal of successful reorganization. The debtor's financial
situation will be stabilized, and the parties will not have to spend time negotiating an
entirely new contract. Furthermore, a negotiated compromise will insure that no
strike will occur upon rejection.
Although the duty to bargain under section 1113 is defined in NLRA terms, the
bargaining process is structured in a very different way. Under section 1113, the
parties are directed to bargain over only a single proposal, the debtor's proposal under
section 1113(b) containing only those modifications deemed necessary to permit
reorganization. Several questions arise as to how this good faith bargaining
requirement should be interpreted. Is bargaining limited to the debtor's initial
proposal, or may the union respond with a counteroffer? Is the debtor required to
bargain over any counteroffer?
The strangest aspect of section 1113's bargaining process is the lack of any
provision for the union to make a counterproposal in response to the debtor's required
proposal. There is no explicit provision for the exchange of offers and counteroffers,
257. A finding of good faith bargaining by the debtor is required indirectly in § 1113(c). In order to rule on rejection
the court must frind that the union refused to accept the debtor's proposal without good cause. If the debtor has not
bargained in good faith, then the union has good cause to refuse to agree. See infra notes 273-74 and accompanying text.
258. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(d)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
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the usual process of negotiation. 259 The statute is phrased in terms of the debtor
making a proposal, which the union may not reject unless it has good cause to do so.
At first blush, the language seems to call for only one "take it or leave it" offer from
the company, a clear violation of the duty to bargain in good faith under the
NLRA.26° The Congressional language, however, then calls for the debtor to "confer
in good faith" in order to reach "mutually satisfactory modifications" of the
agreement. How can mutual satisfaction be achieved if the union is not allowed to
make any suggestions or any counter offer which the debtor, in turn, is required to
consider seriously? What is there to confer about if the company makes only one
proposal and refuses to amend it in responses to union proposals? The entire concept
of bargaining is meaningless if the union is not allowed to present its own proposals
and if the employer is not required to give them the same serious consideration which
the union must give the employer's. The only way this procedure will be successful
in achieving Congress' goal of encouraging negotiated settlements is for the
bankruptcy courts to interpret this bargaining requirement to include a duty on both
sides to bargain over both parties' offers and counteroffers.
The most helpful comment in the legislative history is Senator Thurmond's
suggestion that the courts interpret this bargaining procedure "in the most practical
and workable manner possible. ' ' 261 With that admonition in mind, it would be
preferable for the courts to encourage the union to make a counterproposal which
includes those modifications that the union considers necessary to the debtor's
reorganization. If the employer rejects the union's counteroffer and does not make a
second offer in response, at a minimum, the employer should be required to explain
why the union's offer is not adequate to achieve a successful rehabilitation of the
business. If the employer refuses to bargain over the union's counteroffer, the
bankruptcy court in its discretion may find that the company's proposal did not meet
the requirements of section 11 13(b)(1)(A) because it contained unnecessary modifi-
cations, or that the union had good cause under section 1113(c) to refuse to accept the
proposal.
259. This is in contrast to the provision of H.R. 5174 as passed by the House in March 1984. The House version
provided in § 11 13(d)(2) that a motion for rejection could be filed if:
(A) the trustee has proposed modifications in such agreement to such authorized representative deemed
necessary by the trustee for successful financial reorganization of the debtor and preservation of the jobs covered
by such agreement;
(B) the trustee has considered but rejected as inadequate for successful financial reorganization of the debtor
and preservation of the jobs covered by such agreement alternative proposals for modifying such agreement
made by such authorized representatives; ....
130 CoNs. RPc. H1842 (daily ed. March 21, 1984) (emphasis added).
260. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 485 (1960) ("Collective bargaining, then, is not
simply an occasion for purely formal meetings between management and labor, while each maintains an attitude of 'take
it or leave it."'); NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736, 746 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970)
(notifying union of unilateral wage increase to be instituted, unless union objects, constitutes refusal to bargain); Federal
Mogul Corp., 212 N.L.R.B. 950, 965 (1974), enforced, 524 F.2d 37 (6th Cir. 1975) ("take it or leave it" offer that
expired in five days shows refusal to bargain).
261. 130 CoG. REc. S8888 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Thunnond).
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In the few early cases decided under section 1113, the courts have been willing
to deny rejection in order to enforce the duty to bargain and require the parties to
engage in some give and take. In In re American Provision Co., the bankruptcy court
found the debtor did not confer in good faith. 262 Only one meeting was held, at which
the debtor made its required proposal. The union rejected this proposal, but indicated
a willingness to discuss the issues further; the debtor made no further response. The
court concluded the debtor's attempts to confer "were perfunctory only and meant
only to literally meet the requirements of the statute. "263 Similarly, in Fiber Glass
Industries, the court denied rejection in part because the debtor refused to consider
any of the union's counteroffers, holding firm to its initial demand. 264 In contrast, the
debtor in Allied Delivery System reduced the demands contained in its initial proposal
in response to a counteroffer from the union and submitted a second revised proposal.
The court found that both the original and the subsequent proposal of the debtor met
the requirements of section 11 13(b).265 Because the debtor reduced its demand during
the period of negotiations between the date of its original offer and the date of the
rejection hearing, the court found the debtor had engaged in good faith bargaining and
the union had rejected the second proposal without good cause, a prerequisite to the
court's approval of rejection. 266
If the parties have bargained over possible contract modifications prior to the
debtor's bankruptcy filing, these prepetition negotiations should be taken into account
in making a determination of good faith bargaining. Any such prior history of
negotiations will also have an impact on whether counteroffers and responses should
be required after the debtor's section 1113(b) proposal has been made. The long and
extensive history of negotiations, concessions, and contract modifications between
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation and the United Steelworkers give a unique
tone to the court's approval of the company's rejection petition in In re Wheeling-
Pittsburgh Steel Corp. The company's section 1113(b) proposal, delivered in May
1985, shortly after it filed bankruptcy, functioned as a final offer delivered at the end
of a long period of negotiations and concessions which began in 1982.267 During May
262. 44 Bankr. 907, 910 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
263. Id. at 911.
264. 49 Bankr. 202, 206-07 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1985).
265. 49 Bankr. 700, 702-04 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985). In fact, the court felt constrained to construe the term
"necessary" in § 1113(b) as a broader term, less stringent than the "essential" used in § 1113(e), in order to give the
debtor room to respond to the union and revise its original proposal. The court was of the opinion that if "necessary" was
construed too narrowly, it would render the requirement of good faith negotiations meaningless, "since the debtor would
thereby be subject to a finding that any substantial lessening of the demands made in the original proposal proves that the
original proposal's modifications were not 'necessary."' Id. at 702. Consequently, the court found both proposals of the
debtor in compliance with § 1113: the original proposal, which must be made before the debtor files for rejection,
complied with § 1l13(b)(1)(A); the second revised proposal complied with § 1113(c)(1), incorporating the requirement
of § II13(b)(1) that a proposal contain only necessary modifications. Id. at 703-04.
266. Id. at 704. The facts of In re Salt Creek Freightways, 47 Bankr. 835 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985), are similar to
Allied Delivery in that the union submitted counterproposals which the debtor analyzed and for which it prepared cost
estimates. In response, the debtor also modified its proposal on insurance, requested the participation of a federal mediator
at the last of four negotiating sessions, and submitted a "Last Best Offer" to the union prior to the court's ruling approving
rejection. Id. at 839. These facts were more than sufficient to establish that the debtor had bargained in good faith.
In K & B Mounting, on the other hand, the court found the debtor had not engaged in good faith bargaining because
the debtor had never met with the union. 50 Bankr. 460, 468 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985).
267. 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3277, 3279-80 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1985). In December 1982, Wheeling-Pittsburgh and
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and June 1985, the union apparently accepted six of the company's eight proposed
modifications, refusing to agree to only two items.268 The union, however, made no
counteroffers during this bankruptcy negotiation period and the company never
deviated from its initial section 1113(b) proposal. Presumably, all previous bargain-
ing offers and counteroffers had been considered and refused by both parties prior to
the company's formulation of its section 1113(b) proposal as its final offer before
seeking rejection.
Assuming that the exchange of offers and counteroffers is the preferable
approach under section 1113, the parties have a limited time period within which this
duty to bargain in good faith must be fulfilled. The statute requires that the parties
meet at reasonable times "[d]uring the period beginning on the date of the making of
[the debtor's] proposal ... and ending on the date of the [rejection] hearing. '269
Because the statute requires a rejection hearing to be held within fourteen to
twenty-one days after the debtor's rejection application is filed,270 the debtor's filing
of its rejection application determines the limits of the time period during which
bargaining must take place. The bankruptcy context gives these negotiations an
urgency they otherwise might not have. The need for speed, however, does not mean
the bargaining may be superficial or in bad faith. These time limits provide the
framework within which significant movement by both parties may take place if they
are serious about seeking agreement. If the parties bargain in good faith and reach
agreement on mutually satisfactory modifications, any application for rejection
becomes moot.271 The contract is modified per agreement and remains in effect until
the Steelworkers Union negotiated a new contract which immediately cut labor costs from $25 per hour to $18.60 per
hour, and provided for periodic increases which would restore wage costs to $25 per hour by the time the agreement
expired on July 31, 1986. In November 1984, Wheeling-Pittsburgh asked the union to cancel the remaining restorations
provided for in the 1982 contract; the union agreed to defer the remaiiing restorations indefinitely. Id. On January 15,
1985, Wheeling-Pittsburgh again asked the union for another concession. The union agreed to consider further
concessions, but only if Wheeling-Pittsburgh's lenders would also grant the company financial concessions. Negotiations
between the company, its lenders, and the union eventually reached a stalemate in April 1985, and the company filed its
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. After submitting its § 1113(b) proposal to the union on May 9, 1985, the company filed
its application for rejection of the collective bargaining agreement on May 31, 1985. Id. at 3280.
268. The two issues still in dispute at the time of the rejection hearing in June 1985, were (1) the company's average
labor cost offer of $15.20 per hour, which included an hourly wage rate plus all fringe benefit costs and government
payroll taxes; and (2) the company's proposal that the contract with this wage rate be extended for a five-year term. Id.
at 3282. At the time the company filed its bankruptcy petition, the average labor cost was $21.40 per hour. Id. at 3280.
Without the proposed five-year extension, the contract would expire on July 31, 1986.
269. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(b)(2) (Vest Supp. 1985).
270. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(d)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
271. Senator Moynihan commented that "if the union and the company cannot reach agreement, the bankruptcy
court may authorize the cancellation of the union contract" as long as § 1113's requirements are met. 130 Cos-,. REc.
S8900 (daily ed. June 29, 1984). Rep. Lungren, in explaining § 1113's provisions, stated that for the bankruptcy court
to consider the rejection question, "the authorized representatives of the employees would have had to refuse to accept
such proposal without good cause. Only at that point would the court move to allow abrogation of the contract." Id. at
H7495.
The 1984 amendments require good faith bargaining, but make no provision for court approval of any resulting
agreement modifying the contract. If mutually satisfactory modifications are made in the collective bargaining agreement,
the parties should request court authorization for the debtor to enter into or assume the modified contract. The courts have
disagreed on whether a trustee or debtor-in-possession has the authority to enter into a new collective bargaining
agreement during bankruptcy without express approval by the bankruptcy court. See In re Willow Cafeterias, 111 F.2d
429 (2d Cir. 1940) (under the Bankruptcy Act, trustee may enter into new collective bargaining agreement during
reorganization proceedings without court approval, since authority to hire workers is a necessary part of the authority to
operate the business); In re DeLuca Dist. Co., 38 Bankr. 588 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984) (same result under the Bankruptcy
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it expires by its own terms.
4. The "Without Good Cause" Refusal of the Union to Agree as a Precondition
to Rejection
In the event the debtor and the union have bargained in good faith and have been
unable to reach agreement on mutually satisfactory modifications of the collective
bargaining agreement, the bankruptcy court may proceed to rule on the debtor's
rejection application. Section 1113(c) sets forth two preconditions which must be met
before the court reaches the "balancing of the equities" stage. The court must find
(1) that the debtor has made a proposal which satisfies the requirements of section
1113(b), and (2) that the union has refused to accept the proposal without good
cause. 272 The first precondition has already been discussed. The second precondition
is the final step in the bankruptcy bargaining process.
This final prerequisite to rejection, that the union has refused to agree to the
debtor's proposal without good cause, was evidently included by Congress as an
indirect way to enforce the duty to bargain in good faith. It is under this subsection
of section 1113 that the question of whether the parties have bargained in good faith
will be litigated. Senator Packwood describes the phrase as giving the employer
greater incentive to bargain in good faith:
The "without good cause" language provides an incentive or pressure on the debtor to
negotiate in good faith. In practical terms, this language imposes no barrier to rejection
if the debtor's proposal has contained only the specified "necessary" modifications.
Thus, the language serves to prohibit any bad faith conduct by an employer, while at the
Code). Cf Local Joint Executive Bd. v. Hotel Circle, 613 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1980) (under the Bankruptcy Act, receiver
has no authority to adopt a collective bargaining agreement without court approval); In re Air Florida Sys., 48 Bankr. 440
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (court approval needed for interim collective bargaining agreement to be effective). In order to
protect the employer from possible further litigation and to protect the union's and employees' rights under the modified
contract, a wise debtor or union should seek bankruptcy court approval of the modified contract.
Under § 365, a debtor-in-possession may not assume an executory contract without court authorization. 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(a) (1982). This provision only applies to executory contracts in existence when the bankruptcy petition was filed,
not to contracts entered into by the debtor-in-possession after bankruptcy has been filed. A debtor-in-possession may enter
into a new contract during bankruptcy without court authorization if the contract is part of the ordinary course of business.
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107 and 1108 (1982); In re James Phillips, Inc., 29 Bankr. 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). If not a part of the
ordinary course of business, the debtor must get court approval.
In this situation, any agreement between the debtor and the union would probably be regarded as a modification of
a pre-existing executory contract. Consequently, assumption may be required. To assume a contract, however, certain
conditions must be met, such as curing any default under the contract. See § 365(b)(1) and infra note 356 and
accompanying text. If it is not possible for the debtor to meet these assumption requirements, the parties should adopt the
modified contract as an entirely new collective bargaining agreement and obtain court authorization of it as a new contract.
Court authorization should be sought because the collective bargaining agreement may be regarded as a contract outside
the scope of the ordinary course of doing business.
Section 1113 seems to imply that a collective bargaining agreement may be assumed under its provisions. In the first
paragraph it states that "[tihe debtor in possession, or the trustee . . . may assume or reject a collective bargaining
agreement only in accordance with the provisions of this section." 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(a) (Vest Supp. 1985) (emphasis
added). There are, however, no further provisions in § 1113 dealing with assumption. Accordingly, we must presume that
assumption of the modified contract should occur in conformance with the assumption requirements contained elsewhere
in the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a), (b)(1) (1982). Regardless of whether the modified contract is assumed, or whether a
new contract containing the modifications is formed, court approval is required. If a rejection application is pending, this
could be done at the time the rejection application is dismissed as moot. If no rejection application has yet been filed, a
joint request for assumption or court approval should be filed by the debtor and the union.
272. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(c) (West Supp. 1985).
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same time protecting the employer from a Union's rejection of the proposal without good
cause.
273
Senator Packwood views this provision of section 1113(c) as the way to enforce
the "meet and confer" requirements of section 1113(b).274 If the court finds the
debtor has not bargained in good faith, then the court should find that the union has
had good cause not to accept the debtor's proposal. Similarly, if the union has not
bargained in good faith, then obviously its refusal to accept the debtor's proposal was
without good cause. These conclusions on cause follow naturally from the court's
conclusion on the presence or absence of good faith in bargaining.
A more difficult issue of interpretation is presented, however, if both parties
have bargained in good faith but have not been able to reach agreement on mutually
satisfactory modifications. Where good faith bargaining has occurred, does the
"without good cause" prerequisite require any additional findings by the bankruptcy
court evaluating the union's substantive position at the bargaining table? On the one
hand, does it give the union a chance to avoid rejection by arguing the merits of its
position in negotiations? On the other hand, does it require the court to find the
union's bargaining position is not justified in order to reach rejection?
If this language is interpreted as requiring the court to evaluate the merits of the
parties' bargaining positions, it has no parallel in labor law. In fact, the notion that
a party in negotiations must have any reason, let alone a good reason, for rejecting
the proposal of the other party is totally at odds with labor law principles. In defining
the duty to bargain under the NLRA, section 8(d) explicitly states that the bargaininig
obligation "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making
of a concession." 275 In contrast, this bankruptcy requirement seems to suggest that
in order to avoid rejection the union must agree to the debtor's proposal unless it has
some undefined good cause to refuse, or in the alternative, that, if the union has this
273. 130 Co.G. REC. S8898 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
274. In an analysis of § 1113 prepared by conference committee members Representatives Hughes and Morrison,
they identify the "without good cause" requirement as based on a suggestion by Professor Countryman and Mr.
Bordewieck contained in their 1983 article: "[Rejection of a collective bargaining agreement should be permitted only
in extraordinary cases, when the union involved has unjustifiably refised to agree to modification of the agreement
necessary to insure a successful reorganization." Bordewieck & Countryman, supra note 74, at 299-300, cited in 130
Coso. REc. S8899 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (emphasis added). After making this suggestion, Countryman and
Bordewieck continue by arguing that, because court approval of rejection interferes with collective bargaining and labor
agreements in violation of national labor law policy, a bankruptcy court should approach any rejection petition "with a
strong presumption against approval of the relief sought." Id. at 300. Countryman and Bordewieck give two examples
of when a union would not be justified in opposing rejection:
11.1 if it appeared that the union was willing for tactical reasons to sacrifice the particular employees involved
and thus did not care whether the debtor in fact was forced into liquidation.
[2.] [if a union was] seeking only to forestall a liquidation by several months (or perhaps years) in order to
preserve short-term employment.... [A] union seeking to preserve short-term employment benefits is not even
acting in the best interests of the employees.
Id. at 319. These are examples of when, in their opinion, a court would be justified in approving rejection over a union's
objections. Such unjustified union opposition to rejection, however, has little relationship, if any, to an evaluation of when
a union has good cause to refuse to agree to specific proposed contract modifications. Opposing rejection altogether is not
the same as refusing to agree with an employer on what contract modifications are necessary for reorganization, or
refusing to agree because the union believes the debtor has not bargained in good faith. It is debatable just how helpful
these examples are in interpreting the "good cause" language of the statute.
275. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
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good cause, the court may not consider rejection. 276 If this prerequisite requires or
allows the court to evaluate the merits of the union's bargaining stance, this
legislation marks a fundamental departure by Congress from the "freedom of
contract" principle that is embodied in the NLRA. 277
Congress, no doubt, was encouraged to abandon labor law's insistence on
freedom of contract by the Supreme Court's approach in Bildisco. Until Bildisco, the
Supreme Court had taken a "hands-off' policy in refusing to interfere with the
substance of labor negotiations, denying the NLRB any remedial power to compel a
party to agree to any specific contract term, no matter how egregious the party's
violations of the NLRA.278 In Bildisco itself, the Court recognized that "the national
labor policies of avoiding labor strife and encouraging collective bar-
gaining ... generally require that employers and unions reach their own agree-
ments on terms and conditions of employment free from governmental interfer-
ence. "279 In allowing the debtor to modify a collective bargaining agreement
unilaterally, the Court departed from the freedom of contract principle, justifying its
result by the exigencies of bankruptcy. 280 The Court recognized labor policy only to
the extent that it required the employer to make reasonable efforts to negotiate prior
to rejection.
Although in section 1113 Congress imposed an actual duty to bargain, instead
of only reasonable efforts, it implicitly accepted Bildisco's radical departure from
traditional labor law principles. Section 1113 does not leave the parties free to
negotiate their own contract terms once it has compelled their presence at the
276. Although the courts seem to agree that the debtor bears the ultimate burden of persuasion on each element that
is required before rejection can be approved, they have specified that the union bears the burden of production of evidence
on this issue: "[Olnce the debtor has shown that the Union has refused to accept its proposal the Union must produce
evidence that it was not without good cause. . . . [O]nce the Union has come forward with evidence on [this element],
the ultimate burden of persuasion . . . still lies with the debtor." In re American Provision Co., 44 Bankr. 907, 910
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1984). See also In re Salt Creek Freightways, 47 Bankr. 835, 838 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).
277. The fact that the NLRA was based on the principle of freedom of contract has been recognized often by courts
and commentators and is reflected in the legislative history of the Act. See, e.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S.
99, 103 (1970) ("The object of this Act was . . . to ensure that employers and their employees could work together to
establish mutually satisfactory conditions."); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937) ("The Act
does not compel agreements between employers and employees. It does not compel any agreement whatever."); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 295, 300 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("We recognize that the National Labor Relations
Act is grounded on the premise of freedom of contract."); S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (1935) ("the duty
to bargain collectively does not carry with it the duty to reach an agreement, because the essence of collective bargaining
is that either party shall be free to decide whether proposals made to it are satisfactory"); 79 Coxo. R-c. 7659 (1935)
(remarks of Sen. Walsh) ("the bill requires no employer to sign any contract, to make any agreement, to reach any
understanding with any employee or group of employees"); Wellington, Freedom of Contract and the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 467, 467 (1964) ("Among the many competing goals of national labor policy,
two have been frequently proclaimed and staunchly defended. . . . One is industrial peace; the other is freedom of
contract. . . . Both goals are embedded deeply in the myth and in the reality of national labor policy.").
278. See, e.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970) (Supreme Court refused to enforce a Board order
requiring the employer to agree to a union dues check-off provision in the collective bargaining agreement. The Board
had ordered the employer to agree to the clause because it continued to refuse to agree to the check-off clause for over
eight years for the sole purpose of avoiding reaching an agreement with the union.).
279. 465 U.S. 513, 526 (1984).
280. Id. at 533-34.
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bargaining table. It mandates the scope of the proposal the debtor must make and
seems to imply that the union must accept it unless it has good cause to refuse.28'
Because section 1113(c)'s requirement that the union accept the proposed
modifications, unless it has good cause to refuse, is such a radical departure from
labor policy, no labor law precedent exists to assist in its interpretation. How are
the courts to apply this "without good cause" requirement? The brief legislative
history gives us few clues and only more confusion.282 Senator Thurmond
commented:
The requirement that the union refusal to accept the proposal be "without good cause" is
obviously not intended to import traditional labor law concepts into a bankruptcy forum
or turn the bankruptcy courts into a version of the National Labor Relations Board. Again,
the intent is for these provisions to be interpreted in a workable manner.283
Obviously, this phrase cannot import labor law concepts into the bankruptcy court,
at least not NLRA bargaining concepts, because this language is foreign to the
NLRA .24
In the few opinions on rejection under section 1113, the courts have had a
difficult time giving any meaning to the "without good cause" requirement. In Allied
Delivery, the court basically equated the "without good cause" requirement with the
previous "necessity" and "fair treatment" requirements of the debtor's proposal: "If
the proposal is necessary and is fair and equitable, which this Court finds that it is,
then the union's refusal to accept it on the basis that the proposal is unjust, as the
union representative has testified, is not for good cause." 285 The court had previously
held that the parties had bargained in good faith and did not tie the "without good
cause" prerequisite to the bargaining obligation.
281. This departure from labor law principles a la Bildisco is also exemplified by § 1113's provisions allowing the
court to authorize interim changes (see infra notes 327-51 and accompanying text) and allowing the employer to terminate
the collective bargaining agreement upon the expiration of 30 days after the rejection hearing (see supra notes 174-82 and
accompanying text).
282. Senator Hatch described the "without good cause" requirement as follows:
[IThe unions must not reject the business offer without good cause. This opportunity to accept or reject the
proposal should be assessed in light of the essentiality of swift and fair resolution of the initial phases of
reorganization. Accordingly, rejection of a proposal should only happen if the cause for rejection is good enough
to risk the damage to the business as well as its creditors and employees that delay or protracted negotiations
could produce.
130 Co-nG. Rec. S8892 (daily ed. June 29, 1984). One commentator has remarked that "[t]o the ears of a somewhat
jaundiced bankruptcy practitioner, this seems to bea long-winded way of saying that this provision means nothing at all."
Gibson, supra note 190, at 340-41.
283. 130 Coso. Rrc. S8888 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
284. Perhaps Senator Thurmond had in mind the "good cause" language on employee discharges found in both the
NLRA and most collective bargaining agreements. Section 10(c) of the NLRA provides, in part:
No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or
discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or dischargedfor cause.
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982) (emphasis added). Most collective bargaining agreements contain a provision to the effect that
no employee may be discharged without good cause. In fact, many arbitrators will imply a "good cause" limitation on
discharge in a collective bargaining agreement even if it does not contain express language to that effect. See F. Erxousi
& E. Exouj, How AssrrArou WOR 611-12 (3d ed. 1973). Thus, in the employment context, good cause is litigated
most frequently in the arbitration of individual employee discharges under collective bargaining agreements.
285. 49 Bankr. 700, 704 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985). Accord, In re Carey Transp. 50 Bankr. 203, 212 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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In Salt Creek Freightways, the court in effect ruled that as long as the parties
bargained in good faith, the court could reach rejection, refusing to give any
additional significance to the "without good cause" language. 286 The court raised the
question of whether the "without good cause" requirement required a finding that the
union had bargained in bad faith, refusing to give the phrase such a construction, and
holding that in order to reach rejection it was not necessary to find that the union's
refusal to agree was in bad faith. The failure of the parties to reach agreement on
modifications appeared to be "the result of the difficultness of the task, rather than
the lack of 'good faith' of either party."287 The union may have a "principled
reason" for rejecting the debtor's proposal, which, from a subjective view and in
light of the union's self-interest, may be a perfectly good reason. "However," the
court continued, "the court must review the union's rejection utilizing an objective
standard which narrowly construes the phrase 'without good cause' in light of the
main purpose of Chapter 11, namely reorganization of financially distressed
businesses.' '288 The court held that the union's refusal to agree, based on its policy
decision to insist on pension benefits and a contract based on the union's national
industry-wide contract, was not unreasonable and was in good faith, but did not
constitute good cause under section 11 13(c)(2). 289
By giving a narrow reading to this prerequisite, the court appears to be saying
that if the debtor has made a proper proposal under section 1113(b), the parties have
both bargained in good faith, and yet have not reached agreement, then the court
should be able to rule on rejection. 290 Any refusal of the union to accept the debtor's
proposal, as long as all the previous requirements have been met, will be without
good cause. In this way, the court avoids any substantive evaluation of the merits of
the union's bargaining position which the court is in no position to make. At least two
bankruptcy courts have explicitly recognized the inappropriateness of the court
inserting itself into the substance of the negotiations. In Fiber Glass Industries, the
court stated that it could not "evaluate the proposal and counterproposals with the
aim of formulating a substantive solution to the parties' differences by fixing the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement, nor would it be appropriate to do
so. '291
Similarly, in Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel, the bankruptcy court commented:
286. 47 Bankr. 835, 840 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).
287. Id.
288. Id. at 840.
289. Id. at 841.
290. The bankruptcy court in Wheeling.Pittsburgh Steel gave a similar construction to the "without good cause"
requirement:
Having found that Wheeling-Pittsburgh submitted a propsal which was based on the most complete and reliable
information available at the time of its creation, contained only necessary modifications, and treated all affected
parties fairly and equitably; and having further found that the Company met at reasonable times with the Union,
conferred in good faith, and provided the Union with such relevant information as was necessary to evaluate the
proposal, the court is constrained by logic to find that the Union rejected the Company's proposal without good
cause.
119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3277, 3287 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1985).
291. 49 Bankr. 202, 206 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1985).
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The parties recognize that this is a collective bargaining dispute and that this court, as a
place for resolving a collective bargaining dispute, is not the proper forum. The real
decisions must be made at the bargaining table .... This court cannot compel, but it can
and does encourage the parties to continue negotiations to reach a solution, without which
the likelihood of liquidation is very real. 292
The courts should not be in the position, even indirectly, of dictating to the
parties the terms of their agreement, which they, not the court, are going to have to
live with over a relatively long period of time until the contract expires. The most that
can be asked of the bankruptcy court is to guarantee that the debtor has made the
required proposal and has truly bargained in good faith with the union. If these
requirements are met, and the debtor and union have not reached agreement, then the
union takes the chance of rejection of the entire contract.
C. The Rejection Standard Adopted by Congress
Assuming all the preconditions have been met and no agreement has been reached
on a modified contract, the bankruptcy court is allowed to rule on the debtor's
application for rejection of the collective bargaining agreement. Section 1113(c)
specifies:
The court shall approve an application for rejection of a collective bargaining agreement
only if the court finds that-
(3) the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection of such agreement.293
Now the court must proceed to balance the equities in deciding whether to grant
rejection.
1. The Balance of the Equities Must Clearly Favor Rejection
Although Congress adopted the Bildisco "balancing of the equities" standard,
the Congressional language is stronger than that used by the Supreme Court.
Rejection may be approved only when the "balance of the equities clearly favors
rejection." The addition of the word "clearly" seems to call for more evidence or a
slightly higher burden of proof in support of rejection.294 Senator Hatch, a member
of the conference committee, commented:
292. 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3277, 3288 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1985). in aff'ming the bankruptcy court, the district court
quoted this language and added its own comment:
If a way out of this financial and legal mire, which has produced anger, distrust, accusations, finger pointing
and a major labor strike, is to be found, it will have to be a joint effort based on cooperation by the parties and
not judicial fiat.
A word to the wise has not yet been sufficient and so it is hoped that its repetition here will prompt the
parties to negotiate without ceasing until a fair accord in (sic] reached. The inability or unwillingness to do so
will not produce a winner and a loser but the premature fall of proud warriors whose last struggle will be
overshadowed by a failure to sense their need for each other.
120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2198, 2205 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
293. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(c) (West Supp. 1985).
294. One bankruptcy court has suggested that perhaps the debtor's burden of proof on clearly balancing the equities
in favor of rejection is heavier than the normal preponderance of the evidence standard. See In re K & B Mounting, Inc.,
50 Bankr. 460, 466-67 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985) ("[T]he debtor's counsel has the burden of proving that the balance of
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The word "clearly" is merely intended to assure that rejection is not warranted where the
equities balance exactly equally on each side. . . .Of course, the equities will almost
always balance in favor of one resolution or another. In such cases, the court will surely
rule in accordance with the tilt of the balance.2 9
Thus, if a bankruptcy court has any doubts about whether the balance favors
rejection, the court must deny rejection. Rejection may be granted only where the
balance clearly favors rejection.
2. The Equities to be Balanced
After the 1984 legislation the question remains just what equities are to be
balanced. In interpreting the phrase "balancing of the equities," we must examine
not only the Supreme Court's language in Bildisco, but the language of the Third
Circuit opinion which was affirmed in Bildisco, and the language of the Kevin Steel
and Brada Miller opinions, both discussed and approved by the Supreme Court in
Bildisco. All of these cases give meaning to the "balancing of the equities"
standard. 296 Based on these four opinions, the various equities to be balanced can be
grouped into three categories: (a) factors concerning the relationship between the
parties prior to rejection, (b) the possibility of successful reorganization with or
without rejection, and (c) the consequences of rejection.
a. The Relationship Between the Employer and the Union
Prior to the 1984 amendments, the questions considered by the courts involving
the labor relations of the debtor and the union included the following:
1. Were reasonable efforts to negotiate a modification of the contract made by both the
debtor and the union?297
2. Is the debtor employer motivated by a desire to get rid of the union?293
3. Has the debtor employer committed unfair labor practices, apart from seeking to
terminate the collective bargaining agreement?299
The first question is largely eliminated as a factor because of the more specific
bargaining requirement of section 1113. With section 1113's imposition of an actual
duty to bargain in good faith, any questions about the sufficiency of negotiations will
have been settled before the court reaches the balancing process. The bankruptcy
the equities clearly favors rejection. The modifying adverb suggests that a preponderance of the evidence will not be
sufficient." Id., quoting S.B. BRNsrEeN, BANRuwscv PrLcnc Aias mE AmEND.MTas Act ov 1984 134 (PEC 1984)).
295. 130 CoNG. REc. S8892 (daily ed. June 29, 1984). Senator Dole commented that "the court will apply the
balancing of equities test enunciated in Bildisco, with a clarification of that standard to ensure that rejection is
accomplished only where the equities balance clearly in favor of rejection." Id. at S8890.
296. See also In re Parrot Packing Co., 42 Bankr. 323 (N.D. Ind. 1983); In re Alan Wood Steel Co., 449 F. Supp.
165 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Bohack Corp. v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807, 431 F. Supp. 646 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd,
567 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1977); In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
297. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 526 (1984); In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890, 900
(llth Cir. 1983).
298. In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890, 901 (1 1th Cir. 1983); Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin
Steel Prod., 519 F.2d 698, 707 (2d Cit. 1975).
299. Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prod., 519 F.2d 698, 707 (2d Cir. 1975).
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court's impression, however, of the willingness of each party to make accommoda-
tions will no doubt influence its inevitably subjective decision whether the equities
clearly balance in favor of rejection.
The second and third questions remain relevant as factors in the balancing
process. The court will still be free to consider whether the employer is motivated by
antiunion animus or a desire to get rid of the union or its contract in reaching its
decision on rejection. 30° In addition, the question whether the debtor has committed
any unfair labor practices under the NLRA will continue to be relevant to rejection
in that it reduces the equities on the employer's side and may indicate an antiunion
300. Rep. Morrison, in his analysis of § 1113, stated that "[ilt was also our understanding that a chapter 11
reorganization case that is brought for the sole purpose or [sic] repudiating or modifying a collective bargaining agreement
is a case brought in 'bad faith."' 130 CoNG. Rc. H7496 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
Picking up on Rep. Morrison's comment, at least two of the cases decided under § 1113 have phrased this factor as
a question of whether the debtor filed the bankruptcy solely to rid itself of the collective bargaining agreement. See In re
Salt Creek Freightways, 47 Bankr. 835, 841 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985) and In re Carey Transp., 50 Bankr. 203, 212 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1985). It should be noted, however, that an antiunion motive may be relevant in balancing equities even it it
is not the sole motive for filing bankruptcy and seeking to reject the contract.
On the other hand, the court in Carey Transp. rejected the issue of whether the debtor filed bankruptcy "solely to
disencumber itself from the collective bargaining agreement" as a relevant factor in the balancing process. The court
stated:
[This court] is loathe to attach any significance to whether or not the Union asserts a claim that the case was
filed solely to jettison its union contract. That issue is more appropriate fodder for dismissal considerations
under § 1112(b) of the Code, or for a motion by a party in interest such as the Union here . . . to appoint a
trustee or examiner under Code § 1104.
50 Bankr. 203, 212-13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
In addition to using motive as a factor in balancing the equities, a more drastic approach to opposing rejection has
been to attack the entire bankruptcy filing as being in bad faith. This has been unsuccessful so far, even in the infamous
case of Continental Airlines, in large part because it is very difficult to prove that the sole reason for filing bankruptcy
was rejection of the debtor's collective bargaining agreement. See In re Continental Airlines Corp., 38 Bankr. 67 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 1984). For a discussion of the general "good faith" requirement under the Bankruptcy Code, see 3 BRoKRm
BmcH REvxsw 9 (Feb. 1984).
In cases involving rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, it is likely that any debtor who has filed a
bankruptcy petition in bad faith will not be willing to bargain in good faith. Consequently, motive will be litigated most
often under § I113's requirement to meet and confer in good faith. I1 U.S.C.A. § 1113(b)(2) (Vest Supp. 1985). For
an example of a pre-§ 1113 case under Bildisco, illustrating a connection between the debtor's reason for filing bankruptcy
and its bargaining efforts, see In re C & W Mining Co., 38 Bankr. 496 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984), in which the court found
that the debtor had not made reasonable efforts to reach agreement on modifications prior to rejection. The debtor's
president admitted he was antiunion, had threatened to "bust" the union by filing a Chapter 11 petition, and had opened
a nonunion coal mine to compete with the unionized one. Id. at 503-04.
Some debtors-in-possession seem to have believed that under pre-Bildisco law rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement somehow enabled them to reject the union. In In re Southern Elec. Co., 23 Bankr. 348 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1982), the debtor moved to reject its collective bargaining agreement, and in its proposed reorganization plan stated that
it intended "to operate as a non-union plant in the future." Id. at 350. The debtor told the union in its letter purporting
to reject the contract that "my main desire is to operate in a union free environment. . . . I do believe the employees of
Southern Electronics would be better off without union representation." Id. at 362-63. In approving the debtor's
application for rejection, the bankruptcy court pointed out that the debtor may still be obligated to bargain with the union
in spite of rejection. Id. See also In re Kirkpatrick, 34 Bankr. 767 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983) (debtor announced the day after
filing bankruptcy that the business would no longer be operating as a union shop); In re Reserve Roofing Florida, Inc.,
21 Bankr. 96 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982) (roofing contractor will be able to go nonunion if it rejects union contract and is
no longer required to hire through union hiring hall). See supra note 107 and infra notes 365-79 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the duty to bargain which survives rejection.
In other pre-Bildisco cases, rejection was denied in large part because the debtor's sole or primary purpose in filing
bankruptcy appeared to be to get rid of the union contract: In re Tinti Constr. Co., 29 Bankr. 971 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.
1983); In re Miles Mach. Co., 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3114 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982) (filed bankruptcy one month after
signing new collective bargaining agreement); In re Louis F. Sammarco Elec. Co., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3288 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. 1982) (filed bankruptcy to attempt to avoid NLRB order to operate according to its collective bargaining
agreement); In re Mamie Conti Gowns, 12 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
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motive.301 Although these factors would not be determinative, they are entitled to be
weighed and considered in the balancing process.
b. The Possibility of Successful Reorganization
The possibility of a successful reorganization of the debtor was the major
emphasis of the Court's balancing of the equities in Bildisco.3 02 Broken down into its
component parts, an evaluation of successful rehabilitation must include consider-
ation of the following specific questions:
1. What is the likelihood of successful reorganization without rejection? If the collective
bargaining agreement is affirmed, what will be the cost of doing business? What
alternative ways of cutting costs exist?
2. What is the likelihood of successful reorganization with rejection? What proposed
reduction in costs will the debtor seek to implement if operating without a contract?
What are the predicted terms of a new collective bargaining agreement to be negotiated
after rejection?
3. What is the likelihood of liquidation either with or without rejection of the collective
bargaining agreement?
Whether rejection will permit successful rehabilitation of the debtor will be the
overriding concern of the court and will no doubt make up the bulk of the debtor's
case for rejection. In large part, it will involve a comparison of the costs of operating
the business under the collective bargaining agreement with the costs of operating the
business without the collective bargaining agreement or under the debtor's proposed
contract modifications, which it will seek to implement upon approval of rejection. 30 3
The rejection decision must also include an examination of whether other alternatives
exist for cutting operating costs in addition to or instead of reducing rates under the
collective bargaining agreement. To a great extent, these comparisons are the same
comparisons the court will have already made in determining whether the debtor's
301. The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in In re Kirkpatrick, 34 Bankr. 767 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983),
commented that it would consider the issue of improper motive in balancing the equities only "when there is evidence
of a pattern of unfair labor practice or other conduct that might give rise to an inference that the debtor is improperly
motivated." Id. at 770. The court felt that the language in Kevin Steel and Brada Miller on the existence of a debtor's
unfair labor practices was "clearly directed to the concern that the business reorganization process and contract rejection
power not become tools in a continuing campaign of unfair labor practice." Id. (emphasis added). If no continual pattern
of unfair labor practices is established, the court is suggesting it would give little or no weight to a violation of the NLRA
in balancing equities.
302. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984). See also In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d
890, 899 (1lth Cir. 1983); Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prod., 519 F.2d 698, 707 (2d Cir. 1975);
Brotherhood of Ry., Airline and S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, 523 F.2d 164, 172 (2d Cir. 1975).
303. This cost comparison contains the implication that, if the collective bargaining agreement is rejected, the
debtor-employer will set whatever terms and conditions of employment, wages, and benefits it sees fit. The employer will
be able to do this, without violating the NLRA, only if it first bargains to impasse on these changes as a part of its
obligation to bargain with the union for a new collective bargaining agreement. See infra notes 364-80 and accompanying
text. When an employer unilaterally changes ternis and conditions of employment without bargaining first, the employer
violates the duty to bargain imposed by NLRA § 8(a)(5). NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962); 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(5) (1982). For the duty to bargain fora new contract, see NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildiseco, 465 U.S. 513, 534 (1984);
In re Binda Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890, 899 (11th Cir. 1983). Evaluation of the possibility of a successful
reorganization must take into account the likelihood of negotiating a new agreement, making adjustments in the debtor's
projected costs of operation to reflect possible compromises reached after bargaining for a new agreement.
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proposed modifications under section 1113(b) were necessary to permit reorganiza-
tion.30 4
Finally, a court must consider whether liquidation, as opposed to reorganization,
is likely even if the collective bargaining agreement is rejected. This issue is raised
only indirectly by the previous "necessity" requirement. Under the Supreme Court's
emphasis in Bildisco, if liquidation seems likely even after rejection, then rejection
should be denied. The goal of successful reorganization will not be furthered by
rejection. 30 5 Under section 1113, rejection should never be approved if liquidation is
the probable outcome. A buyer of the business will not be bound by the collective
bargaining agreement and the only effect of rejection may be to reduce the priority of
some of the employees' claims for breach.3o6 Changing the priority of claim in
liquidation will in no way help save the employees' jobs or the debtor's business.
c. The Consequences of Rejection
The more numerous but less significant factors to be balanced by the bankruptcy
court involve the consequences of rejection and its impact on all the parties, including
the debtor, the unionized employees, the nonunionized employees, and the debtor's
other creditors. The specific questions the courts have asked about the consequences
of rejection on the various parties include:
I. With regard to the debtor-
a. What is the likelihood and potential impact of a strike by the employees?307
b. What will be the impact of any monetary claims by employees arising from
rejection and breach of the collective bargaining agreement?30 8
2. With regard to the unionized employees-
a. How adequate will the monetary relief be for employees through the recovery of
claims against the estate?309
b. What will be the degree of hardship, and any qualitative difference in the hardship,
suffered by employees as opposed to other creditors?3lo
c. What will be the impact on employees of the loss of intangible, nonmonetary job
rights, such as seniority, pension rights, and use of grievance and arbitration
procedures?3t1
304. See, e.g., In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3277, 3287-88 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1985); In re Salt Creek Freightways, 47 Bankr. 835, 838, 841 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985); In re Allied Delivery Sys., 49
Bankr. 700, 702, 704 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
305. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984) ("Since the policy of Chapter 11 is to permit
successful rehabilitation of debtors, rejection should not be permitted without a finding that that policy would be served
by such actions.").
306. See supra notes 42, 56-60, 194 and accompanying text.
307. In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890, 899 (1 lth Cir. 1983); In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72, 80 (3d Cir.
1982).
303. In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890, 899-900 (11th Cir. 1983); In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72, 80 (3d
Cir. 1982). See also In re Salt Creek Freightways, 47 Bankr. 835, 841-42 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985); In re Carey Transp.,
50 Bankr. 203, 212-13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
309. In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890, 899-900 (11th Cir. 1983); Brotherhood of Ry., Airline and S.S.
Clerks v. REA Express, 523 F.2d 164, 172 (2d Cir. 1975); Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prod., 519
F.2d 698, 707 (2d Cir. 1975).
310. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984); In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890, 900
(llth Cir. 1983).
311. In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890, 900 (11th Cir. 1983); Brotherhood of Ry., Airline and S.S.
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d. What is the relative position of these employees, based on their wages and
benefits, compared with the debtor's nonunion employees and other employees
in the same industry and geographical area?312
e. What proportion of the debtor's employees are covered by the collective
bargaining agreement? 3
3. With regard to other creditors-
a. What comparative sacrifices are other creditors making?3 4
b. What are the cost-spreading abilities of other creditors, compared to that of
employees working under the collective bargaining agreement?315
c. What effect would affirmance of the collective bargaining agreement have on
other creditors' claims?316
First, the impact of rejection on the debtor must be examined. Will rejection
result in a strike by the employees? 317 As soon as the contract is terminated, the
employees are no longer bound by its no-strike clause and are free to strike. If they
do go on strike, what effect will that have on the debtor's business?
In examining the impact of employee claims arising from rejection, a bankruptcy
court will generally find that the impact of such claims will be the same on the debtor
as on other creditors. As the bankruptcy court in Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel
suggested, in seeking rejection, the employer is acting as the representative of all the
other creditors in attempting to reduce payments to employees under the contract so
that there will be greater funds available to satisfy other creditors' claims. 31 8 This
pressure on the debtor-employer to advance the cause of the other creditors is rooted
in the fact that, in order for a reorganization plan to be confirmed under Chapter 11,
creditors representing at least one class of impaired claims must have accepted the
debtor's plan.3 1 9 Creditors will be inclined to accept a reorganization plan if they
believe it is the most favorable settlement they are likely to receive. In order to make
more funds available to the other creditors, the debtor must first seek to reduce wages
Clerks v. REA Express, 523 F.2d 164, 172 (2d Cir. 1975); Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prod., 519
F.2d 698, 707 (2d Cir. 1975).
312. In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72, 80 n.12 (3d Cir. 1982).
313. Id.
314. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984); In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72, 81 (3d Cir. 1982).
315. In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890, 900 (11 th Cir. 1983).
316. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984); In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72, 80-81 (3d Cir. 1982).
317. "[Tlhe debtor-in-possession who rejects a collective bargaining agreement remains an employer and is still
required by the NLRA to bargain... and . . . its employees retain their right to strike should negotiations fail." In re
Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72, 80 (3d Cir. 1982). See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
It is ironic that in Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel, the first case that has attracted nationwide attention under § 1113, the
bankruptcy court focused on the need for labor stability as the major reason for finding the debtor's proposal for extending
the contract from one more year to five more years a necessary modification. Yet, in balancing the equities, the court
never mentioned or considered the possibility of a strike if rejection was granted, even though the Steelworkers Union had
announced before rejection was granted that they would probably call a strike. In re Wlheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 119
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3277, 3287-88 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1985); Wall St. J., July 16, 1985, at 8, col. 3. The steelworkers in
fact went on strike four days after the court granted rejection in July 1985. The strike was eventually settled three months
later, in October 1985. See Wall St. J., July 22, 1985, at 3, col. 1, and Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1985, at 2, col. 3.
318. 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3277, 3288 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1985).
319. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126, 1129 (1982).
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and benefits by negotiating favorable contract modifications. If the negotiations fail
and the contract is rejected, any employee claims for first priority administrative
expenses will be kept to a minimum, and any breach of contract claims, which are not
entitled to administrative expense treatment, will become prepetition unsecured
claims. 320 The percentage at which prepetition unsecured claims are ultimately paid
is usually very low, if they receive any payment at all. 32' Therefore, the reality of
rejection is that employees will receive lower pay and fringe benefits, and, even
though they will have increased claims for breach of contract, they can expect to
receive little or nothing in payment of these claims. They will be in the same position
with regard to their contract claims as all other prepetition unsecured creditors of the
debtor. The only creditors who ordinarily have any chance of significant payment are
secured creditors or those with first priority claims for administrative expense. Thus,
the issues of priority and the need to obtain acceptance of a reorganization plan from
at least one class of creditors-usually the secured creditors-provide the impetus for
the debtor to represent the nonemployee creditors in the quest for rejection of the
contract. 32
2
In contrast to the impact of resulting employee claims on the debtor and on other
creditors, the appellate courts have directed the bankruptcy courts to evaluate the
impact of rejection on the employees themselves and to compare this impact with the
sacrifices being made by other creditors in furtherance of the rehabilitation effort.
These issues will have already been considered by the court in determining whether
the debtor's proposed modifications of the contract assured fair and equitable
320. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text. For example, past due pension plan payments based on services
rendered prior to the bankruptcy filing will become prepetition unsecured claims.
321. See, e.g., In re Carey Transp., 50 Bankr. 203,213 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (prepetition unsecured claims will
most likely receive no payment). See also D. STAN.ur & M. GiRm, BAsmurrcv: PROBULM, Psocrss, Rropui (1971). In one
study of Bankruptcy Act Chapter I1 plans, the amounts paid to priority creditors and general unsecured creditors differed
greatly, Priority creditors were almost uniformly paid in full. Unsecured creditors with prepetition claims were paid an
average of 19% of their claims in plans calling for a single payment. In multiple payment plans, unsecured creditors were
paid an average of 10% immediately and were scheduled to be paid another 25% of their claims later. Id. at 142-43.
322. The Wheeling-Pitsburgh Steel case provides a concrete example of the fact that in many ways rejection
involves a conflict between the union and the employees on the one hand and the debtor's other creditors on the other,
with the debtor simply caught in the middle. Impasse was reached in the negotiations between Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel
and the Steelworkers Union before bankruptcy was filed because the union insisted that the company first obtain
concessions from its lenders before the union would consider additional wage concessions. The banks agreed to make
some concessions, but only on the condition that the company pledge all its current assets as collateral on the old debt.
The union responded by agreeing to concessions but only on the condition that the company not pledge its current assets
as security for its old debt. In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3277, 3280 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1985). Thus, the impasse that existed was between the union and the company's lenders, not between the union and the
company.
This tension between the union and the debtor's other creditors continues. On October 24, 1985, the debtor's creditor
banks filed objections in bankruptcy court opposing the settlement reached between Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel and the
Steelworkers Union in an effort to end the three-month-old strike. The banks objected to the $18 per hour wage cost
agreement, arguing that the company should not have agreed to pay more than the $15.20 per hour figure included in the
debtor's § 1113(b) proposal on necessary modifications. The banks' representative indicated, however, that the banks
might accept a $16 per hour wage cost. The intervention by the banks in opposing court approval of the labor accord
suggests the union should have been negotiating directly with the banks, not the company, on a new collective bargaining
agreement. See Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 1985, at 5. col. 2. The bankruptcy court, however, approved the strike settlement
agreement over the lenders' objections. Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1985, at 2, col. 3.
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treatment of the affected parties. 323 An examination of the adequacy of monetary
relief for employees through the recovery of claims in bankruptcy will lead to the
conclusion that such relief is inadequate because employees will normally recover
very little, if anything, as unsecured creditors. Consequently, the real question is how
much will employees suffer from the loss of income and other contractual benefits.
One way of examining the degrees of hardship suffered by the parties, and any
"qualitative differences between the types of hardship" per Bildisco,324 is to look at
the cost-spreading abilities of the various creditors, and compare the cost-spreading
abilities of trade creditors with that of employees. Because employees are usually
much more vulnerable as individuals to the possible loss of income than are business
creditors, a recognition of any qualitative difference will normally weigh in favor of
the employees and against rejection. On the other hand, if rejection will guarantee a
successful reorganization which will save jobs, whereas liquidation may destroy jobs,
then loss of a portion of one's income may be a smaller hardship than collecting
unemployment benefits and looking for another job. Likewise, the layoff of some
employees as a result of rejection would be preferable to the layoff of all employees.
The appellate courts have also insisted that recognition be given to the
employees' loss of intangible, nonmonetary job rights, such as grievance and
arbitration procedures, in balancing the equities. 325 There is the possibility that these
323. See supra notes 216-26 and accompanying text.
324. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984).
325. See In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890, 900 (11 th Cir. 1983) (court should consider adequacy of
relief provided by claims against debtor, especially "since many of the benefits received by employees under collective
bargaining agreements are non-monetary and generally incapable of providing a basis for a damage award").
The loss by employees of nonwage contractual rights and benefits was a somewhat more serious problem under the
Bankruptcy Act than under the Bankruptcy Code. Under the Act, only liquidated claims, such as those for wages or
vacation pay, would be allowed and entitled to payment. Unliquidated or contingent claims, such as pension claims,
would not be estimated and allowed. See generally 3 L. Kumo, Couim ox Bmu, rcy 502.03 (15th ed. 1979).
Consequently, the bankruptcy court may now estimate and assign a value to claims for future pension or health benefits
which would accrue during the remaining term of a rejected contract. On the other hand, because recovery of unsecured
claims even if estimated and allowed is usually so rare, this difference between the Act and the Code may be of little
practical significance.
In balancing the equities under the Act, the appellate courts were concerned about the employees' loss of all
unliquidated claims. See Brotherhood of Ry., Airline and S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, 523 F.2d 164, 172 (2d Cir. 1975)
("equities [include] the employees' inability in Chapter XI proceedings to evaluate and obtain compensation for loss of
their pension, welfare, seniority and other contract rights"); Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prod., 519
F.2d 698, 707 (2d Cir. 1975) (by allowing rejection, court may be "depriving the employees affected of their seniority,
welfare and pension rights, as well as other valuable benefits which are incapable of forming the basis of a provable claim
for money damages" (quoting In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, 238 F. Supp. 359, 361-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1965))). For an
example of a district court applying this requirement in balancing the equities, see In re Parrot Packing Co., 42 Bankr.
323, 333 (N.D. Ind. 1983).
The loss of intangible, nonmonetary contract rights could be avoided if the courts had the power to grant only partial
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, leaving intact those portions containing the noneconomic items. See supra
note 206 (discussion of noneconomic items). Although partial rejection has been suggested as a preferable approach to
collective bargaining agreements, the courts have generally found that it is not permitted by bankruptcy law. For the
suggestion that partial rejection would be appropriate for collective bargaining agreements in order to preserve the less
costly but important aspects of labor contracts, see Note, The Bankruptcy Law's Effect on Collective Bargaining
Agreements, 81 CoLumt. L. REv. 391, 403-04 (1981). For court opinions refusing to grant partial rejection, see, e.g., In
re Braniff Airways, 25 Bankr. 216, 217-18 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982); In re David A. Rosow Inc., 9 Bankr. 190, 193
n.5 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981). At least one bankruptcy court, however, has granted rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement, while ordering the debtor to maintain in effect all provisions of the contract except wages and salaries. In In
re San Jose Unified School Dist., No. 583-02387-A (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1983) (order granting rejection of two
collective bargaining agreements), the court granted rejection on the following two conditions: (1) all terms and conditions
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rights may be lost if employees are required to work for any length of time without
any collective bargaining agreement in effect. Although the debtor is obligated to
bargain for a new contract once rejection is granted, it will be difficult to predict
whether bargaining will be successful in producing a new contract.
Finally, in examining the impact of rejection on employees, the courts have
suggested that one factor to be examined is a comparison of the relative financial
position of the employees involved with that of other employees working in the same
industry. Presumably, if the employees involved are relatively well paid, the degree
of hardship they may suffer through a wage reduction will be less. Comparatively
high wages in the industry may imply the company's competitive position has
suffered from its high labor costs, and rejection will be more important for successful
reorganization than if the debtor's wage costs had been relatively low.
In contrast to evaluating the impact on employees, the Supreme Court has also
suggested that the bankruptcy court consider "the reduced value of the creditors'
claims that would follow from affirmance. "326 This factor does not need to be
evaluated, as it will always weigh in favor of rejection. If the debtor continues to pay
employees at a higher contract rate, the debtor will have less money to pay other
creditors.
The entire rejection controversy ultimately is reduced to who is going to receive
whatever money the debtor's assets or business generates. On the one hand, the other
creditors argue that maintenance of the contract wage and benefit rates results in a
preference being granted to employee or union creditors at the expense of other
creditors. On the other hand, employees and unions argue that their entire livelihood
depends on their employment with the debtor and they should not be asked to reduce
their standard of living unless similar sacrifices will be made by the debtor and all
other creditors. Because it is impossible to determine the actual sacrifices made by
trade creditors, except in terms of the percentage of payment the claims receive, any
court's evaluation of the comparative impact of rejection on people's lives will
remain largely hypothetical.
Under the 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, the court should approve
an application for rejection if the court finds that the balance of equities clearly favors
rejection. By relying on Bildisco as the basis of the balancing standard, Congress, by
implication, has endorsed the factors listed above, which have been previously used
by the courts of appeal and were approved by Bildisco, in carrying out this balancing
process.
of the rejected contracts, other than wages and salaries, "shall remain in effect until . .. the rejection agreements would
have expired by their terms" unless the parties earlier agree on new terms and conditions; and (2) the school district shall
pay employees at the 1981-82 salary schedules set forth in the rejected agreements for the period the contracts would have
remained in effect, unless a new salary schedule is agreed on in the meantime.
The loss of nonnonetary rights could also be avoided if rejection were conditioned on the negotiation by the parties
of a new collective bargaining agreement and its inclusion in the debtor's Chapter 11 reorganization plan.
326. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984).
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D. Court-Ordered Interim Changes Under Section 1113
The major thrust of section 1113 is to provide a framework for the negotiation
of contract modifications in order to avoid rejection if possible. In addition, section
1113 overruled the second half of Bildisco by prohibiting the employer from
terminating the contract unilaterally on filing bankruptcy. In drafting the compromise
version of section 1113, however, the conference committee had to find a way to
meet the objections of those who felt the debtor needed some freedom to make
immediate changes on filing bankruptcy. Otherwise, the possibility of a successful
reorganization might be jeopardized by the two-to-three-week time period required
before a rejection application could be heard. Accordingly, a subsection was added
to section 1113 authorizing the court to approve interim changes if they are essential
to the continuation of the business. Subsection (e) of section 1113 provides:
If during a period when the collective bargaining agreement continues in effect, and if
essential to the continuation of the debtor's business, or in order to avoid irreparable
damage to the estate, the court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the trustee to
implement interim changes in the terms, conditions, wages, benefits, or work rules
provided by a collective bargaining agreement. Any hearing under this paragraph shall be
scheduled in accordance with the needs of the trustee. The implementation of such interim
changes shall not render the application for rejection moot.327
This provision was designed to provide relatively quick relief for that debtor who
would otherwise be forced into liquidation.328
The language of this subsection is ambiguous with respect to the exact time at
which a request for interim changes may be filed and such changes authorized. The
statute specifies that the court may authorize the changes "during a period when the
collective bargaining agreement continues in effect." Although it further provides
that implementation of any interim changes "shall not render the application for
rejection moot," it does not specifically require that changes be sought only in
conjunction with a rejection application. Two members of the conference committee,
however, expressed their understanding that the request for interim changes may be
made only if the debtor has filed for rejection:
The House conferees accepted subsection (e) permitting the court to authorize interim
changes in the collective bargaining agreement on the understanding: that, as the final
sentence of the subsection makes clear, a motion for such interim relief may only be made
in conjunction with an application for rejection and any authorization shall be effective
only for the period for considering and ruling on the application stated in subsection
(d).329
327. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(e) (West Supp. 1985).
328. 130 CoNG. Rwc. S8888 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Thurmond).
An earlier version of this emergency procedure was sponsored by the National Bankruptcy Conference and
introduced in the Senate. 130 CONG. REc. S6126 (daily ed. May 21, 1984). It was deleted prior to the legislation's being
sent to the conference committee, but served as the basis for the eventual compromise which emerged from conference.
The National Bankruptcy Conference draft was identical to the provision adopted except that it did not include the term
"interim" and did not contain the last sentence of § 1113(e). In addition, a phrase referring to the continuation of
necessary services by a municipality was deleted from the final language. Id.
329. 130 Coxo. REc. S8899, H7496 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Rep. Hughes and Rep. Morrison on
H.R. 5174).
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This interpretation, however, may conflict with the provision's emergency
nature and the debtor's possible need for immediate relief. Because an application for
rejection cannot be filed immediately upon filing for bankruptcy, but only after the
debtor has made its proposal to the union under section 1113(b), interim changes, if
essential to continue the business, may be needed before a request for rejection has
been filed. 330 Futhermore, if the parties bargain successfully on the debtor's proposal
and reach agreement on contract modifications, the debtor may never need to file for
rejection. Therefore, in some cases the authorization of interim changes may occur
prior to and in the absence of any rejection application.
As explained above, Congress intended the old contract to remain in effect until
rejection is approved. 331 Consequently, if one relies on the first phrase of section
1113(e), "during a period when the collective bargaining agreement continues in
effect," interim changes may be sought and authorized at any point after the
bankruptcy petition is filed. The power of the court to authorize such changes appears
to continue indefinitely until rejection is granted, if it is sought, or until the collective
bargaining agreement expires by its own terms.3 32
Once the court authorizes interim changes in the collective bargaining agree-
ment, these changes presumably remain in effect only as long as the contract remains
in effect. These changes are labeled "interim" indicating their temporary nature and
are described as changes "in the terms, conditions, wages, benefits, or work rules
provided by a collective bargaining agreement. '333 Because they are changes in the
contract, their life span is tied to that of the contract. This is reinforced by the final
sentence of section 1113(e): "The implementation of such interim changes shall not
render the application for rejection moot." Once rejection is granted or denied, the
interim changes presumably end. The courts have recognized the temporary nature of
these interim changes in the few reported cases decided under section 1113(e). 334
Another question which arises concerns the scope of any interim changes the
court may authorize. The legislative history includes a statement of two members of
the conference committee interpreting section 1113(e): "In deference to the overall
policy of the provision which is to encourage the parties to reach their own agreement
through collective bargaining, the court in framing any such relief may not go beyond
the proposal made by the trustee pursuant to subsection (b)(1)(A)."335 Under this
330. 130 Co.o. REc. S8891 (Sen. Hatch's remarks discussing the required bargaining process, describing the
emergency provision as allowing the business to petition for interim relief "at any time" during the required negotiations).
331. See supra text accompanying notes 171-76.
332. In one of the few reported cases construing § 1113(e), In re Salt Creek Freightways, 46 Bankr. 347 (Bankr.
D. Wyo. 1985), the union argued that interim changes could be authorized only during "the period following an
unsuccessful attempt at rejection." Id. at 350. This argument appears frivolous based on the last sentence of § 1113(e),
specifying that any interim changes will not make the rejection application moot. The court quickly dismissed the union's
argument, ruling that the statutory phrase "a period when the collective bargaining agreement continues in effect"
includes several time periods: the period between the bankruptcy filing and the filing of the rejection application, the
period between the rejection filing and the court's ruling on rejection, and any period following a court's denial of
rejection. Id. at 351.
333. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(e) (West Supp. 1985).
334. See, e.g., In re Russell Transfer, 48 Bankr. 241, 243, 244 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1985); In re Salt Creek
Freightways, 46 Bankr. 347, 351 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985); In re Wright Air Lines, 44 Bankr. 744, 746 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1984).
335. 130 Co.o. Rsc. S8899, H7496 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Rep. Hughes and Rep. Morrison).
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view, the scope of any interim changes may not be broader than the proposed changes
contained in the debtor's bargaining proposal made under section 1113(b). The
difficulty with actually measuring the scope of interim changes by the scope of the
debtor's proposed necessary modifications is that the debtor may not yet have
formulated its section 1113(b) proposal. If interim changes may be sought and
authorized at any time after filing bankruptcy, this may occur before and in the
absence of proposed modifications.
On the other hand, the phrase used in subsection (e), "if essential to the
continuation of the debtor's business," is certainly no broader than the language of
subsection (b), "necessary to permit reorganization." If anything, it may imply a
more limited scope for interim changes. Continuation of the business may be for a
shorter period of time and of a more temporary, emergency nature than a
reorganization. A temporary continuation of the business may be required for an
orderly liquidation, even though no reorganization is contemplated. Because a
successful reorganization may require more fundamental and longer-term changes in
operations than temporary ones pending liquidation, some modifications may be
deemed necessary under subsection (b) but not essential under (e). 336 Thus, the
language of subsection (e) may indicate a more limited scope for interim changes than
for contract modifications necessary for reorganization even if the section 1113(b)
bargaining proposal itself is ignored. 337
An additional question, related to the issue of what changes may be authorized,
is the question of what showing is necessary to justify the court's authorization of
these interim changes. Several members of the conference committee expressed their
opinion that the phrases "essential to the continuation" of the business and "in order
336. The bankruptcy court in In re Allied Delivery Sys., 49 Bankr. 700 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985), agreed that the
scope of interim changes is narrower than the scope of modifications deemed necessary under § 1113(b). The court
construed the term "necessary" as used in § 1113(b) as a less stringent standard than the term "essential" used in §
1113(e). The court felt that the word "necessary" had to be read as a term of lesser degree than "essential" in order to
permit some bargaining give and take over the debtor's proposed modifications. Otherwise, if the debtor agreed to any
terms other than those contained in its initial proposal, it would be admitting the initial modifications were not, in fact,
necessary to the reorganization of its business. The court's difficulty in making sense out of the synonymous, yet varied,
terms used in § 1113 is in large part due to the court's attempt to create a meaningful good faith bargaining requirement
out of § 1113's strange bargaining procedure. See supra notes 244-92 and accompanying text.
The terms "necessary" and "essential" are synonymous when not considered as a part of the phrases in which they
are used. The word "necessary" used in § 1113(b) is defined as meaning "absolutely required" or "essential." G & C
Moauumt Co., WEssmER's Timo New INra NAToNAL Dicno'vR 1510-11 (1981). Similarly, the word "essential" is defined
in part by use of the synonyms "necessary" and "indispensable." Id. at 777.
337. Congress included two phrases in § 1113(e) describing under what circumstances interim changes may be
authorized: (1) "if essential to the continuation of the debtor's business" or (2) "in order to avoid irreparable damage to
the estate." There is little clue in the legislative history to what the second phrase adds to the requirements of the section.
It is difficult to imagine what kind of immediate relief might be needed to avoid irreparable damage to the estate that would
not also be essential to the continuation of the business. The "avoid irreparable damage" phrase was part of the National
Bankruptcy Conference's proposed legislation and was included unchanged in the final bill. Senator Thurmond's remarks
when introducing the NBC's draft indicate that this language simply reinforces the emergency nature of the interim change
provision:
There remains the possibility that during the [period the contract remains in effect] the debtor may find himself
in need of emergency relief in order to continue his business operations. The NBC provisions address this
contingency by providing that the court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the trustee to make changes
in the agreement if essential to the continuation of the debtor's business or to avoid irreparable damage to the
estate.
130 CoNo. REc. S6084 (daily ed. May 21, 1984).
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to avoid irreparable damage to the estate" incorporate the standard for rejection found
in REA Express: interim changes should be allowed only if the debtor's business
would otherwise collapse. 338 At least one bankruptcy court has agreed, ruling that
under the REA Express standard "a debtor seeking interim relief must show a more
immediate level of economic emergency than it would need to show as support for an
application for rejection.' ' 339 The more stringent standard of REA Express, as
compared to the "balancing of the equities" standard, seems appropriate in light of
the purpose behind section 1113(e). All members of the conference committee who
spoke on the floor of Congress described section 1113(e) as an emergency relief
provision only, and Senator Packwood expressed the hope that "these emergency
relief provisions will have only limited and secondary consequences and applica-
tion." 340
The few reported cases under section 1113(e) indicate that the bankruptcy courts
are taking their task seriously and requiring debtors to present meaningful evidence
that interim relief really is essential to the continuation of the business before it will
be approved. InIn re Wright Air Lines,341 the debtor-in-possession must have thought
its application for interim relief was largely pro forma and would be granted
automatically because it presented what the court characterized as "largely incom-
plete" financial information with no reliable projections of income and expenses over
the next two months. 342 The debtor was seeking modification of the collective
bargaining agreement to save approximately $71,000 of pilot training expenses per
month, while the airline admitted its overall monthly loss was approximately
$800,000. The court found that though the cost of pilot training may be burdensome
and uneconomical, the debtor did not show that this relatively minor relief, less than
ten percent of each monthly loss, was essential to permit the company to continue
operations. Consequently, the court ruled that the debtor did not meet its relatively
heavy burden of proof under section 11 13(e). 343 The court's denial of interim relief
appeared to be a preliminary indication of its inclination to deny rejection of the
collective bargaining agreement, not because rejection of the collective bargaining
agreement would not be vital to the company's successful rehabilitation, but because
successful rehabilitation appeared impossible even with rejection.
338. 130 CoNo. REc. H7496 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (remarks of Rep. Morrison); id. at 58898 (remarks of Sen.
Packwood). Rep. Lungren, however, remarked that although he would agree the standard for emergency relief is
extremely narrow, "whether or not it is precisely the REA standard... is open to question." Id. at H7496. On the other
hand, Gibson states that the legislative history of § 1113 "makes it plain" that a court should apply the REA Express test.
Gibson, supra note 190 at 333 and n.31.
339. In re Salt Creek Freightways, 46 Bankr. 347, 350 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).
340. 130 CoNG. REc. S8898 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
341. 44 Bankr. 744 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984).
342. The debtor's chief witness admitted the financial figures were based on assumptions which were not valid for
purposes of making financial projections. Id. at 745.
343. Id. at 745-46. The court further pointed out that the debtor failed to address a major problem resulting from
the temporary nature of the requested relief. The employer was asking the court to authorize it to suspend the seniority
provisions of the contract so it could recall pilots without regard to contract seniority. If the debtor's pending rejection
application was eventually denied and the collective bargaining agreement's term reinstated, any pilots recalled out of
seniority order would have to be laid off and those pilots with the greater contract seniority recalled. The court
commented, "Thus, any training program in which they were involved would appear to be left, so to speak, in mid-air."
Id. at 746.
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In a second reported case decided under section 1113(e), In re Salt Creek
Freightways, the court, after adopting the REA Express standard for authorizing
interim relief, ruled for the company and granted interim relief over the union's
objections. 344 In this case, it was the union that failed to produce evidence. The
debtor presented a prima facie case for interim relief and the union failed to offer any
evidence that the debtor could stay in business without the proposed interim
changes. 345 It is interesting to note that the debtor requested interim relief even
though it had not yet filed for rejection of the collective bargaining agreement. The
debtor, however, had already submitted its proposal of necessary modifications to the
union and bargaining was underway. 346 The court granted interim relief, reducing
wages and fringe benefits, but specified that the interim relief was temporary, in
effect only until either the contract expired in two months or a new collective
bargaining agreement was negotiated, whichever occurred first.347
In a third reported decision, In re Russell Transfer,348 the bankruptcy court
compromised by granting the debtor the interim relief requested, a twenty percent
reduction in union employees' wages and benefits, but at the same time ordered a ten
percent reduction in nonunion administrative employees' wages to meet the union's
argument that the unionized employees should not bear more than their share of the
reductions required. 349 The court again emphasized the temporary nature of the
interim relief, describing it as "an emergency stopgap measure" to give the parties
time to resolve their differences through negotiation, and specified that the order was
effective for only ninety days.350
Thus, under the 1984 amendments, the collective bargaining agreement remains
in effect on filing bankruptcy, but the court may authorize interim changes of a
temporary and emergency nature. The effect of section 1113(e), allowing the
bankruptcy court to authorize changes in the collective bargaining agreement, is to
insulate the employer from any unfair labor practice charges under the NLRA for
unilaterally modifying the contract without the union's consent in violation of section
8(d). Congress obviously intended section 1113(e) to take precedence over section
8(d) of the NLRA. Because these changes are made per court order in bankruptcy
proceedings, the employer has not committed a violation of the NLRA. On the other
hand, the employer has not been given a free rein to make whatever changes it wants
as in Bildisco, but the changes are limited in scope and subject to court scrutiny.
Furthermore, with the notice and hearing requirements, the union has been assured a
chance to be heard and to have its position considered prior to court approval of any
requested changes.
344. 46 Bankr. 347, 349-51 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).
345. The union unsuccessfully relied on its strange argument that interim relief could be granted only after a petition
for rejection of the contract had been denied. See supra note 331.
346. 46 Bankr. 347, 348 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).
347. Id. at 351.
348. 48 Bankr. 241 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1985).
349. Id. at 244. For criticism of this compromise as beyond the power of the court, see In re Carey Trasp., 50
Bankr. 203, 210 n.4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
350. 48 Bankr. 241, 243, 244 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1985).
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In spite of any interim changes, the underlying collective bargaining agreement
remains in effect and the employees and the union should be able to file claims in
bankruptcy based on breach of contract for any wages or benefits the employees may
have lost by virtue of the interim changes. These changes constitute a breach of
contract just as rejection results in a breach. The priority of these contract claims will
be dependent on their nature. 35'
If interim changes are authorized but no application for rejection is ever filed, a
situation not contemplated by Congress, the changes will apparently continue until
the underlying contract expires. If a rejection petition is filed but rejection is denied,
then the changes end and the contract terms once again control the parties'
relationship. If rejection is granted, however, the statute provides no guidance on
what happens to these interim changes. In fact, all of section 1113's provisions, not
just section 1113(e), end with a ruling on rejection. There is no language in the statute
describing what happens next. Presumably, relevant labor law obligations will
control the parties' conduct after the provisions of section 1113 have been satisfied.
The next section examines these obligations first in the context of the denial of
rejection and then with relation to the approval of rejection.
E. The Impact of Rejection on the Debtor's Labor Law Obligations
1. When Rejection is Denied
If the bankruptcy court denies the debtor's rejection application, the collective
bargaining agreement continues in effect. It may either be assumed by the debtor,
352
or it may simply "ride through" the bankruptcy proceedings and emerge unaffected
if it has not already expired by its own terms. 353 Denial of rejection does not
automatically result in assumption of the collective bargaining agreement. 354 Al-
though section 1113 purports to govern both rejection and assumption of collective
bargaining agreements, 355 it contains no further provisions on assumption. Conse-
quently, assumption of a collective bargaining agreement apparently continues to be
subject to the provisions of section 365. Under section 365, a contract may not be
assumed unless the debtor promptly cures any breach of the contract and provides
351. If the claims are for wages and other forms of compensation such as fringe benefits earned after the bankruptcy
was filed, the employees' claims are entitled to first priority as administrative expenses, regardless of acceptance or
rejection, based on the reasonable value of their services. See supra notes 57-58. Before any interim changes in wages
or benefits are authorized, the collective bargaining agreement presumably sets the reasonable rate of pay. Once the court
authorizes interim changes in wage or benefit rates, it may or may not continue to regard the contract rate as the reasonable
value of the employees' services. More likely, it will regard its order authorizing the interim changes as an express
direction to the debtor to conduct its business on specific terms per the court's power under § 1107 of the Bankruptcy Code
to authorize a debtor to continue its business on whatever terms the court sets. Thus, any further administrative expense
claims will be limited to the amount of any wages and benefits earned at the lower authorized rates.
352. See supra note 55.
353. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 160-464 and accompanying text. Although Justice Rehnquist seemed to imply in Bildisco that,
if a contract is not rejected, it is assumed, this clearly is not the case under § 365.
355. Section 1113(a) begins: "The debtor in possession . . . may assume or reject a collective bargaining
agreement only in accordance with the provisions of this section." 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(a) (WestSupp. 1985) (emphasis
added).
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adequate assurance of future performance under the contract. 356 The court must
approve any assumption of the collective bargaining agreement. 35 7 If a debtor has
been seeking to reject its collective bargaining agreement, it is unlikely it will be
willing to assume it. Furthermore, if the debtor has been in breach of the contract
either before or after filing bankruptcy, it may not be able to assume it because of its
inability to cure its breach. Finally, there is no incentive for the debtor to assume the
contract, because the only effect of assumption will be to foreclose a later attempt at
rejection if circumstances change.
No provisions in section 1113 limit the debtor to one application for rejection.
Under section 365, a contract may be assumed or rejected at any time before
confirmation of a reorganization plan.358 Because section 1113 makes no provision in
this regard, section 365 presumably would continue to set the limits on when
assumption or rejection may occur. Accordingly, the debtor may petition a second
time for rejection, as long as no reorganization plan has been confirmed. The debtor
would be required again to go through all the steps set forth in section 1113 as
prerequisites to rejection.
As long as the contract has not been rejected, it continues in effect. The contract
rates will continue to set the rates for the valuation of any claims filed in bankruptcy,
whether they are administrative expense claims or lower priority claims. On the other
hand, the union will continue to be bound by the contract and by any agreement,
express or implied, not to strike during its term. If disputes arise during the remaining
term of the contract, they may be adjudicated under its grievance and arbitration
provisions, with any final arbitration award enforced by the bankruptcy court or
through the bankruptcy claims procedure. 359
Presumably, the NLRB will continue to be deprived of its jurisdiction under
section 8(d) to prevent any court-authorized unilateral modifications of the contract
during its remaining term. If rejection is denied, but the employer tries to make any
unilateral changes without seeking bankruptcy court approval under section 1113(e),
it is an open question whether the union could file an unfair labor practice charge
under the NLRA or whether the union's recourse would be to return to the bankruptcy
court to hold the employer in contempt of the court's order denying rejection. The
union may also file additional claims in bankruptcy for any new breaches of the
contract's terms. If it was Congress' intent to have section 1113 take precedence over
section 8(d), the jurisdiction of the NLRA may be suspended as long as the debtor
continues to have the opportunity to seek rejection of the contract under section 1113
(i.e., until a reorganization plan is confirmed).
If the contract expires by its own terms during bankruptcy, rejection of the
contract will no longer be possible. The collective bargaining agreement will no
longer be an executory contract subject to rejection. 360 At this point, any suspension
356. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a), (b) (1982).
357. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (a) (1982).
358. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (1982).
359. See Berger, supra note 154.
360. See supra note 54.
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by section 1113 of the NLRA's duty to enforce section 8(d) against the debtor will
end. If no collective bargaining agreement is in effect between the parties, the parties
will once more be subject to the normal labor law obligation to bargain for a new
contract. If they bargain to impasse without reaching agreement, the debtor may then
implement any changes in terms and conditions of employment consistent with its last
offer to the union. 36' On the other hand, the employees will be free to strike because
they will no longer be bound by the contract's no-strike clause. 362 Several rejection
applications, hearings, and court decisions could have been avoided if the bankruptcy
courts were aware that once a contract expires, an employer may make unilateral
changes in employment conditions as long as it first exhausts its duty to bargain in
good faith with the union by bargaining to impasse. 363
2. When Rejection is Granted
Let us now assume that the bankruptcy court grants rejection of the collective
bargaining agreement. What happens next? More specifically, may the employer
change the terms and conditions of employment upon rejection of the contract? If so,
may the employer make whatever changes it desires, or is it limited to those changes
contained in its proposal of necessary modifications under section 1113? Congress
did not answer these questions in section 1113, but the implications contained in its
limits on unilateral changes suggest that the employer may make unilateral changes
only in conformity with its duty to bargain in good faith for a new contract.
Approval of rejection of a collective bargaining agreement results in termination
of the contract. The collective bargaining agreement ends and is no longer
enforceable or in effect; there is now no collective bargaining agreement between the
361. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
362. See supra note 66. In addition to the requirement of good faith bargaining, § 8(d) of the NLRA also requires
that the employer give the union sixty days notice prior to changing any terms and conditions of employment as they
existed under the expired contract, or prior to any lockout. The union must also give sixty days notice to the employer
before striking. In addition, both parties are required to give notice to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service of
the existence of a labor dispute within thirty days of the above sixty day notice. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). See text of
§ 8(d), supra note 48, These provisions apply whenever a collective bargaining agreement is in effect between the parties.
Their purpose is to give the parties a cooling-off period in which to negotiate a subsequent agreement free from strikes
or lockouts and with the possible assistance of mediation. Because the contract under this scenario is expiring by its own
terms and is not being terminated by rejection, these § 8(d) cooling-off procedures would apply to the expiration of the
old contract and the subsequent negotiation of a new one.
363. See, e.g., In re Salt Creek Freightways, 47 Bankr. 835 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985); In re Allied Delivery Sys.,
49 Bankr. 700 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985). In Salt Creek Freighways, the motion to reject was filed on March 1 and
granted on March 28, three days before the collective bargaining agreement was due to expire. 47 Bankr. 835, 837, 842.
In Allied Delivery System, rejection was requested on February 7 and granted on March 21, ten days before the contract
would have expired. 49 Bankr. 700, 701, 704. In these cases rejection was not necessary to allow the employers to change
working conditions. Normally, notice under § 8(d) is given and bargaining in earnest begins several weeks before a
collective bargaining agreement expires so that either a new contract will have been negotiated or impasse will have been
reached by the contract's expiration date. If normal bargaining had taken place in these cases, the debtor would have been
in a position to implement its last offer and reduce wages and benefits upon expiration of the contract without seeking
rejection.
See also In re K & B Mounting, Inc., 50 Bankr. 460 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985). In K & B Mounting, there had been
no signed contract between the employer and union for three years prior to the motion to reject. Since the employer had
withdrawn from a multi-employer bargaining unit in 1982, there had been no written collective bargaining agreement in
effect between the parties. The employer, however, had been voluntarily abiding by the terms of the multi-employer
bargaining unit's current contract. Without any discussion of whether there was an executory contract in effect, the court
denied the employer's application to reject the unsigned but honored contract. Id. at 462, 468.
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parties. As discussed above, when a collective bargaining agreement expires, the
employer may make unilateral changes in the prevailing status quo, but only after it
has bargained to impasse with the union. Any changes must be consistent with its last
offer to the union. 364
Because section 1113 contains no provision dealing with the postrejection
period, we may assume the parties are subject, once again, to the provisions and
obligations of the NLRA. 365 Indeed, the Supreme Court in Bildisco was eager to
reassure the parties that the debtor was an employer under the NLRA and was bound
by the duty to bargain in good faith for a new collective bargaining agreement.3 66 The
Court, however, did not have to address the issue whether the employer could
immediately change terms and conditions of employment upon rejection because it
held that the employer could do so immediately on filing bankruptcy. Congress
reversed this holding of Bildisco, but did not directly regulate what happens after
rejection. It did provide for court authorization of interim changes, pending rejection,
and allowed the employer to terminate or modify the contract in the event the
bankruptcy court did not rule on rejection within thirty days of the hearing. Again,
however, this right of the employer to terminate or modify the contract ends with an
eventual court ruling on rejection. 367 Once the contract is terminated by rejection,
there is no contract to modify. Without any express direction from Congress, we are
left with the task of structuring the relationship between the debtor and its union in
364. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
365. when an employer files a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, that filing does not relieve the employer from
meeting its continuing legal obligations under federal and state law. United States v. Nixon, 235 U.S. 231 (1914); Cullen
v. Bowles, 148 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1945). The Bankruptcy and Judiciary Codes together make it clear that a
debtor-in-possession must obey the law except where a statute or court specifically alters the debtor's legal duties. Section
959(a) of the Judiciary Code states that "[trustees . . .of any property, including debtors in possession, may be
sued ... with respect to any of their acts or transactions in carrying on business connected with such property" subject
to the Bankruptcy Court's discretionary equitable powers. 28 U.S.C. § 959(a) (1982). In addition, § 959(b) states:
"[A] debtor in possession ... shall manage and operate the property in his possession . . . according to
the requirements of the valid laws of the State . in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof
would be bound to do if in possession thereof.
28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1982). The continuing obligation of the employer as debtor-in-possession to conduct its business in
accord with federal law has been affi-ned in a variety of cases. See, e.g., Otte v. United States, 419 U.S. 43 (1974) (the
Internal Revenue Code); United States v. Nixon, 235 U.S. 231 (1914) (livestock quarantine restrictions); Cullen v.
Bowles, 148 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1945) (wartime price controls); In re Northern Boneless Meat Corp., 9 Bankr. 27
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (the Packers and Stockyards Act); In re Canarico Quarries, 466 F. Supp. 1333 (D.P.R. 1979) (permit
requirements and air pollution standards); Brennan v. T & T Trucking, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 615 (N.D. Okla. 1975)
(overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
Debtors have sought protection from various legal obligations under the automatic-stay provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362, but the automatic stay protects the debtor only from suits or administrative proceedings arising
out of the debtor's prepetition conduct. Section 362(a)(1) automatically stays "the commencement or
continuation ... of ... proceedings against the debtor that were or could have been commenced before the
commencement of the case under this title." 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1982). Even then, this automatic stay protection does
not extend to actions by a governmental agency to enforce its police or regulatory power, which are expressly exempted:
".The filing of a petition . . .does not operate as a stay-. . . under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the
commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's
police or regulatory power." 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1982). This exemption, allowing governmental entities to continue
to prosecute a debtor-in-possession for prepetition violations, reinforces the proposition that filing a bankruptcy petition
does not relieve an employer from its obligation to conduct its business in accordance with state or federal law.
366. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 534 (1984). See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
367. Section 1113(d)(2) provides: "[T]he trustee may terminate or alter any provisions of the collective bargaining
agreementpending the ruling of the court on such [rejection] application." 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(d)(2) (West Supp. 1985)
(emphasis added).
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a manner consistent with both bankruptcy and labor law. Several scenarios are
possible.
a. If Interim Changes Have Been Authorized
If the debtor has requested and the court has approved interim changes under
section 1113(e), these interim changes, along with the unilateral provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement, constitute a new, albeit temporary, status quo in the
terms and conditions of employment. If these interim changes could be regarded as
establishing a new and continuing status quo under labor law, the employer would be
justified in maintaining this staus quo until a new contract is negotiated. A logical
way to reconcile the bankruptcy provisions with the NLRA would be to consider
these interim changes as creating such a new status quo, which must be maintained
until a new contract is negotiated or the parties have bargained to impasse. Under this
approach, the debtor would be prevented from making any additional changes in
terms and conditions of employment upon rejection, but would be justified in
continuing to abide by the interim court-authorized changes pending exhaustion of the
duty to bargain in good faith for a new contract.
This result is not mandated by the Bankruptcy Code. Section 1113(e) expressly
states that the bankruptcy court may authorize interim changes only "during a period
when the collective bargaining agreement continues in effect" and strongly implies
that such changes are temporary, until rejection is either granted or denied.368 If the
changes must end upon approval of rejection, however, the terms and conditions of
employment would revert back to those in effect under the now rejected contract.
Surely, Congress did not intend this to happen. It would be contrary to the purpose
behind section 1113(e) of giving the debtor the immediate flexibility needed to
continue its business so that a successful reorganization will remain a viable
alternative to liquidation. On the other hand, Congress did not give the debtor the
right to ignore its NLRA obligations and set whatever terms and conditions of
employment it likes upon approval of rejection.
In order to resolve this dilemma, defining interim changes as temporary until a
new collective bargaining agreement is negotiated by the parties has the advantage
under bankruptcy law of allowing the debtor to continue in effect those changes
which the court has already found to be "essential to the continuation of the
business." Under labor law, this result protects the union and the employees from
unrestrained unilateral action by the debtor, because it allows the debtor to continue
in effect only those changes previously reviewed and authorized by the court, a
neutral party in the labor dispute. 369 By expressly authorizing the changes to remain
368. "The implementation of such interim changes shall not render the application for rejection moot." 11
U.S.C.A. § 1113(e) (West Supp. 1985). Presumably, under these provisions, if rejection is denied after interim changes
are authorized, the interim changes would end and the terms of the old contract would become enforceable again. See In
re Wright Air Lines, 44 Bankr. 744 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984), and supra note 334 and accompanying text.
369. This is the result reached in In re Salt Creek Freightways, 46 Bankr. 347 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985), but without
any discussion of the meaning of the word "interim." No application to reject the contract was pending. The court
specified that the interim changes authorized by the court would remain in effect until the present contract expired "or
until a new collective bargaining agreement is negotiated with the Union, whichever first occurs." Id. at 351.
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in effect until a new contract is negotiated, even if rejection is approved, the
bankruptcy court will have established, by court order, a new status quo to serve as
the foundation from which to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement.
Regarding these changes as a part of the prevailing status quo when rejection is
granted will accommodate the bankruptcy goal of promoting a successful rehabilita-
tion, while also furthering the NLRA's goal of insuring good faith bargaining.
b. Where No Interim Changes Have Been Authorized
If no interim changes have been authorized, the status quo in effect when
rejection is granted consists of the terms and conditions of employment contained in
the now terminated contract. Under section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, the debtor is
obligated to bargain to impasse for a new contract before it may unilaterally
implement any changes in terms and conditions of employment. It may now become
significant whether the parties had bargained to impasse prior to rejection on the
debtor's proposed necessary modifications. If they did, and if the debtor's section
1113(b) proposal constitutes its proposal for a new contract, then upon rejection, the
NLRA would allow the debtor to implement immediately the changes contained in its
proposal. There is no reason to require the parties to bargain to impasse a second time
on the same proposed changes, simply because now the parties are bargaining for a
new contract, not bargaining on the section 1113(b) proposal to modify the old
contract. If the parties had not yet reached impasse, or if impasse has been broken by
a shift in bargaining positions, then further bargaining would be required before the
debtor may make unilateral changes. If the debtor wants to abandon its section
1113(b) proposal, and make a different offer as its proposal for a new contract, then
bargaining to impasse would be required on this new proposal. Any unilateral
changes made must be in accord with the debtor's final offer to the union.
Language in some bankruptcy court opinions seems to imply that approval of
rejection carries with it the authority for the debtor to immediately change conditions
of employment without any consideration of these bargaining obligations. In Salt
Creek Freightways, the court granted rejection of a collective bargaining agreement
that was to expire in three days so the debtor could presumably escape from labor
law's bargaining requirements:
It is clear from the evidence that the debtor will be forced into liquidation if it is not allowed
to implement all of its cost-cutting plans, including the reduction of wages and benefits
for its union personnel ....
Lastly, even though the agreement in question arguably expires March 31, 1985, it is not
clear, absent rejection, whether under the National Labor Relations Act the debtor may
make unilateral changes in a collective bargaining agreement, after the apparent
expiration of the contract.370
370. 47 Bankr. 835, 841-42 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985). The court erred in its approach, viewing the issue as a
question of making changes in a collective bargaining agreement. The contract will have expired, however, so the
employer will be making unilateral changes in the status quo, not in the contract.
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The court assumed that with rejection it is clear the employer may make
unilateral changes in the existing status quo. The court, however, cited no statutory
or other basis for this assumption. 371 Although the court was not explicit about what
unilateral changes the debtor may make, it seemed to assume the debtor may
implement only the cost-cutting plans contained in its proposal of necessary
modifications. Citing Bildisco, the court did reaffirm that, following approval of
rejection of the collective bargaining agreement, the status of the union as the
exclusive bargaining representative remains unchanged and "the debtor will continue
to have a duty to bargain in good faith towards achieving a new contract with the
Union.' '372
In a similar case, the court in Allied Delivery also assumed rejection of the
collective bargaining agreement gives the debtor the right to change working
conditions immediately:
The evidence herein clearly demonstrated that the financial drain on this debtor is
enormous. The cutting of labor costs is essential.... The debtor herein is in no position
to continue to pay salaries and benefits at the current level, much less to be subject to a
cost of living increase. 373
Again, as in Salt Creek, the collective bargaining agreement was going to expire
by its own terms only ten days after the court issued its opinion. The court recognized
that rejection would subject the debtor to the duty to bargain in good faith for a new
contract. The court was worried, however, about a provision of the soon-to-expire
contract which provided for a future cost-of-living wage increase to go into effect the
day after the contract expired. The court was of the opinion that without rejection the
debtor would be bound by the cost-of-living increase, whereas with rejection it would
not be. 374 The court's assumption was incorrect. Whether the contract is rejected or
not, failure to pay the cost-of-living increase would be a breach of contract resulting
in merely another monetary claim by the employees against the estate. Rejection
would simply prevent the claim from becoming a possible first priority administrative
expense, converting it to a lower priority prepetition claim.375
371. Indeed, from additional remarks of the court, it appears that the court's major concern, prompting it to grant
rejection of the contract three days before it expired, was to convert any employee claims for breach of the contract from
first priority administrative expense claims to third, fourth, or no priority unsecured claims for wages and benefits. Id.
at 842 n.2. The court tried to justify this by pointing to the fact that, even with rejection, the union employees will be
better off than the nonunion employees; the nonunion employees will not be able to assert any claims in bankruptcy
because they are not working under an employment contract. It should be obvious, however, that this "advantage" of the
union employees to assert unsecured claims, with a lower or no priority, does not arise from the Bankruptcy Code but from
the fact the union employees organized in the first place.
372. Id. at 842.
373. In re Allied Delivery Sys., 49 Bankr. 700, 704 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
374. Id.
375. Even without rejection, the cost-of-living wage increase could serve as a basis for an administrative expense
claim, but only if it were considered a part of the reasonable value of the employees' services. This is unlikely.
The court's opinion seems to assume that without rejection the union could somehow obtain specific performance of
the cost-of-living wage increase provision in the contract, forcing the employer to actually pay the higher wage. It would
be impossible to obtain an injunction granting such specific performance, however, when legal damages constitute an
adequate remedy at law. Furthermore, the only court order a union is able to obtain to enforce a collective bargaining
agreement under § 301 is an injunction to compel arbitration, which would result in an arbitration award for back pay
equal to the cost-of-living increase enforceable only through the bankruptcy claims procedure.
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Finally, the court was eager to grant rejection because "the union was unable to
offer any assurances that a new agreeement between the union and the debtor could
be speedily reached once the existing contract does expire. "376 Obviously, neither the
debtor's attorney nor the union's attorney were able or willing to explain to the court
that the debtor did not have to wait for a new contract before it could unilaterally
change terms and conditions of employment. Once it bargained to impasse, it would
be free to implement whatever reductions in labor cost it desired, consistent with its
last offer to the union at the bargaining table.
In contrast to Salt Creek Freightways and Allied Delivery, the court in American
Provision explicitly recognized that the effect of rejection would be only to accelerate
the process of bargaining for a new contract. The contract then in effect expired in
approximately eight months. The court found that rejection would force both parties
to bargain now instead of eight months later. The court stated that "[i]f the debtor's
rejection of its collective bargaining agreement was approved, such rejection would
not affect the Union's status as the authorized representative of those employees nor
the debtor's obligation to bargain with the Union.' '3 77 In a footnote, the court
explained: "As a general principle, rejection of a collective bargaining agreement
does not affect the rights and responsibilities under the National Labor Relations
Act.' '3 78 The court denied rejection, forcing the debtor to wait until the contract
expired before it could legally change terms and conditions of employment.
Although the courts have agreed that once rejection occurs, the debtor employer
is bound by the bargaining obligations of section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, no court has
explored the ramifications of this postrejection bargaining obligation. Furthermore,
the federal appellate courts, prior to the enactment of the new bankruptcy provisions,
had been allowing debtors to make unilateral changes in terms and conditions of
employment upon rejection beginning with the case of REA Express under the "new
entity" successor employer theory. 379 The Supreme Court in Bildisco, however,
overruled the "new entity" theory which had previously justified the employer's
escape from the prohibitions of the Railway Labor Act or the NLRA against unilateral
changes. Congress, in turn, overruled the Supreme Court, rejecting the Court's
rationale for allowing such changes (that the Bankruptcy Code itself modified the
contract and that therefore sections 8(d) and 8(a)(5) did not apply). Consequently,
neither the "new entity" successor employer theory of Kevin Steel and REA Express,
nor the debtor's inherent power under the Bankruptcy Code per Bildisco, can serve
any longer as a basis for allowing the debtor to make unilateral changes as soon as
the contract is terminated by rejection.
More importantly, the enactment of section 1113 has removed any justification
for allowing a debtor to make unilateral changes upon rejection without first
bargaining to impasse. Unilateral action is no longer necessary on the grounds that the
376. 49 Bankr. 700, 704 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
377. In re American Provision Co., 44 Bankr. 907, 910-11 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
378. Id. at 911 n.8, citing Briggs Trans. Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 40 Bankr. 972 (D. Minn.), affd,
739 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1984).
379. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
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debtor could not otherwise make necessary changes quickly enough to keep
financially afloat. Until Bildisco, many unions refused to negotiate any changes in
their contracts because they continued to maintain that the contract was immune from
modification or rejection under section 8(d). Since rejection of the contract is now
clearly possible, unions have no incentive to avoid prompt and serious negotiations.
Moreover, the duty to bargain under the NLRA is now incorporated in the
Bankruptcy Code by section 1113's obligations "to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith," at least with regard to necessary modifications. Consequently,
by complying with the requirements of section 1113, the debtor has already
substantially completed the bargaining process required by the NLRA on those
changes contained in its section 1113(b) proposal.
Furthermore, Congress has now provided in section 1113(e) a means by which
any immediate changes needed to keep the business going may be made under court
supervision. As long as these interim changes are allowed to continue into the
postrejection period, the debtor will have no need to violate the NLRA in order to
pursue the bankruptcy goal of successful rehabilitation. If such emergency interim
changes are not sought by the debtor, or are not authorized by the court, the debtor
should not be allowed to avoid section 1113(e) and make unilateral changes after
rejection, except in conformity with the NLRA.
The situation confronting employers covered by the Railway Labor Act (RLA),
not the NLRA, is more complicated. 380 The result, however, should be the same.
Under the RLA the duty to bargain which attaches on termination of the old contract
includes several steps and is deliberately structured to extend over a substantial period
of time. 381 Because of section 1113(e)'s provision for interim changes, however,
380. This discussion is applicable only to those employers covered by the RLA who are not railroad employers.
Contracts covering railroad employees may not be rejected because of the provisions of § 1167 of the Bankruptcy Code.
See supra note 61. The prime example of a nonrailroad employer covered by the RLA is an airline company.
In the RLA, employers are referred to as "carriers." The Act defines "carriers" as follows:
The term "carrier" includes any express company, sleeping-car company, carrier by railroad . and any
company which is directly or indirectly owned or controlled by or under common control with any carrier by
railroad and which operates any equipment or facilities or performs any service (other than trucking service) in
connection with the transportation, receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer in transit, refrigeration or icing, storage,
and handling of property transported by railroad, and any receiver, trustee, or other individual or body, judicial
or otherwise, when in possession of the business of any such "carrier": Provided, however, that the term
"carrier" shall not include any street, interurban, or suburban electric railway, unless such railway is operating
as a part of a general steam-railroad system of transportation, but shall not exclude any part of the general
steam-railroad system of transportation now or hereafter operated by any other motive power.... The term
"carrier" shall not include any company by reason of its being engaged in the mining of coal, the supplying
of coal to a carrier where delivery is not beyond the mine tipple, and the operation of equipment or facilities
therefor, or in any of such activities.
45 U.S.C. § 151(1) (1982). In 1936 the Act was amended to include airlines. See Act of April 10, 1936, Pub. L. No.
74-487, § 201, 49 Stat. 1189. Section 181 provides in pertinent part:
All of the provisions of subchapter I of this chapter . . . are extended to and shall cover every common carrier
by air engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, and every carrier by air transporting mail for or under contract
with the United States Government, and every air pilot or other person who performs any work as an employee
or subordinate official of such carrier or carriers, subject to its or their continuing authority to supervise and
direct the manner of rendition of his service.
45 U.S.C. § 181 (1982).
381. See supra notes 109-10. Per H8 1113 and 1167 of the Bankruptcy Code, this extenuated bargaining procedure
continues to apply to railroad employers. See supra note 61. The RLA remains an absolute barrier to any unilateral
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there is no reason to treat these employers any differently after rejection than
employers covered by the NLRA. These debtors have the option of requesting
immediate interim changes essential for the continuation of their business under
section 1113(e), and this right to seek interim changes continues as long as the
contract remains in effect. If the bankruptcy court terminates the contract by approval
of rejection, then under the language of section 1113(e), the debtor's right to request
interim changes expires. If the debtor has not sought changes prior to rejection, one
may safely conclude that no changes in the terms and conditions of employment, as
set by the now terminated contract, were essential to keep the business going. If the
debtor sought and the court approved interim changes, the changes should remain in
effect during the negotiations over a new contract. Therefore, the debtor should be
required to complete even the more extenuated bargaining process required by the
RLA before it may make unilateral changes.
This conclusion-that no unilateral changes may be made after rejection without
bargaining to impasse-may put greater pressure on the debtor to seek interim
changes under section 1113(e). This result is preferable, however, to allowing the
debtor to wait, not seek interim changes, and then make unilateral changes after
rejection. It subjects any changes in the employees' working conditions to judicial
scrutiny and control. It also gives the union protection from arbitrary employer action
because it guarantees the union prior notice and a chance to be heard before any
changes are made.
In the alternative, if section 1113 is interpreted to allow the debtor to make
immediate changes upon the approval of rejection, without further bargaining, then
any changes should be limited to those contained in the debtor's final section 1113(b)
proposal. Congress did not intend to give the debtor a free hand to violate the labor
laws, but carefully circumscribed the debtor's options by requiring court supervision
over the bargaining and rejection process. The major purpose behind section 1113
was to impose a good faith bargaining requirement on the parties so that rejection
could be avoided, if at all possible, by agreement on those modifications in terms and
conditions of employment necessary for successful reorganization. A debtor will be
encouraged to take this prerejection bargaining process more seriously if the courts
prohibit or limit any changes it may make following rejection to those contained in
its section 1113(b) proposal. If the debtor could immediately implement any changes
it desired, it would have a greater incentive simply to go through the motions of
bargaining by appearing to bargain in good faith on necessary modification, while
waiting to make more drastic changes as soon as rejection is granted. The debtor, of
course, takes the risk that the court will find that it did not bargain in good faith, with
a resulting denial of rejection. The debtor will not even be tempted to take this risk,
however, if it is limited to its section 1113(b) proposal in making any immediate
changes if rejection is granted.
changes regarding the working conditions of railroad employees until all steps of the RLA bargaining and mediation
procedure are completed.
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As soon as rejection is granted, regardless whether the debtor is allowed to
implement any unilateral changes immediately, the union is free to call a strike. Once
the contract ends, the union is released from its no-strike promise. If the union strikes
and the parties' bargaining deadlock continues for any length of time, the bankruptcy
goal of successful reorganization becomes increasingly remote and the prospect of
liquidation more likely. The case of Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel provides a current
example of both sides risking liquidation rather than reaching agreement. 382 Thus, in
the final analysis, even if rejection is granted, reorganization will be successful only
if the parties are able to negotiate a new contract. To facilitate agreement in the place
of economic warfare, the bankruptcy and other federal courts must interpret and apply
section 1113 in such a way as to emphasize and reinforce the parties' duty to bargain
in good faith over modifications before rejection. Only if rejection is avoided
altogether will the risk of a strike and its consequences be eliminated.
F. The Jurisdiction of the NLRB to Enforce the Postrejection Duty to Bargain
The final issue to be resolved is which entity, the bankruptcy court, the NLRB,
or both, should have jurisdiction to enforce the obligation of the employer to bargain
to impasse prior to making unilateral changes after rejection. On the one hand, the
bankruptcy court has been intimately involved in the previous activities of the parties,
having scrutinized their actions carefully to determine if the equities clearly balance
in favor of rejection. If, as a part of the rejection process, the bankruptcy court has
found that the parties have bargained to impasse on the debtor's proposed modifica-
tions, there seems to be no reason not to allow the debtor to implement these proposed
changes immediately after rejection. If, however, the union wants to challenge the
employer's unilateral action or the finding of impasse, where does it go?
No statutory basis exists for the bankruptcy court to continue to enforce the
parties' bargaining obligation after rejection. Reading the Bankruptcy Code and the
NLRA together, one must conclude that primary jurisdiction to enforce this
continuing bargaining obligation lies with the NLRB, not the bankruptcy court. As
discussed above, a bankruptcy trustee and a debtor-in-possession are expressly
included in the definition of "employer" under the NLRA, 38 3 and the NLRB has
always had jurisdiction over any unfair labor practices which are committed by a
debtor-in-possession during the administration of the bankruptcy estate.3 84 In
addition, both the Supreme Court in Bildisco and various members of Congress have
cautioned against asking the bankruptcy courts to make any labor law determinations
382. Even though the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's approval of rejection in Wheeling-Pittsburgh
Steel, it urged the parties to reach agreement in order to avoid an almost certain liquidation. In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh
Steel Corp., 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2198, 2205 (,.D. Pa. 1985). The strike has even prompted a realignment of the
management of the company, with the largest shareholder taking over as chairman of the board, causing the chief
executive officer and two-thirds of the board members to resign. Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 1985, at 3, col. 2.
383. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text. The bankruptcy courts have been allowed to enjoin the NLRB
from pursuing actions against debtors-in-possession in only those rare cases where the regulatory enforcement has been
held "to threaten the assets of the estate." NLRB v. Superior Forwarding, Inc., 762 F.2d 695 (8th Cir. 1985); In re
Shippers Interstate Serv., 618 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Bel Aire Chateau Hosp., 611 F.2d 1248 (per curiam) (9th Cir.
1979).
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which are outside their area of expertise. 385 The justification that exists to allow the
bankruptcy courts to enforce the impasse requirement before rejection does not exist
postrejection. Although Congress specifically required the bankruptcy courts to
require debtors to meet and confer in good faith prior to rejection, Congress made no
provision in section 1113 for the bankruptcy courts to assist the parties in reaching
agreement on a new contract after rejection of the old one.
The proper procedure to follow to contest any unilateral changes made by the
employer after rejection, but before impasse, would be for the union to file unfair
labor practice charges with the NLRB for violation of section 8(a)(5). If the
bankruptcy court has already made a finding on impasse as a part of the rejection
procedure, the debtor could offer this finding as evidence during the NLRB
proceeding. The Board would be justified in according such a judicial finding
whatever weight seemed appropriate under the circumstances, much as the Board
defers to arbitration decisions implicating possibly unfair labor practice issues.3 86 If
the impasse issue actually was raised and decided during the rejection hearing, there
would be little reason for the NLRB to readjudicate the issue, unless intervening
events have cast doubt on the continued existence of the impasse. If, during the
bankruptcy proceeding, no evidence on impasse was offered or no question of
impasse decided, the NLRB would be free to make an original finding on whether or
not impasse had occurred prior to the debtor's imposition of unilateral changes in
working conditions.
Although the NLRB should have jurisdiction to determine whether the debtor
has violated the NLRA, any resulting unfair labor practice award would become a
claim on the bankruptcy estate to be presented and allowed as a claim in the
bankruptcy process. The NLRB may determine if an unfair labor practice has
occurred and may compute any resulting back pay award resulting from the difference
in wages and benefits actually paid by the debtor and those wages and benefits which
should have been paid pursuant to the status quo in effect when rejection was
granted. 387 The NLRB is not free, however, under the Bankruptcy Code to enforce
the resulting monetary judgment. Any monetary award must be enforced, if at all,
385. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 534 (1984). The majority commented:
Whether impasse has been reached generally is a judgment call for the Board to make; imposing such a
requirement as a condition precedent to rejection of the labor contract will simply divert the Bankruptcy Court
from its customary area of expertise into a field in which it presumably has little or none.
Id. at 534. Senator Thurmond remarked: "The . . . 'without good cause' [requirement] is obviously not intended
to . . . turn the bankruptcy courts into a version of the National Labor Relations Board." 130 CoNo. Rc. S8888 (daily
ed. June 29, 1984). See also the remarks of the bankruptcy court in In re C & W Mining Co., 38 Bankr. 496 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1984), in denying rejection of a collective bargaining agreement under Bildisco, not § 1113, because of the
bad faith and refusal to bargain by the debtor-
The court's discussion of bad faith, relates solely to the issue, under section 365(a) concerning C. & W.'s
motion to reject its contract with the Union. The court notes that, at the time the petition was filed, C. & W.
and the Union were parties to labor-related actions in the district court and before the National Labor Relations
Board. The court expresses no opinion on the merits of those actions. The court has tried to stay within the field
of its expertise and its decision is grounded solely in bankruptcy law.
Id. at 504.
386. See supra note 50.
387. See MoRuS, supra note 23, at 1665.
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through the bankruptcy claims procedure. 388 Assuming the bankruptcy court allows
the unfair labor practice award as a claim against the estate, it would normally be
given first priority as an expense of the administration of the estate because the debtor
committed the unfair labor practice during the administration period and the award
was attributable to services rendered during administration. 389
VII. CONCLUSION
Congress made a determined effort to resolve the conflicts between labor law
and bankruptcy in the enactment of section 1113. Only the passage of time, the
conduct of debtors and unions, and courts' interpretations of section 1113 will tell us
whether Congress was successful in setting up a procedure that works. The success
of section 1113 will be most evident if few cases are litigated under it. Its basic
purpose is to encourage negotiated settlements, not litigated rejections. It is hoped the
passage of section 1113 will reverse the trend begun by Kevin Steel and culminating
in Bildisco which resulted in a continual increase in the number of cases involving
rejection of collective bargaining agreements.
On the other hand, section 1113 does not answer all the questions raised by the
intersection of labor law and bankruptcy. It ends abruptly with the ruling on rejection.
It provides no guidance on what actions the debtor may take following rejection. To
fill this void, the parties and the courts must return to familiar labor law principles to
stabilize the debtor's labor relations. Only if both sides are certain of their options
will they share the same assumptions about what actions their adversary may take and
thus be able to make informed judgments on the risks they face. Uncertainty in labor
relations often leads to increased confrontation and hostility which impedes the
exchange of information and the negotiated settlement of disputes. Congress rejected
the Supreme Court's attempt to reconcile the legal conflicts by elevating bankruptcy
principles over labor law obligations. Now is the time to give affirmative consider-
ation to both the obligations and concepts of the NLRA, as well as bankruptcy
objectives, in order to resolve any remaining uncertainties regarding the relationship
between the debtor-in-possession and the union during bankruptcy.
388. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1982); Yorke v. NLRB, 709 F.2d 1138 (7th Cir. 1983).
389. Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968); Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25 (1952); Yorke v. NLRB, 709
F.2d 1138 (7th Cir. 1983); see supra note 106.

